FOUR

DIALOGUES

BETWEEN

Eubulus and *Phygellus*,

CONCERNING

Natural Religion.

~~L. 5. 25~~

Mm. 3. 21

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DIALOGUES

BETWEEN

EUBULUS and PHYGELLUS,

CONCERNING

Natural Religion,

VIZ.

I. Of the Exiſtence and Idea of God.

II. Of the Production of Creatures.

III. Of the Faculties of Human Nature.

IV. Of the Immortality of Human Nature in a Future State.

By a Divine of the Church of ENGLAND.

ECCLES. III. 21.

Who knoweth the Spirit of a Man that goeth upward, and the Spirit of the Beaſt that goeth downward to the Earth?

Mentem hominis, quamvis eam non videas, ut Deum non vides, tamen ut Deum agnoſcis ex operibus ejus; ſic ex memoria rerum & inventione, & celeritate motus, omnique pulchritudine virtutis, vim divinam mentis agnoſcito. [Cic. Tuſc. quæſt. L. 1. c. 29.

LONDON:
Printed for W. TAYLOR, at the *Ship in Pater-Noſter-Row.* MDCCXVII.

FOUR
DIALOGUES
BETWEEN
EUSEBIUS and PHILALETHES,
CONCERNING
Natural Religion.
VIZ.
I. Of the Existence and Unity of God.
II. Of the Providence of Creatures.
III. Of the Freedom of Human Actions.
IV. Of the Immortality of Human Souls.
In a Future State.

ECCLES. III. 21.
Who knoweth the spirit of the children of man that goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast that goeth downward to the earth?

LONDON:
Printed for J. TAYLOR, at the Ship in Ivy-Lane. MDCCXVII.

To His GRACE

THE

Duke of *Roxburgh, &c.*

Principal Secretary of STATE.

May it please Your GRACE,

TO impute the Imperfections of the following Papers; not to the want of an ardent Desire to publish a Work worthy of your Acceptance; but to my Inability of writing any Book which deserves it.

The Subject treated of in theſe Sheets is ſo ſublime in it ſelf, and of ſo much Conſequence and univerſal Concern; that if the Performance on my Part, did but in any tolerable Degree riſe up to the Dignity and Uſefulneſs of my Argument, I ſhould neither ſcruple to recommend it to your GRACE's Peruſal, nor dread the Detraction of cenſorious Readers.

To theſe I need not excuſe my ſelf; nor ſhall I beſpeak their Candor, becauſe no Writer can readily avoid their Reflections. But my giving your GRACE, who is much better acquainted than I am with all Sorts of Literature, this Trouble, and that at a Time too when your GRACE is engaged in the moſt weighty Affairs of the State, is ſuch a Step

as

as I ſhould not know how to juſtify it from impertinent Preſumption, were it not that the Height of the Subject here diſcourſed of, may in ſome meaſure attone for the Defects which are in it; and the humble Condeſcenſion that ſhines in Your GRACE's Character, and is indeed the conſtant Companion, as well as the greateſt Ornament of genuine Grandeur, encourage me to make this Addreſs.

That I put not my Name to it, needs no other Apology but this, That I am conſcious, that the ſubſequent Papers, tho' they were more poliſh'd than a much better Author could make them to be; yet ſtill would carry along with them this double Defect, of neither anſwering the Sublimity of the Subject, nor the deep Penetration of your GRACE's Genius, whoſe Pardon I therefore

earneſtly ask, tho' I dare not at preſent preſume to make my ſelf known to the World by any other Name than that (which I ſhall ever reckon my Honour) of being,

May it pleaſe Your GRACE,

Your GRACE's,

Moſt Humble,

Moſt Obedient, and

Moſt Devoted Servant,

------ Nec Phœbo gratior ulla eſt,
Quam ſibi quæ Vari præſcripſit Pagina nomen.

PREFACE.

After ſo much as hath been writ, and not a little thereof lately too, by many Eminent Men, upon the Heads here handled; the Reader may expect ſome Reaſon from me for inſiſting on a Subject which ſeems quite exhauſted; and his Expectation in this Caſe ought not to be fruſtrated, becauſe my Undertaking may appear to him either arrogant, as if I ſuppos'd my ſelf qualify'd to excel others of greater Sagacity, in explaining intricate Points; or uſeleſs, if I come as much behind them in the Correctneſs, as I do in the Date of their Works. My Reaſons, therefore, are theſe:

First, *That the Matters here treated of, have employ'd the Pens of all Ages in which Learning has been cultivated; and conſequently it is no more Arrogance in me to publiſh the following Papers, than it is in the Moderns to preſume to do the like after the Ancients; or in any one Author of leſs Renown than another,*

ther, to diſcourſe of a Matter which that other handled before him.

Secondly, *Tho' this Performance may, upon the main, fall much ſhort of many others of the like Nature and Deſign; yet, if it prove preferable to them in any one Matter of Moment, (which I flatter my ſelf it may be,) then it cannot be uſeleſs; ſince the putting, were it but one ſingle Point of Importance, in a clearer Light than it hath been formerly cloath'd with, is worth any Man's while.*

Thirdly, *Suppoſe I flatter my ſelf in vain, and that nothing neither new nor material is here offer'd to the World; yet ſome Benefit may be reap'd from it, if the Way of propoſing it does but ſuit in a peculiar manner the Genius of a few Readers, who may thereby be work'd up to that Attention, and conſequently Conviction, which perhaps they received not from far better Books of this Kind, becauſe they were compos'd in a different Method and Stile.*

Fourthly, *Whilſt Infidels carry on their Objections, it will be incumbent on others who eſpouſe the Cauſe of Religion, to anſwer them: For there are ſome Fools to whom Wiſe Men muſt ſtill make Replies, accord-*

according to their Folly; if for no other Reaſon, yet for this, leſt many others become like unto them. For if they are not refuted over and over again, and indeed all along while they have Leiſure to object, they will be apt to ſing a Song of Triumph over the Silent; and ſo gain Ground upon the inadvertent Multitude, who are prone to think thoſe in the right that make the laſt Reply (however ridiculous) in any Debate.

Laſtly, *The Conſideration, that moſt of the beſt Books of this ſort, have not reach'd to the whole Compaſs of the Controverſy, was that which chiefly moved me to engage in it. They have gone no farther than the Proof of the Being of God, and of his Power and Wiſdom diſcernible in the World; and conſequently have (as I humbly conceive) ſtopt ſhort of the principal Scope of ſuch Writings, which ought to terminate in a Demonſtration of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments; without which, all ſuch Works amount to no more than Philoſophical Amuſements. This Demonſtration I have endeavour'd to deduce in the plaineſt manner, and from the moſt evident Principles I know of: And if it may be in any meaſure ſerviceable*

towards the checking of the Petulance of prophane Libertines, or the reclaiming any one of them, or the confirming others in their Belief of Religion; I ſhall not wholly miſs of my Aim, nor think my Labour ill laid out.

ERRATA, By reaſon of the Author's Abſence from the Preſs.

PAge 6. Line 31. for *for*, read *from*. p. 7. l. 28. r. *in Contradiction*. p. 10. l. 12. l. for *little*, r. *tittle*. p. 23. l. 13. for *one* r. *ſome*. p. 24. l. 27. for *Contradiction* r. *Contradiſtinction*. p. 27. l. penult. r. *hear of*. p. 37. l. 10. dele *in*. p. 48. l. 9. r. *Similar*. p. 110. l. 11. r. *irregularly*.

Note, The Running Titles over the Pages are wrong, from Page 81, to the End.

DIA-

DIALOGUE I.

Concerning the Exiſtence and Idea of God.

Phygellus. I Am come *Eubulus*, to diſcourſe you concerning the Principles of Natural Religion; more deliberately than hitherto I have done. Theſe, I think, Revelation rather preſuppoſes, than proves them to be true; and therefore ſeems to me precarious throughout. I know, you have thought much of thoſe Matters, and deſire to canvas them with an impartial Mind; not doubting that you'll gratify this Deſire; ſince now I am no leſs willing to receive, than you are always ready to give Inſtruction and Good Advice.

Eubulus. Phygellus, it is my Opinion, that Religion, whether you read it in the Characters of Nature's Light, or thoſe brighter ones of Revelation, has ſo much to recommend it; that I really wonder how any Man, tho' more particularly how one of your Pious Education, ſhould be able to

break looſe from it's Reſtraints, and betake himſelf to the doleful and ignominious Latitude of an Unbeliever's Life, which if it paſſeth not away (as for the moſt part it doth) in the purſuit of Pleaſures common to Men and Beaſts; yet naturally expires like that of four footed Creatures, which periſh without the Proſpect of a future State; but with this ſad Difference, that theſe live and die entirely deſtitute of the Terrors of that Proſpect, whereas the Infidel all his Life long is more or leſs liable to thoſe Terrors, which gradually encreaſe upon him as he grows old, and at the approach of Death utterly conſume him. However, while you are only doubtful of that State, and continue inquiſitive about it, I ſhall neither deſpair to ſee your Doubts removed, nor begrudge my Pains in endeavouring to diſpel them. Lay therefore before me the whole Ridle of your Scepticiſm; and I'll try to unravel and refute it.

Phyg. Tho' I am perſwaded of the Exiſtence of a Deity, yet my Thoughts fluctuate in thinking of him: Nor can I determine whether or no he and Nature are the ſame; or tho' as different as the Workman is from his Work, whether or no the one is a neceſſary, and therefore an Eternal Emanation from the other; or if the effect of a free Cauſe, whether or no it was produc'd only by one ſuch Cauſe, or owes its Exiſtence to the Concurrent Combination of more, if not of many ſuch Cauſes; or, if it ows its Exiſtence to the Efficacy of one ſuch ſingle Cauſe, whether or no that Cauſe hath endowed Human Nature with Faculties which ſurmount the Strength of Mechanical Powers. And finally, Suppoſing a thinking Faculty unapplicable to what is purely Material,

terial, whether or no the Subject of that Faculty, tho' immaterial, is therefore immortal; or tho' not therefore immortal, whether or no there are any collateral Proofs of it's Subsistence in a future State of Immortality. Thus *Eubulus*, I have laid before you the whole Scheme of my Scepticism without any sort of Reserve.

Eub. Now to make you sensible that it is a mere Hotch-potch of precarious and incoherent Suppositions, let this be our first Inquiry, whether or no God and Nature are the same. Here I must ask a Description of your Idea of God.

Phyg. It is this, that he is the most immense, perfect, and eternal Being, comprehending all things in himself, from whom they all issue when they become visible, at what we call their Birth; to whose Bosom they go back, when through Decays they disappear; and so continue (as they ever have done) in an endless Rotation around the Circle of their changeable Circumstances and Condition, like Rivers ever running to and returning from the Ocean. And thus my Idea of God and Nature is the same.

Eub. Truly *Phygellus*, this Sketch of *Spinosa*'s Doctrine points at Principles so unphilosophical and extremely absurd; that every judicious Reader of his Writings, stands alike amaz'd at the Audacity of the Author in daring to publish them, and the inadvertence of his Disciples in being deceived by them. You say then, that of God and Nature you have but one and the same Idea, Don't you?

Phyg. Yes individually the same.

Eub. Remember then, that according to your Sense of Things these two Words may be used promiscuously in our Debate; insomuch that what-

ever may be affirmed or denied as belonging or not belonging to the Idea tied to the one, may in like manner be affirm'd or denied of the Idea tied to the other. Pray inform me farther, what Notion you have of Nature.

Phyg. None but this, that it is the Fabrick of the Univerſe, made up of all that's viſible, and of much more than can be ſeen by the ſharpeſt Sight; ſo compacted in every part, and adjuſted upon the whole; as to conſiſt together by a Cement which cannot be diſſolv'd, and diſplay it's Energy in all the various Productions, iſſuing from that Prolifick Mechaniſm which reveals, removes, and renews it's ever changing Scenes, in an unbegun courſe of uninterrupted and endleſs Revolutions.

Eub. Phygellus, then it follows that your God is this Fabrick compos'd of unnumbred Parts, cemented you know not how; and acting, or rather acted, by the Laws of an eternal Mechaniſm. Certainly this muſt be your Idea of him, ſince it is that you have of Nature; and according to your Conceptions he and Nature are the ſame.

Phyg. I confeſs the Juſtice of your Inference, but diſcern not what you intend by it.

Eub. I tell you then, that tho' in Words you own, yet in effect you deny the being of God. Have you not acknowledg'd that immenſity is included in the Idea you have of him? Pray give a poſitive Reply to this Queſtion.

Phyg. I confeſs'd him indeed to be the moſt immenſe Being, as comprehending in himſelf all other Beings whatſoever, but this doth not imply that abſolute Immenſity belongs to him.

Eub.

Eub. Hence it inevitably follows, that the moſt immenſe Being is not (as you imagin) the moſt immenſe; becauſe (as I ſhall prove by and by) the moſt immenſe Being is abſolutely immenſe.

Phyg. I uſed that Word not according to its Grammatical Etymology, nor Philoſophical Importance; but in a lax and popular Signification.

Eub. Popular Language agrees not to the Laws of Logick, which (as much as may be) ties determinate Ideas to every Word; but eſpecially to ſuch of them as recur often in any Diſpute; and therefore ought not to be uſed equivocally, otherways, Diſputants reſemble People ſquabling in the Dark, who neither ſee where to ſtrike, nor how to ward off the Blow. Tell me therefore whether or no what you call immenſe is but indefinite, that is, ſo exceeding great, that tho' really limitted; yet the Mind of Man cannot comprehends it's Bounds; or truly infinite, and in it ſelf unbounded. Chuſe then the Alternative.

Phyg. Since the Object is too big for the Comprehenſion of human Faculties, which are feeble and cannot ſee far off; I therefore think it Preſumption to be Peremptory on either ſide of your Queſtion. But what will you infer if I affirm the former? And ſuppoſe that the moſt immenſe Being is really bounded.

Eub. I infer that thence it will follow, that the moſt immenſe Being is not immenſe; and conſequently that your God (how great ſoever you either call or conceive him) is not the greateſt Being: Becauſe upon your Suppoſition there muſt of neceſſity be another greater. By the Word *immenſe*, Don't you here denote ſomewhat in its ſelf finite? tho' at the ſame time ſo

very much extended, that it far exceeds the reach of your Imagination.

Phyg. By that Word I denote indeed a bounded Being.

Eub. Then to prevent ambiguity of Speech, which gives riſe to many needleſs Repetitions and Explanations, let me prevail with you for the Future to uſe the Word *indefinite*, inſtead of *immenſe*; ſince you make the one (which is ambiguous, becauſe ſometimes uſed in a popular Latitude (as is now done by you) and at other times in a Philoſophical Rigor, of the ſame Signification with the other, to which a more preciſe and determinate Idea is annext.

Phyg. Be it ſo then, in the Room of the Word *immenſe* let the Word *indefinite* be ſubſtituted. But what aver you thereupon?

Eub. Thereupon I affirm, that whatever is but indefinitely great, is really limitted.

Phyg. Shew me a Reaſon for this Aſſertion.

Eub. Becauſe in this lies the Difference between *indefinite* and *infinite*, that the one cannot be circumſcrib'd within Bounds, the other cannot be without that Circumſcription.

Phyg. Han't I told you already, that we cannot conceive the Limits of what is indefinitely great; nor conſequently can we determine whether or no it is limitted?

Eub. That is to ſay, you cannot diſtinguiſh *infinite* from *indefinite*, that which you are certain hath no Bounds, for another thing of which you are uncertain whether or no it is bounded; barely becauſe each of the two is bigger than the extent of your Conceptions.

Phyg. No, neither can I, and I think the reaſon very juſt. For how ſhould I aſſign a difference

rence in the extent of two Things which are equally extended in my Imagination? Both of which ſurpaſs ſo much the Comprehenſion of my Faculties that I can ſee the end of neither of them.

Eub. This is an odd way of arguing, ſuppoſe your Imagination were ſo ſtinted, that it could not comprehend the Limits of one County; would it not be very fooliſh therefore to conclude, that that one County is coequal to the whole Kingdom, which conſiſts of above 60 more? Thus Children are apt to think the World bounded by the viſible Horizon, and Clouns confined to the Circle of a few Incloſures, and the Converſation of their fellow-Ignorants think much after the ſame manner. Nay, all Men are far enough from correct Conceptions in the Caſe, till either by the inſtruction of the Learned, or the Exerciſe of Contemplation they are inabled to extricate themſelves from manifold Miſtakes, to which their relying on the Conduct of Senſe and Imagination doth betray them.

Phyg. Suppoſe you that Men or Children, the Learned or the Illiterate, can argue otherways than in conformity to the Conceptions they have of the Objects about which they argue?

Eub. I aſſure you *Phygellus*, I am ſo far from ſuppoſing that any one can reaſon Contradiction to his Ideas; that on the contrary, whenever he does ſo, he argues againſt himſelf, and lies to his opponent; yet at the ſame time I muſt ſubjoin, that it becomes every Diſputant not only to avoid diſingenous Arguments, but alſo to make himſelf a Maſter of juſt ones, eſpecially while he reaſons concerning Matters of the utmoſt Moment.

Phyg. I am conſcious of my Candor in this debate, but am neither ſenſible of a Superiority of Strength on your ſide; nor of a diſtinguiſh'd Weakneſs upon mine, in our reſpective Ways of handling it hitherto: therefore I aver again, that howmuchſoever what is indefinitely great may fall ſhort in it ſelf of the extent of what is infinitely ſo; yet ſince my Facuities cannot reach the Limits of that more than of this, they muſt conſequently be coequal in my Conceptions. Tho' then ſubjectively and in themſelves the one may be incommenſurable to the other; yet objectively, and with reference to the Ideas I have of either they are coextended Quantities.

Eub. This is in effect to affirm that you perceive no difference of Exceſs on the ſide of *infinite*, or of Diminution on the ſide of *finite*, when you ballance them together, or compare them one with the other:

Phyg. Tho' I perceive no ſuch difference between *infinite* and *indefinite*, will it therefore follow that I have the like Perception of the Reference of *finite* to *infinite?* You oblig'd me to lay aſide the Word *Immenſe*, and aſſume the Term *indefinite*, in lieu of it, and after this was done, I think it hardly fair on your part to put the Word *finite* in the Place of the Term *indefinite*, to the Uſe whereof you had obliged me; eſpecially conſidering the Objects repreſented in the Ideas tied to the one and the other of theſe two Terms are no leſs different, than is that whoſe Limits I can deſcribe, from another Thing whoſe Bounds ſurpaſſeth my Apprehenſion.

Eub. Your complaint is cauſeleſs, for every thing indefinite (whatever you conceive concern-

ing

ing it) is really finite in it ſelf. While you define this an Object whoſe Bounds you can deſcribe, and that an other whoſe limits your imagination cannot fathom, you only give an Account of a greater and leſs finite; of one whoſe Bounds you ſee, and of an other whoſe Bounds your imagination cannot reach, tho' it be really bounded in it ſelf.

Phyg. How often ſhall I tell you that this therefore, to me is infinite, however bounded it ſelf? For of Nothing can I argue otherways than I conceive of it.

Eub. Then *infinite* and *indefinite* are both alike to you.

Phyg. I cannot ſay ſo neither. For as *finite* is that whoſe Limits I perceive, and *infinite* is that which hath no Limits; ſo *indefinite* is ſomething, I cannot well ſay what, lying between the two, and partaking as 'twere of the Nature of both Extrems. For behold it where I will, I ſee it hath a Beginning any where, whence let me carry my Contemplation of it as far as poſſible, what way I will, I can never reach the end of it any where.

Eub. Then you have the Conception of a Thing which is neither finite nor infinite, which is both bounded and unbounded, that is to ſay, is, and is not.

Phyg. Does it follow that the Thing is, and is not; becauſe there may be ſome Miſtakes about the Modes of it's Being?

Eub. You may ſay the Thing exiſts notwithſtanding ſuch Miſtakes, but not the Thing thus modify'd. For to aver that it exiſts thus modified, both with and without Bounds, is as great a Contradiction as to aver it is, and is not; becauſe you

you may with equal Reaſon affirm that the Thing modified is, and is not, as you can affirm that it's Modes are and are not. Indeed in aſſerting the one, upon the matter you aſſert the other alſo. For a Thing modified is a Thing cloath'd with it's Modes, of which when it is ſtript, it is not that modified Thing; but another then as different from what it was, as a diverſity of Modes can render it. Weight we know is a Mode of Matter, now to ſay that Matter is weighty and without Weight, (the ſame as to ſay it is bounded and without Bounds) is not a little leſs abſurd, than to affirm it is and is not. It is Matter, but Matter un-endow'd with that Property which accordingly to the preſent Conſtitution of Things conſtantly belongs to it, as apparently as ſolidity it ſelf. For it is no leſs repugnant to the eſtabliſh'd Laws of Nature, that a cubical Foot of Stone ſhould hang unſupported in the Air, than it is that it ſhould ſubſiſt any where without a Coheſion of the Parts of which it is compounded.

Phyg. By Miracle it may hang in that manner, but by no means can it ſubſiſt any where without the Coheſion of it's parts.

Eub. When you can tell me what the *minima* of Matter are, I ſhall be able to determine (but not till then) whether or no it can ſubſiſt without a Coheſion of Parts. By all we can obſerve about it, it is by the Laws of Nature weigthy as well as ſolid: And to avoid the force of any Argument drawn from theſe Laws, you have no right to run to Miracle which is a Suſpenſion of ſome one or other of theſe Laws, by the power of God; till you both believe his exiſtence, and that upon certain Junctures he exerts his Power in ſuſpending the ſtated Laws of Nature.

ture. But to break off this Digreſſion; I think it juſt as evident, that whatever exiſts muſt be either finite or infinite; as it is that no being can both exiſt and not exiſt at the ſame time; becauſe it may as well thus exiſt and not exiſt, as exiſt within and without Limits. And hence it follows, that what you call *indefinite*, if your Idea of it doth not coincide with that of *infinite*, muſt be of it ſelf finite; and you may as well aſſert that it is neither Temporal nor Eternal, ſelf-exiſtent nor the product of ſome Cauſe, as affirm that it is neither finite nor infinite.

Phyg. I yeild up the point, not without ſome ſhame that I ſhould have put you to ſo much Pains in proving ſo perſpicous a Truth. But can you in like manner, and with no leſs Evidence, make out to me that the whole Fabrick of the Univerſe, or Frame of Nature is not infinite?

Eub. If in this Frame or Fabrick you include not ſpace, (which no doubt is boundleſs) but only the Beings comprehended in it, I think no Propoſition more certain; and not many more eaſily demonſtrated, than this, that the Fabrick of the Univerſe or whole Frame of Nature is not infinite.

Phyg. I don't include in it the intire extent of Space, pray therefore produce your Arguments; for if they are convincing, they'll go a great way towards the reclaiming me from the belief of thoſe Principles which you reckon impious and precarious.

Eub. My firſt Argument riſes out of this conſideration, that if the Frame of Nature is infinite, it muſt alſo be ſelf-exiſtent.

Phyg. Since ſomething muſt be ſelf-exiſtent, otherways nothing had ever been, becauſe out of nothing

nothing no being can emerge of it's own accord; I therefore own, that the frame of Nature, which I take to be the τὸ Παν, or Complex of all that ever either was, is, or can be, muſt be ſelf-exiſtent; but don't therefore perceive that it is infinite. Shew me then a neceſſary Connexion between ſelf-exiſtence and infinitude; and you'll prove your Point. But this I think cannot be done becauſe all exiſtence, and conſequently ſelf-exiſtence, relates only to the Being of a thing, whereas infinitude reſpects the illimited extenſion of it's Being. Now, I can conceive no reaſon, why an Atom may not be ſelf-exiſtent as well as a World, or why both of them may not be eternal Beings, as belonging to the Frame of Nature which I eſteem eternal, but not therefore infinite.

Eub. I acknowledge that the leaſt as well as the greateſt finite Being are both alike capable of ſelf-exiſtence, that is to ſay, are utterly incapable thereof; and withal, that bare exiſtence reſpects only the Being of a thing, whereas infinitude hath a reference to it's illimited extent: You ſhould not therefore have hinted at Arguments which I never intended to impugne; but only have required me to ſhew a neceſſary Connexion between infinitude and ſelf-exiſtence, to the doing whereof I now proceed. You are ſo far from denying, that upon demonſtrative evidence you have aſſerted the exiſtence of a ſelf-exiſtent Being; and I ſubjoyn, that it's infinitude is no leſs evident than it's exiſtence; the demonſtartion of which aſſertion depends upon the Proof of theſe two Propoſitions. (1.) That there muſt always have been ſome infinite Being. (2.) That the infinite Being is the ſole ſelf-exiſtent one.

That

That there muſt always have been ſomething infinite is manifeſt from this, that there is now ſomething finite. Finite and infinite are relative Terms, the one whereof neceſſarily infers the other, as all correlatives whatſoever do. For inſtance, high and low, long and ſhort, broad and narrow, great and little, or the like, all which neceſſarily preſuppoſe and point at each other; ſo by a parity of Reaſon finite Points at and preſuppoſes infinite. Were there no infinite there could be no finite, and indeed were there no ſuch Thing as an Inch of ſpace, there cou'd be no ſuch Thing as an immenſity thereof; nor as an infinite Mind commenſurate to that Immenſity. Were there nothing comprehenſible and circumſcrib'd with Bounds, every thing would be incomprehenſible and unbounded, and were nothing incomprehenſible and unbounded, every Thing would be circumſcribed and bounded; Abſurdities of a Piece with theſe, that an Iſland is not ſurrounded with Water, nor an whole World with an Atmoſphere, that what ſets Bounds to and comprehends every Thing is it ſelf circumſcrib'd and bounded; whereas if it is bounded and circumſcrib'd, it cannot be unbounded and incomprehenſible, that which Bounds and comprehends it being certainly more incomprehenſible and unbounded; and that more unbounded muſt either be bounded, or not; if not, then it is infinite, the Thing I plead for. If bounded, then that which bounds it is more comprehenſive: And thus we muſt either go on from leſs to greater Bounds *in infinitum*, which is abſurd, for an infinity of Bounds is a boundleſs Contradiction; or muſt ſtop at the extre-

nity of comprehenſible Finites ſomewhere in the unbounded void, or incomprehenſible infinite which circumſcribes and contains every thing, being it ſelf therefore uncircumſcrib'd and uncontain'd by any thing. Even from this then that there is ſomething finite, it is manifeſt that there is another infinite.

Phyg. This is down-right Demonſtration, but how will you deduce from it, or any other Topick, a Proof of this your foremention'd ſecond Propoſition? That the infinite Being is the only ſelf-exiſtent one. Do this, and you'll do me a double Service; both in demonſtrating to me the Exiſtence of a Deity, as of a Being diſtinct from the Frame of Nature, and alſo as the Author of that Frame, to whom therefore I, and every thing in it, or belonging to it, owe our Exiſtence; and conſequently our Dependence.

Eub. That ſome Being is ſelf-exiſtent, is a Truth which you have own'd, and no Man of Good Senſe can deny; becauſe whatever exiſts, muſt either exiſt of it ſelf, or as the effect of it's proper cauſe. Now, if every Thing exiſted of it ſelf, then nothing could exiſt as an effect, (which is repugnant to daily Obſervation) or if every Thing exiſted as an Effect, then nothing could exiſt as a Cauſe, which is alike Repugnant to Obſervation (ſince we ſee Cauſes produce their Effects every Day) and to right Reaſon, ſince if there were no Cauſe, all would be a Chain of Effects link'd together without any efficient Cauſe, than which nothing more inconſiſtent with good Senſe can be ſuppos'd. It is as certain therefore that ſomething is ſelf-exiſtent, as it is that any Thing exiſts; for had not there always been a ſelf-exiſtent Being, then the time

was

was when there was no Being; and conſequently none could ever have been; becauſe ſomething can never be the effect of nothing. It is alſo no leſs certain that every Thing is not ſelf-exiſtent, than it is that ſomething is ſo; for were every Thing ſelf-exiſtent, then it would follow, 1. That nothing cou'd exiſt as an Effect; ſince what is ſelf-exiſtent can have no cauſe of its Exiſtence; whereas we ſee every Day manifold Effects reſulting from their various Cauſes. 2. That no one Thing cou'd ſo interfere with another as to ſhake, ſhatter, or deſtroy it; for ſelf-exiſtent Things muſt be all of equal and the utmoſt Strength, inſomuch that if they preſs'd upon, or impell'd each other, they muſt remain unalterable and immoveable; becauſe they muſt be ſuppos'd of equal Force to make or reſiſt the impulſe of the preſſure. Being ſelf-exiſtent they muſt therefore be independent, and all alike beyond the reach of Ruine, Perdition, or Diſturbance. But we ſee innumerable Beings of unequal Strength, and no fewer ſinking under the preſſure of Decays, till they periſh out of Sight; and therefore, to be ſure, far enough from inheriting the Divine and incommunicable Property of ſelf-exiſtence.

Phyg. You ſpend too much time in making out what is too plain to need a Proof. Pray come to the main Points, in proving to me theſe two Particulars. 1. That the infinite being is ſelf-exiſtent. 2. That ſelf-exiſtence cannot belong to any finite Being.

Eub. If any Being is ſelf-exiſtent (and you know that ſuch a one there muſt be) it is, no doubt, rather the infinite than any finite one. The exiſtence of a ſelf-exiſtent Being had no beginning

ginning, for it cou'd have no Cauſe; it is therefore infinite in reſpect of its Duration. It ever was, becauſe it never began to be; and therefore it ever muſt be; for a Being without a beginning come to a Period of its Exiſtence, is as unconceivable as a Staff that has but one end. To ſuppoſe a ſelf-exiſtent Being periſhable, is in effect to ſuppoſe it not ſelf-exiſtent. It cannot periſh of it ſelf, for of it ſelf it doth exiſt; nor by any outward Force, becauſe (as hath been proved) the force of it's Reſiſtance muſt be equal to that of any exterior Impulſe. Since then the ſelf-exiſtent Being is unbounded with reſpect of its Duration, pray what can bound it with reſpect of it's Eſſence. Whatever ſet Bounds to the Extent of its Eſſence, can by a Parity of Reaſon limit the Extent of its Duration. This then being impoſſible to be done, that therefore muſt be no leſs difficult.

Phyg. I don't affirm that any cauſe bounded its Being, but that as from Eternity it did exiſt, and is therefore of an illimited Duration; ſo from Eternity it exiſted within Bounds, and by conſequence is of a limited Nature, as to the extenſion of it's Eſſence.

Eub. And I reply, that an eternal Being muſt be every way illimited. Space is of an infinite extention, as it ſignifies either abſolute Time or Place; and time conſider'd as a Portion of eternity, or Place conſider'd as a Portion of the unbounded Void, belong only to bounded Beings, none of which are infinite either in reſpect of their Eſſence or Duration. It is in vain therefore to imagine, that a ſelf-exiſtent Thing is of a limited extent of Eſſence, but of an illimited extent of Duration. For if it always did and muſt

muſt exiſt ſomewhere, it always did and muſt exiſt every-where; for that it ſhould exiſt in a limitted Place, through the Ages of an illimited Eternity, is a Thing not to be ſuppoſed; becauſe the Suppoſition aſcribes to it one mode of Being, while it denies to it another inſeparable from that one; by confining it's Eſſence to a narrow Compaſs of Place, and at the ſame time ſtretching it's Exiſtence through an infinite Duration. The Truth on't is, it is every Jot as eaſy to conceive a Being infinitely extended in it's Eſſence (and conſequently ſelf-exiſtent, becauſe ſuch a one, than which there cannot be another more independent, nor equal to it) ſtinted to a ſhort Duration, nay, e'en narrowed to that of one Day, (that is, ſelf-exiſtent, and yet of but twenty four Hours continuance) as it is to conceive another of an infinite Duration limited to a little Point of Place.

Phyg. You have led me into a Labyrinth of Metaphyſicks, the Light whereof is ſo Dazling; that inſtead of ſubduing my Doubts, it leaves me in a Maze of Schepticiſm. Pray rid me of it if you can, by laying before me a clear and ſuccinct Demonſtration of theſe two Particulars, 1. That an infinite Being muſt be ſelf-exiſtent. 2. That every finite one is a depending Effect. When this is done, you'll readily demoliſh the whole Structure of my Unbelief, the main Pillar whereof you have in ſome meaſure ſhook.

Eub. It's very difficult indeed to remove your Doubts, ſince the Light which ſhould diſpel the Darkneſs that deceives you, rather renders your Head giddy, than relieves your Heart from that Heap of unexemind Prejudices huddled together in it. However, ſince the ſha-

king of falſe Sentiments is a good Step made towards the ſettling of true Ones, I don't deſpair of Succeſs in my Deſign upon you. Anſwer me then a Queſtion or two. Don't you think there is ſome Being abſolutely infinite?

Phyg. Yes, for you have made me ſenſible that abſolute Space is ſuch a Being, becauſe it is every way unbounded.

Eub. And think you there can be another equal to it?

Phyg. No, For if there cou'd, both together would be greater than either of the two, and ſo neither of them would be abſolutely infinite. Beſides, Since every Being exiſts in Space, inſomuch that were there no ſuch Thing as Space, then no manner of Being could exiſt. For a Being that exiſts not in Space exiſts no where, becauſe Space is every where; and that which exiſts no where is not. Further yet then, were there two infinite Beings, there muſt be two infinite Spaces for their exiſtence, but I plainly perceive two ſuch Spaces impoſſible; becauſe they muſt either ſomewhere terminate on each other, and ſo neither of them would be infinite, or coinſide into one every way unbounded; and that coincidence implies an individual identity, which deſtroys the Suppoſition of their being two.

Eub. I am glad *Phygellus* to find that Metaphyſical Light grows familiar to you, dwell in the calm Contemplation of the Objects it brings in view; and inſtead of dazling your Eyes, it will give you Delight. Forget not then the Truth of theſe two Propoſitions, 1. That there muſt be ſome infinite Being. 2. That there can be but one ſuch.

Phyg.

Phyg. Tho' I ſee them ſo certain and evident, that I think henceforth I can never forget them; yet I am not ſo throughly convinced as I would be, that the infinite Being is ſelf-exiſtent; nor that ſelf-exiſtence is the peculiar Property thereof. Demonſtrate to me theſe two Propoſitions, and you'll give me no ſmall Satisfaction.

Eub. Upon the matter I have done it already, and wonder that you perceive it not. There is no difficulty in it, and I ſhall do it again, I hope to your full Satisfaction. You are no leſs certain that ſelf-exiſtence belongs to ſome Being or other, than you are that any Being whatſoever exiſts. Now, if every Thing is not ſelf-exiſtent, (and by and by I ſhall prove that there can be but one Being thus exiſtent) it is no unfair *Poſtulatum* to ſuppoſe an infinite rather than a finite Being ſelf-exiſtent; becauſe no property can be conceived as appertaining to a finite Thing, which doth not appertain to an infinite one; otherwiſe the infinite one deſtitute of that Property wou'd be deficient, and conſequently bounded, (becauſe every Defect is a Signature of finitude) whereas it is evident, that ſome Property appertains to what is infinite which doth not belong to whatever is finite; otherwiſe finite and infinite would be both coeval and coequal, nay, one and the ſame Thing; as having the ſame Properties without Diſtinction as to the Time or Place of their exiſtence, or any other imaginable Difference. Upon the whole then, if it is undeniably demonſtrable that ſome Being is ſelf-exiſtent, it is no leſs evident that the infinite Being which comprehends all conceivable Properties, (and infinitely more than whatever is finite)

muſt be the ſelf-exiſtent one; becauſe ſelf-exiſtence is a Property ſo much more excellent than to exiſt as the effect of ſome Cauſe, by how much a certain Exiſtence excels a contingent one, or an independent Condition a ſtate of Dependence.

Phyg. You have evinc'd to me that there muſt be ſome infinite Being, that there can be but one ſuch; and withal that that infinite Being muſt be ſelf-exiſtent: Now I want to have it made out, that ſelf exiſtence cannot belong to any finite Being.

Eub. In order thereto, I muſt demonſtrate this Propoſition, that infinitude and ſelf-exiſtence are inſeparable Properties. Neceſſary exiſtence is imply'd in ſelf-exiſtence, for whatever exiſts of it ſelf, exiſts without a Cauſe. It's Being had no beginning, and therefore can have no end. It is independent on every Thing, and therefore nothing can deſtroy it. It could not be its own efficient Cauſe (otherwiſe it had been as a Cauſe before it was as an Effect, that is to ſay, it had been and not been at the ſame time) and conſequently cannot annihilate it ſelf. It neither owed its Being to it ſelf, nor to any Thing elſe, as a productive Cauſe: And therefore, can never looſe an exiſtence which it neither gave to it ſelf, nor received from any other Being. From all which it is certain, that of neceſſity it muſt exiſt. Whence it follows, that infinitude and ſelf-exiſtence are Properties inſeperable from each other. For as ſelf-exiſtence implies neceſſary exiſtence, (the Truth laſt explain'd) ſo neceſſary exiſtence implies an exiſtence without Bounds; becauſe what neceſſarily exiſts, exiſts

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by a Neceſſity of Nature, and whatever exiſts by a Neceſſity of Nature, exiſts every where. For if it exiſted in one place at one time, and in another at another time, or any where at any time within Bounds, it could not neceſſarily exiſt at all; for then its exiſtence would no where be neceſſary; neither here, nor there, nor yonder, nor in any aſſignable Place whatſoever. Nor conſequently cou'd it be reaſonable to aſcribe to it the Property of neceſſary exiſtence; becauſe that which exiſts no where neceſſarily, cannot be any where a neceſſarily exiſtent Being: And that which exiſts within Bounds where-ever it is, (as every finite Thing muſt exiſt) is no where neceſſarily exiſtent; becauſe it may be transferred to various Places of the boundleſs void, and what is no where neceſſarily exiſtent cannot be ſaid to exiſt any where by a Neceſſity of Nature, and therefore may certainly ceaſe to be.

Phyg. I don't affirm that any finite Thing exiſts neceſſarily in any particular place, but only that its exiſtence may be neceſſary, tho' not its exiſtence in this or that particular place.

Eub. That's to ſay, it may exiſt by a neceſſity of Nature where-ever it is, tho' its exiſtence is not neceſſarily affixt to any one particular place. Is this your meaning?

Phyg. Yes indeed.

Eub. And is not this a fair Inference from it? That therefore it is not neceſſiſarily exiſtent. Since be where it will, or where-ever it can be, there it exiſts contingently, becauſe the next Moment it may exiſt ſomewhere elſe. Now it is certain that what at all times, and where-ever it is, exiſts contingently, can at no time and no where, exiſt by a neceſſity of Nature. The infinite Ex-

panſion which comprehends every Thing is indeed neceſſarily exiſtent, becauſe, were the vaſt Machine of Nature which operates therein annihilated, by the Power of him who produced it; yet the Expanſion it ſelf would remain the ſame that now it is. Nor is there any conceivable Power (how great ſoever) that can put a Period to its Being. It is unbounded as well as neceſſarily exiſtent; becauſe all other Beings (except the infinite Mind which is compleatly commenſurable thereunto) are bounded by it. It is immoveable, becauſe immenſe; and immaterial, becauſe its Parts are indiſcerptible, and it penetrates the moſt ſolid and compacted Matter in the whole Creation. In ſhort, there is no imaginable Power which can make the leaſt alteration in its unchangeable State.

Phyg. At this rate of Reaſoning, you aſcribe to it ſo many of the peculiar Properties of him, whom your Divines call the Maker of all things, that one would think your God, and infinite Expanſion are the very ſame. If ſo, ſpeak out plainly, and ſay that ſpace is the infinite Mind.

Eub. If by Space, you only mean the univerſal receptacle of Beings, nothing could be more blaſphemous than to ſay ſo; for that would be to ſuppoſe the infinite Mind, rather a receptacle of all other Beings, than a real Being in it ſelf, ſuperior to them, and the Creator and Preſerver of them, which is imply'd in the Notion of an infinite Mind. But if to infinite Space, you annex the Idea of an infinite Mind, coequal to it, and coexiſtent with it, then I think what Mr. *Locke* intimates concerning expanſion and duration, *viz. That they mutually embrace and comprehend each other, every part of Space, being in every*

every part of Duration; *and every part of Duration, in every part of Expanſion*, is not quite unaplicable to the infinite Mind and infinite Space, and may conclude in this, as he does in the other Caſe, *that ſuch a combination of two diſtinct Ideas, is, I ſuppoſe, ſcarce to be found in all that great Variety, we do or can conceive, and may afford Matter to farther Speculation.* After all, I muſt confeſs an unfathomable Myſtery in this Matter, at leaſt to my Underſtanding; and own, that as I am certain that the forementioned Properties appertain to the illimited expanſion of Space, ſo I verily believe they ariſe from one ſpecial, though inexplicable relation that is between the infinite Mind, in whom we live, and move, and have our Being, and that unbounded expanſion in which the whole Fabrick of Nature performs its Operations, according to the various Laws preſcrib'd to it by the God of Nature, and obſervable in the amazing Mechaniſm thereof, by all his Underſtanding Creatures.

Phyg. I feel a great deal of Force in your Arguments, inſomuch that tho' it's hardly needful to ſay more of the Caſe now before us; yet if you have any Topicks untoucht which may ſerve to make it further Evident, it will be very grateful to me to have them open'd and explain'd.

Eub. I have one more, and that I think no mean one neither. It is this, that independence is the reſult of ſelf-exiſtence. For to ſuppoſe a ſelf-exiſtent Thing depending on another, is too flat an Aſurdity to need a refutation. It is in effect to ſuppoſe ſelf-exiſtence transfer'd from the ſelf-exiſtent Thing to that other on which it does depend. And is not this

to remove ſelf-exiſtence from the ſelf-exiſtent Thing? In a Word, it either can or cannot ſubſiſt without that on which it is ſuppos'd to depend. If it cannot, then it is not independent; and if it can then it is not dependent.

Phyg. All this is true, but what infer you from it?

Eub. I'm amaz'd that you are not beforehand with me in making theſe following Inferences. I infer (1.) that no finite Thing is ſelf-exiſtent, both becauſe it exiſts within Bounds, and could have no exiſtence had it no where to exiſt; and conſequently that it depends on that being who circumſcrib'd it's Bounds and continually allots to it the Place of it's abode: And therefore is not ſelf-exiſtent, ſince (as was juſt now made out) no dependent Thing can be ſelf-exiſtent. (2.) That there can be but one independent Being, becauſe (as appears from the former inference) no finite Being can be independent, and there can be but one infinite Being; as you have already own'd, and ſhall hereafter be made out more fully, when we come to diſcourſe of the Unity of the Divine Nature. (3.) That the one ſelf-exiſtent and independent Being is Omnipotent. Omnipotence is a Power to do all that can be done, and ſtands in a contradiction to all other Powers whatſoever, none of which, nay nor all of them together, can do all that can be done. Now the one ſelf-ſubſiſtent and independent Power, which ſtands thus contradiſtinguiſh'd from all other derived and dependent Powers, as a cauſe does from it's effect, muſt of neceſſity be able to do all that can be done; becauſe all other Powers are derived from it, and depend upon it;

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And therefore can no more make Reſiſtance to it, than the deſcending Stream can run back into a reſiſtance of the Fountain whence it flows. (4.) That the independent Being is Omniſcient, becauſe he is Omnipotent. For as Omnipotence is a Power to do all that can be done, ſo Omniſcience is the Knowledge of all that can be known. Now, the one independent Being which alone can do all that can be done, can only know all that can be known. For a Power to effectuate whatever can be done, preſuppoſes the Knowledge of the Ways and Means, how and by which it may be effectuated; and conſequently, a Power to bring all poſſible Purpoſes to paſs, muſt preſuppoſe the Knowledge of all the poſſible Means and Methods by which any or every thing can be brought about and effected. Finally, Therefore I infer, that the independent Being is infinitly Wiſe. This follows from the laſt Inference, becauſe Wiſdom is nothing elſe but the doing Things in a fit Manner, and at a proper Seaſon; and by conſequence infinite Wiſdom conſiſts in doing them at the moſt proper Seaſons, and after the fiteſt manner poſſible. For as a Power to do any Thing implies ſome knowledge of the manner how it is to be done; and a power to do every Thing, implies the Knowledge of all the poſſible Ways and Means of acting; ſo a power to do every thing in the fitteſt Manner, and at the moſt proper Seaſons, implies infinite Wiſdom, which conſiſts in the Knowledge of thoſe Seaſons, and of that manner of acting. From all which inferences laid together, and compared in their Connexion with one another, I think not only God's Exiſtence

iſtence is demonſtrable, but likewiſe the Idea of him as a being infinite, eternal, ſelf-ſubſiſtent, independent, omnipotent, omniſcient, infinitly wiſe, and therefore no leſs Good and Juſt, is deduceable to a degree of evidence beyond all reaſonable Contradiction.

Phyg. I really think it is as you ſay, but withall, the demonſtration lies ſcatter'd in ſo many divers and diſtant Propoſitions of our Conference, and Men of my Principles are ſo inured to a ſuperficial Way of Thinking, ſuch as Poetry with a daſh of Hiſtory gives them at a glance; that they ſeldom take the trouble of collecting Concluſions from a long train of diſſipated Premiſes, which requires ſome cloſe Application if not depth of Thought: That I muſt therefore requeſt you to repeat your Pains in deduceing your Demonſtration, and drawing it up in as little a compaſs as you think compatible with a due degree of plain and eaſy Evidence.

Eub. I'll do it with alacrity, in hopes of working in you that conviction which I wiſh for. For that end it may be proper to review briefly, by way of Queſtion and Anſwer, what hitherto we have diſcours'd at large. And I muſt deſire you to re-collect your Thoughts, and take heed that your Replies may be conſonant to the Conceſſions you have already made; otherwiſe we may go backward and forward, without ever compaſſing the end we aim at in this Diſpute. To begin then my catechiſing work. Did you not at the commencement of our Conference confeſs the exiſtence of a God?

Phyg. I did, and do it again.

Eub.

Eub. Is not this your Idea of him? That he's the moſt immenſe, perfect, and eternal Being.

Phyg. It is, and always was.

Eub. Said you not that your Notion of him and Nature was the ſame? And as a conſequence thereof, that what ever might be affirm'd or denied of the one, might alſo be affirm'd or denied of the other.

Phyg. I ſaid ſo.

Eub. What was your deſcription of Nature?

Phyg. That it is the whole fabrick of the Univerſe endow'd with the everlaſting energy of an inexplicable Mecaniſm, by which it reveals, removes, and renews it's interchanging Scenes, in an unbegun courſe of endleſs Revolutions.

Eub. Doth it not thence follow, that your God (at beſt) muſt be but a myſterious Machine, compacted of parts no leſs moveable and diſcerptible than the Fabrick of the World?

Phyg. I cou'd not avoid the owning of that inference, while my conceptions of him and Nature were the ſame.

Eub. And was not this to affirm in Words, but in effect to deny his exiſtence? Nay was it not a palpable contradicton to what you had antecedently confeſt concerning his immenſity?

Phyg. I remember you compell'd me to own ſo much, hut having forgot your Arguments, muſt deſire you therefore to hint them again,

Eub. Are you not certain that you can weigh in Skales, or meaſure off in Acres, determinate Portions of the Frame of the World? Don't you conceive how one part of it may be torn from another? Did you never hear the Concuſſions, nor read of the terrible Rendings and Eruptions

tions of Earthquakes? By which means Mountains have been ſhook, till they ſunk down into Lakes. What can be more profane and ridiculous than Expreſſions of this kind? An Inch or an Ounce, an Ell or a Furlong, a ſquare or cubical Foot of Divinity it ſelf, one Limb of him cut off from another, an Hill of his being laid low with the Vally, or a Dry part of him drown'd in Water. Is not this, a verbal owning, but a virtual denial of his exiſtence? It is at beſt a grave ſort of Banter, by which an *Hobeſian* wou'd skreen himſelf, from the juſt imputation and puniſhnent belonging to the blackeſt Atheiſm, to which they who make no diſtinction between the Fabrick and Author of Nature are deſervedly liable.

Phyg. You did not till now touch theſe Topicks; tho' I think they were no leſs worth the minding than moſt that you mention'd.

Eub. The Truth on't is, they were Deductions ſo obvious from what was diſcourſt of; that I thought you cou'd ſcarcely miſs to perceive them. It ſeems you did, and therefore I am glad that now at laſt I have laid them before you. Let me go on with my Queſtions. Did you not deſcribe your Deity as the moſt immenſe of Beings? Or rather as a compound of them all complicated together in the contexture of Nature's Frame. did you not at the ſame time aſſert that abſolute immenſity belong'd not to him? Whence I told you this abſurdity ſollow'd, that the moſt immenſe Being is not immenſe. To which you reply'd, That by moſt immenſe you meant not a Being without Bounds; but only ſo extended as to exceed the compaſs of your Com-

Comprehenſion. Have I hitherto erred in my Narrative?

Phyg. No, not in a little, it is a fair and punctual Repreſentation of what hath paſt between us.

Eub. And did not I thereupon make you ſenſible? That by the word *immenſe*, you ſignify'd the ſame thing that philoſophers do by the Word *indefinite*, which denotes a Thing really limitted, tho' it's Limits lie at a diſtance beyond the reach of your imagination or mine.

Phyg. This in like manner I remember diſtinctly, nor have I forgot that therefore you deſired me to uſe the Word *indefinite* inſtead of *immenſe*, ſince I tied the ſame Idea to both, and the one was of a leſs ambiguous ſignification than the other; upon which you went on thus with your Argument. Whatever is only indefinitely great, is really limitted, otherwiſe *indefinite*, which is a Thing circumſcrib'd with Bounds, tho' ſurpaſſing our comprehenſion, wou'd be the ſame with *infinite*, which is too great to be circumſcrib'd, becauſe it hath no Bounds at all. Here it was that I urg'd, that ſince we cannot conceive the Limits of what is indefinite, therefore we ſhould not pretend to determine whether or no it is really limited. What you reply'd I have forgot, pray repeat it.

Eub. Then I told you that your Objection imported, that you cou'd not diſtinguiſh *infinite* (which you are certain hath no Bounds) from *indefinite*, which by your own confeſſion may have Bounds, for any Thing you know to the contrary. Here a good deal was ſaid on each ſide, relating to the neceſſity we are under of arguing concerning things in conformity to the Concep-

Conceptions we have of them. Whence you catch'd at this Concluſion, that how much ſoever a Thing indefinitly great may fall ſhort of the Dimenſions of what is infinitely ſo; yet ſince your Faculties cou'd not reach the Limits of that more than of this: Therefore, how unequal ſoever they might be in themſelves, there was no Diſproportion between the Ideas you had of the one and the other. This ſaid I, is in effect to affirm, that you perceive no Difference of Exceſs on the ſide of *infinite*, nor of Diminution on the ſide of *finite*, when you compare them together. Have not I further yet given a candid Abſtract of our Conference?

Phyg. Faithful in all Reſpects, and now it was that I complain'd, that though you had oblig'd me to change the Word *immenſe*, as a Term of an equivocal Signification, for that of *indefinite*, as more unambiguous; yet you had thrown out of my Argument the Word *indefinite*, to the uſe whereof you had tied me, and had put the Term *finite* in its room. This I cenſured as ſavouring of Sophiſtry; ſince *finite* differs from *indefinite*, no leſs than that whoſe Bounds I apprehend, doth from another thing whoſe Bounds are every way above and beyond my apprehenſion. How you ſatisfied this Complaint of mine, may be worth my while to hear over again; for I have but a confuſed Remembrance of it.

Eub. Thus I did it, by making it appear that every indefinite thing is really finite; and conſequently, that in the Caſe before us, the Words might be uſed promiſcuouſly, the difference of their Ideas terminating only in the repreſentation of one *finite* greater than the Com-

Comprehenſion of our Faculties, and of another which comes within the reach of their Compaſs. For be *indefinite* what it will, with reſpect to your Imagination or mine; yet if it is not infinite in it ſelf, to you and me it muſt be finite. And here, in ſaying it was of a middle Nature between the two, you ſhew'd a great intanglement of Thought, and might as well have ſaid, it was neither bounded (for then it wou'd be finite) nor unbounded (becauſe then it would be infinite) an abſurdity no leſs perceptible than to aver it is, and is not; ſince it may as well be and not be, at the ſame moment of Time, as be at once bounded and unbounded.

Phyg. Being thus puſh'd, I remember I yielded up the Point, not without ſome wonder that I had diſputed it ſo obſtinately. The next we handled was this, Whether or no the whole Frame of Nature is to be accounted infinite? Pray give me a ſhort Abridgment of what you ſaid of it?

Eub. Upon this Head I proved to you, *Firſt*, That there muſt always have been ſomething infinite; for ſince every finite Thing is bounded, therefore that which bounds all finites, muſt certainly be infinite; otherwiſe there is an infinity of finites bounding one another, which is an hideous Contradiction; becauſe in that infinity of finites, there either muſt be ſome one or other of them that bounds all the reſt, and what is this but an infinite finite? or all of them muſt bound each other, and ſo all of them are not infinite, becauſe they are without exception mutual Boundaries to one another. *Secondly*, That

That the infinite Being can be but one; for two infinities muſt either ſomewhere touch each other, and ſo neither of them could be infinite, becauſe where they touch, there they terminate one the other mutually; or muſt coincide together, and ſo mutually embrace and involve each other, as to become thereby but really one; and as thus there can be but one infinite Being, ſo ſelf-exiſtence belongs to him alone. For if it is demonſtrable that ſome Being muſt be ſelf-exiſtent (otherwiſe nothing could ever have exiſted) it is no leſs evident, that the infinite Being, which virtually comprehends all imaginable Properties, and infinitely more than any finite one, muſt be the ſole ſelf-exiſtent Being. Upon this you acknowledg'd the Unity and Self-exiſtence of ſome infinite Being: From that acknowledgment, by Arguments too plain to be denied, eaſily remembred, and therefore needleſs to be repeated, I drove you to confeſs further, that that ſelf-exiſtent Being is the only independent and neceſſarily exiſtent one, the only Being Omnipotent, Omniſcient, and infinitely Wiſe. I did not inſiſt upon, but barely named thoſe other Attributes of Goodneſs, Juſtice, Mercy, or the like, belonging to his bleſſed Nature; both becauſe they are very obvious in the Conduct of his Providence, and we may have occaſion to diſcourſe of them copiouſly hereafter. Upon the whole then, I hope I have not only demonſtrated the exiſtence of God, but alſo of the Idea ſome Men have, and all ought to have of him, as of an infinitely perfect Being, as far above the reach of any Competitor, as the ſingle Creator of all other Beings

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is above his needy and dependent Creatures.

Phyg. I never doubted his Exiſtence, but muſt confeſs withal, that my Conceptions of him were very groſs and confuſed. I return you my Thanks for rendering them more clear and regular; particularly in having evinced to me that the Frame of Nature is as different from the God thereof, as a piece of human Mechaniſm is from the Mind of him who contrived it; nay, as an effect rear'd out of nothing, is from the productive Cauſe of its Being. Could you in like manner convince me that that ſtupendious Frame is neither a neceſſary emanation from the Author of it, nor (ſuppoſing it a voluntary effect of a Cauſe free from all coercion) had the concurrence of any other Cauſe towards its production, you'll thereby lay upon me an Obligation which I ſhall never forget.

Eub. My Friend *Phygellus*, it is now too late in the Night to enter upon theſe important Subjects; but if you'll meet me here to Morrow an hour or two before Sun-ſet, I hope e're the Evening cloſe, to give you the Satisfaction you wiſh for; and ſo I bid you good Night.

Phyg. Good Night to my beſt Friend, but believe me, neither Night nor Day will be ſo to me, till I ſee you again.

DIALOGUE II.

Concerning the Production of Creatures.

Phygellus I Hope good *Eubulus*, you'll forgive me my breaking in upon you ſome Hours ſooner than you appointed; and impute this peice of ill-breeding to the impatience of that Thirſt which you have rais'd in me after further Improvements in Religious Knowledge.

Eub. I aſſure you *Phygellus*, you might have ſpared this Apology; for your Viſits are like to be forever acceptable to me. But not to loſe time on trifling Compliments, let us therefore

come to the Point now to be diſcours'd of; namely, That of the Production of Creatures. This, as you propoſed it at our parting laſt Night, preſuppos'd not only upon your Part the Belief of God's exiſtence, but alſo the owning him to be the Fountain of all other Beings: Tho' ſtill with a doubtfulneſs, whether or no they iſſued from him as neceſſary Emanations, or as the Effects of a free Cauſe which was under no Compulſion to produce them: And if as the Effects of ſuch a conſtrain'd Cauſe, whether or no all of them were that way effected, without the Concurrence of any other either co-ordinate or ſubordinate Agent. Have not I hit upon the whole of thoſe Scruples which you hinted at in a ſhort Suggeſtion or two.

Phyg. You have to a Nicety, and indeed more plainly than I could have expreſt them my ſelf.

Eub. To ſhorten our Work then, I ſhall conſider your Scruples as ſo many ſtated Objections againſt this Truth, that God acted by Choice, and not by fatal Neceſſity in the production of Creatures. Whence it will appear an inevitable Conſequence, that no other Being did or could concur in the Production of any one of them. Now that no Creature could iſſue from it's Creator by way of a neceſſary Emanation from him, is a Truth evident from the Conſtitution and Circumſtances of a Creature, from the Perfection of him who created the ſame, and from the very Act of Creation it ſelf. To conſiſt within Limits, to be liable to Alteration, and to depend on him who ſet Bounds to it's Being, and ſubjected it to Alteration, are Properties inſeperable

perable from the Idea of whatever is created. For ſince there are many different Creatures, they muſt ſubſiſt in as many different Places; and muſt therefore be all of them bounded by the finite Portions which they occupy in the infinite Space; and conſequently, an illimited Creature is a direct Contradiction. It is one of them unbounded, muſt it not therefore encloſe all the reſt? And if ſo, muſt not the reſt terminate in it, where-ever it encloſeth and terminates them? And what is this to think of it? But that it is both limited and illimited, limited where it terminates them, and yet illimitable, as having nothing beyond it ſelf to bound it. Tho', I ſay, be it as large as poſſible, it is terminated both ways, even by its Fellow Creatures on one ſide, and unbounded Space on the other.

Phyg. Here you ſuggeſt an Objection. I deſire you to tell me whether or no Space is a Creature or uncreated Being. For that it is ſomewhat more than Nothing cannot be denied, ſince all that is, exiſts in it, and could have no exiſtence were it not. If it is a Creature, then you muſt acknowledge a created Being unbounded, the very Thing I plead for. If it is uncreated, then you muſt either acknowledge it to be the Creator of all; or that there is ſome real Thing which is neither created nor uncreated. Beſides, I may argue, that the whole Complex of the Creatures (ſuppoſing Space to be one of them) is to be conſidered as one illimited Creature iſſuing neceſſarily from the Creator of all Things.

Eub. I apprehend what gravels you, and ſhall give you what farther inſight I can into that un-

fathomable Abyſs now before us. That the extenſion of Space, whether with reſpect to abſolute time, (the ſame with Eternity) or to abſolute Place, (the ſame with that Void which comprehends the whole Fabrick of Nature) is truly illimited, now a Days is a Point not controverted among thoſe who are accuſtom'd to demonſtrative Reaſonings. For it is obvious, that reſt where we will in our Contemplation of that extenſion, we ſee it ſtill ſtretched further and further, without any conceivable end of it; nay, without admitting of any poſſible Bounds or Period. Becauſe whatever can be ſuppoſed to bound it, muſt either be bounded or not; if bounded, it muſt either be bounded by Space, that's to ſay, by it ſelf, which is abſurd; ſince the ſame Thing can never be both the Boundary and the being bounded; or by ſomewhat elſe. Now that ſomewhat elſe being different from Space muſt be comprehended in it, becauſe Space comprehends every Thing; and therefore cannot be bounded by any Thing. To contradict this, is to ſuppoſe that the bounded Being may bound its own Boundary; which is a Suppoſition apparently abſurd. If we imagine the extenſion of abſolute Place limited, we muſt imagine it either under a circular or an angular Figure. If under that of a Circle, then a tangent drawn from any Point of that Circle muſt in every Point but that of contact fall without and beyond its Circumference. If under that of an angular Figure, the Caſe will be the ſame, if a ſtreight Line be drawn touching only one angular Point. And indeed, if a Circle is angular at every Point of its Circumference, then theſe

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two Caſes coincide. And ſince what hath been ſaid of either, holds equally true of every figured, that's to ſay finite Portion of abſolute place; it infallibly follows from the plain Proceſs of this undeniable Argument, that the whole of abſolute place muſt be infinite and unfigurable.

Phyg. I'm ſenſible of the force of this Demonſtration, but don't foreſee your Deſign in it. Pray therefore apply it to the Point now under our Conſideration.

Eub. Have a little Patience, that ſhall be done by and by; but in order thereto, it may be proper in like manner to ſhew that Space, as it reſpecteth abſolute Time, is alſo infinite. That ſomething muſt always have been, you know to be no leſs certain from our former Conference, than that now ſomething actually is; and that that Thing which was from Everlaſting, being Self-exiſtent, muſt therefore continue for ever, was then likewiſe made out at large; and conſequently that the Duration thereof had no Beginning, and ſhall continue through Ages that can never come to an End. Abſolute Time then, is an abſolute Infinite, becauſe it could have no Beginning, nor can it poſſibly come to an End; more than the unbegun and never ending Being, whoſe Duration is evidently Infinite. Moreover, could we imagine a Time when nothing exiſted, or ſhall exiſt, but Time; yet we cannot ſuppoſe that ever there was, or can be a Time, when Time neither was, nor ſhall be. For a Time paſt, when there was no Time, or yet to come, when there ſhall be none, is a Time when there was, and a Time when there ſhall be no Time. A Contradiction no leſs repugnant to

Reaſon, than if one ſhould ſuppoſe that the preſent Time is, and is not; or is both paſt, and to come. For the preſent Time may as well be, and not be, or be both future and paſt, as any part of Time paſt, or yet to come, could have been, or poſſibly hereafter can be, without the Time that formerly was, or hereafter ſhall be preſent. Upon the whole then it is evident, that the extenſion of Space, whether conſider'd as it implies abſolute Time (the ſame with Eternity) or abſolute Place (the ſame with that interminable Void which comprehends all Things, being it ſelf Incomprehenſible) is truly and in all Reſpects illimited. Now to apply this to the Solution of your Queſtion, Whether or no Space is a Created or Uncreated Being? If Created (ſay you) then ſomething Created is infinite, Space being certainly boundleſs (as hath juſt now been demonſtrated) which would overturn my Proof of this Truth, that every Creature is limited; and if Uncreated, then it follows, that it is either the Creator of all, or that there is ſome real, nay even infinite Thing, which is neither Created nor Uncreated. To this Objection I thus reply, that Finitude and Infinitude don't denote real Beings, more than the Conception of Humanity in the abſtract, denotes a particular Man. As this Conception is a meer Fiction of the Brain, by which, from this Idea of any particular Man, that he's a Being made up of Body and Mind, it forms the Notion of Humanity in the abſtract, which is a bare Idea, and no more; becauſe there is no ſuch thing as Humanity in the abſtract, for human Nature exiſts no where but in individual Perſons. Nor is there any *Apothegm*

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in Philoſophy more certain than this, that whatever has a real Exiſtence, is of a ſingular Nature; and conſequently, that Univerſals have only an Ideal or Fictitious Exiſtence in the Minds of Contemplative People: So in like manner, Finitude or Infinitude are meer Mental Abſtractions, relating to ſome particular Finite or Infinite, and have no more reality in them, than is in the general Idea of Humanity, conſider'd in an abſtraction from every particular Man, by the force of a Mental Energy.

Phyg. To what purpoſe ſerves this Metaphyſical Exſpatiation? Suppoſe I own it through-out; yet I ſee not how it can be apply'd to the ſolution of this Difficulty, that if abſolute Space be infinite, it muſt therefore, according to your Sentiments who maintain that whatever is infinite is uncreated, be the Creator of all beſides; ſince (as I ſaid before) there can be no intermedial Being between the Creator and the Creature, all that is, was, or ever can be, being either a Creature, or the great Creator of all.

Eub. I dare not aver, nor pretend here to determine, that abſolute Space, as it implys what we conceive concerning the infinite extenſion of Place, and Duration of time, repreſents the real immenſity and eternity of God. Becauſe theſe Properties may belong to him (as every Thing elſe doth) in a far more tranſcendent manner than our Conceptions can reach. But ſo much I will preſume to affirm, that ſince he exiſts every where, as he has done from everlaſting, and ſhall for ever exiſt; therefore we cannot (at leaſt during the preſent State of our

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ſlow and ſhort ſighted Faculties) have any other Notion of his ubiquity or of his Eternity, but what muſt be in ſome meaſure conformable to the Conceptions we have of illimited Space, that is of abſolute Time and Place: And therefore I hope it will neither be cenſured as heretical Pravity, nor conſtrued unphiloſophical Precipitance, tho' I conclude, that there is ſome ſingular, but unaccountable Relation (I had almoſt ſaid Connexion) between him who exiſted from everlaſting, and to everlaſting ſhall exiſt every where; and the illimited extent of abſolute Time and Place. For this is no more than to think of him according to the moſt natural Notions we have of his Being, or can poſſibly compaſs at preſent by whatever we know of the Univerſe; from which Knowledge alone it is that we derive a demonſtration of his Exiſtence, or of any of his peculiar and diſtinguiſh'd Perfections. E'er I leave this Matter, *Phygellus*, you muſt permit me to tell you that you are loſt in the dark, in inferring from any thing I aſſerted concerning illimited Space, as if it had imply'd that either Time or Place (how unbounded ſoever they may be) are the ſame with the immenſe and eternal Being. In refuteing this allegation againſt me, you'll perceive that what a while a go you call'd a metaphyſical expatiation ſerves to a Purpoſe you was not then aware of. For as Humanity in the abſtract Notion of it, is not the Human Nature of any particular Perſon; but only a Fiction of Philoſophy not inferior (in the way of Fiction) to that of Adoption in the Law; ſo neither is the forementiond immenſity of Duration or local extenſion, the immenſe and

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eternal Being: But only an abſtraction of thought by which we apprehend his infinitude, which yet is no more himſelf, than finitude, (which is but the Mode of a finite Being denoteing it's exiſtence within Bounds) is the very finite Being it ſelf exiſting under that limited Modification.

Phyg. You rather perplex than perſwade me, by the art you have of involving an Argument in abſtruſe and intricate Speculations. Pray tell me plainly, whether or no Space is ſomething or nothing, whether or no it is created or uncreated.

Eub. I have told you again and again, that tho' in it ſelf it is neither Matter nor Mind, yet it is ſomething ſo real, that without the Notion of it we have reaſon to conclude we could have no Notion of any Thing elſe. I further add, that it is not a Creature; becauſe I have no Conception that it can be annihilated by creating Power; nor yet that it is the Creator of all Things: But (as I ſaid before) an eternal and inexplicable concomitant of the infinite Mind who exiſts in it, and whoſe immaterial eſſence is commenſurate to it, as an immaterial Modification of his unbounded exiſtence. Now as this is all I can ſay of it, ſo neither am I aſhamed to confeſs that my finite Underſtanding cannot find out a proper Name to ſignify that which has ſo peculiar a relation to the eternal and infinite Mind.

Phyg. It ſeems more rational to ſuppoſe, that the eternal Mind exiſts in ſome particular Diſtrict, or rather individual Point of infinite Space; than that his Exiſtence ſhould be commenſurate to, and diffuſed through the whole of it: And that for theſe ſeveral Reaſons, 1. Becauſe a Spiritual

Spiritual Being is incapable of extention. 2. Becauſe where-ever the Almighty Mind exiſts, he exiſts entirely; and therefore in ſome individual point of Space, for if he exiſt intirely in this, and that, and every part of Space, thence it will follow, that he is one, multiplied into many Gods, indeed no fewer than the infinite Number of Points comprehended in infinite Space, in every one whereof, he is ſuppoſed intirely to exiſt. If he don't exiſt thus intirely in every part of infinite Space, then he exiſts no where intirely, neither here, nor there, nor yonder; but every where only by a partial Exiſtence. 3. Becauſe, according to the Sentiments of thoſe whom you ſtile Believers, he hath an Imperial Throne in Heaven, where the Bleſs'd, to whom he diſplays himſelf, behold the Splendor of his Glory. From all which I think it reaſonable to conclude, that his Infinity conſiſts in the amplitude of his unbounded Power, Wiſdom, and all other imaginable Excellencies; but not in that of his illimited Exiſtence, commenſurate to the infinitude of Space.

Eub. The firſt Reaſon why you make this Concluſion, is, becauſe a Spiritual Being is incapable of Extention. It is I own incapable of Extention, as it belongs to Material Beings, Compoſed of Parts diſcerptible from one another; but not incapable of that immaterial extention which appertains to Space, whoſe Parts are indiſcerptible. Becauſe, where-ever the Almighty Mind exiſts, he exiſts intirely; therefore you infer again, that his Exiſtence is not co-extended with, but confined to one Point of Space. To which I anſwer, *Firſt*, That accordingly you muſt

muſt ſuppoſe the infinite Being, the moſt finite One imaginable, the Being that muſt exiſt every where, exiſting almoſt no where. And *Secondly*, That the Integrity of his Exiſtence, conſiſts not in his exiſting intirely in every Point of Space (for that would infer indeed an unnumber'd Multiplication of his individual Being) but in the immaterial coextenſion of his immaterial Eſſence, with that of infinite Space, which makes his immaterial Reſidence. If you urge the Queſtion, Is he intirely every where? I reply, he is excluded no where, for he is infinite in himſelf; but having no Notion of the Parts of a Spiritual Being, how his infinitude is ſpred through infinite Space, I cannot tell. He is infinite in his Power, for he can exert it every where, tho' I know not how. He is the ſingle Infinite, and abſolutely perfect Being, unmultipliable into more than one, for a plurality of Infinites abſolutely perfect, is utterly impoſſible; becauſe there is nothing in, nor belonging to any one of them, that is not in, and belonging to every one of them, which utterly removes the Notion of their plurality, and reſolves them at laſt into one Numerical, being infinitely perfect. As for what you object in the third Place, relating to the Throne of God diſplay'd to the Bleſs'd in a State of Glory; I tell you, that Objection is a meer Sophiſm in the Mouth of an Unbeliever; and add further, that the Almighty Mind can erect his Throne of Glory, and Seat of Judgment too, among his intelligent Creatures, when and where-ever he thinks fit. And thus I hope I have thoroughly refuted one of your moſt formidable Objections againſt Religion, which would have

come

come in more pertinently, had you ſtarted it the other Evening.

Phyg. I muſt confeſs it is neither conſonant to the Notion I had of God, as being the ſame with the Frame of Nature; nor to the more rectified Idea which you gave me of him, and made me then acquieſce in as the only true one. However, you muſt permit me to deſire a Solution of Difficulties as they occur to my Mind, without Regard to a Methodical Connexion; while I reap Inſtruction from your Replies, as I have done from the laſt you made to me. For that end I thus preceed to lay before you more of my Objections. Tho' perhaps no Creature is poſſeſt of any one infinite Property, yet that ſuch a Creature there may be implies no Contradiction; ſince there may be infinites of ſeveral Sorts which have no neceſſary Connection one with another. For inſtance, a Line limited at one end and not at the other, a Parallelogram infinitely long and finitely broad, a Solid infinitely long and broad, but finitely thick. You know *Eubulus* that Philoſophers of no ſmall Renown reaſon at this rate, and if they argue right, then I think it will follow, that even a created Being may be endow'd with more than one infinite Property: and conſequently your Arguments to prove that every created Thing muſt of neceſſity be finite fall to the Ground.

Eub. I am not ignorant that the preceding Poſitions are maintain'd by ſome Men of diſtinguiſh'd Sagacity, who tell us withal that finites and infinites are ſo very diſſimilar, that no finite can make any part of what they denominate infinite. But with due Deference to their Mathematical

matical Penetration, I muſt crave leave to diſſent from them as to ſome of their mixt Contemplations, in which Metaphyſical Knowledge ſeems mainly concern'd, and ſhould therefore (at laſt) be jointly conſulted. The Reaſon they give why no finite can make a part of an infinite is this, that there is no aſſignable Proportion between that part and ſuch an whole. No number of Additions of the one to it ſelf, the Sum whereof will riſe up to that of the other. But I can ſee no Reaſon why a Foot or twelve Inches in length, may not be a part of their infinite Line. Is it becauſe no number of Additions of twelve to it ſelf will ever terminate in an infinite Sum? Why then do theſe very Men inform us, that the generation thereof, tho' impoſſible in any aſſignable Portion of time, (becauſe that is too ſhort for performing all the Operations neceſſary towards the Generation of ſuch a Sum) implies no Contradiction in the nature of Things? For if a finite Number (ſee Doctor *Cheyne*'s *Philoſ. Prin. Cap.* 4. *Sect.* 6.) may be once added to it ſelf, it may be added again and again, and ſo on continually; and conſequently the Addition of it to it ſelf *in infinitum* (the Sum of all which Additions would make an infinite number) implies no Contradiction. And by Conſequence (ſay I) Unity may be divided till a Cypher come to ſtand in the Quotient, for if the continual Addition of it to it ſelf (which implies no Contradiction) would produce an infinite Number by a Parity of Reaſon, the continual Diviſion and Subdiviſion thereof muſt terminate in nothing. But what then becomes of the boaſted of Demonſtrations of the infinite Diviſibility

visibility of Matter? Now how the Doctor came, notwithstanding what he lays down in the forecited Section, soon after to assert, *Sect.* 9. That finite is no part of infinite, is a Mathematical Riddle which I cannot resolve. For to me it appears plain, that the length of twelve Inches is part of a Line made up of an infinite Number of Inches, according to his way of Reasoning; I say a part similer to the whole, which according to him can be nothing else but an infinite Line compounded out of the continual Addition of the length of twelve Inches to it self, which the Doctor owns a Thing that implies no Contradiction.

Aliquando bonus ipse dormitat homerus.

However, such a Slip (if it is one) should be easily forgiven, in a Discourse on a Subject so very intricate as that of Infinites must be to the most penetrating intellect of Mankind in the state of their Mortality. As for the Instances of a Line limited one way, and illimited an other, of a Parallelogram infinitely long, but finitely broad, or of a solid infinite both in length and breadth, but finite in it's thickness; believe me *Phygellus*, all this looks so like a stick with one end, or an unfigured Figure, or a Thing infinite and not infinite; that no Account should be made of nor Regard had unto any sort of Calculations composed by the means of Lines or Numbers, which tend to confound together our Ideas of finites with the one and only infinite being. All besides this Being, to which we give the Name of infinite, is really finite: And there-

therefore our Application of that Name to finite Things, if it is not Profane, is yet far enough from the proper Idioms of a truly Philoſophical Dictionary; and is no doubt occaſion'd by the partial Ideas we have of the every way incomprehenſible Dimenſions of the one and only Being that is truly infinite. Upon the whole then; the Authority of the Philoſophers you refer to has no place in the Deciſion of our Debate; becauſe how diſtinguiſh'd ſoever they may be for their Knowledge of Arithmetick, yet while they confeſs that their Numbers are only Signs of finite Quantities, they ſtand upon the Level with other People as to this Point: And there I think they ſhould be content to ſtand during their Diſputes concerning Infinites, till the Time come, when they ſhall have found infinite Numbers to expreſs infinite Quantities, a Time I believe they quite deſpair to live to, and would be well pleas'd if they could but make a tollerable Progreſs in the Arithmetick of Indefinites, which it's probable had been made long a go, if they had not too haſtily aſpired after that of Infinites; which, if I am not much miſtaken, is quite Chimerical where it coincides not with that of Indefinites. Nor can it ever be otherways, as I imagine; for while there is, or poſſibly can be, but one infinite in Nature, pray what elſe can the Numbering of Infinites ever amount to but the Numbering of ſo many Nothings, to which a ſpecula-

tive Man (I had almoſt ſaid an idle one) gives the Name of ſo many Somethings?

Phyg. Eubulus, you ſtorm me in my ſtrong holds, but I am not aſham'd of being baffled in ſo good Company, as was the laſt in which you attack'd me. You have convinced me that God is the great Creator of the Fabrick of the World, and that as the immenſity of his Exiſtence infinitely exceeds the whole Compaſs of Creation, ſo every Creature by reaſon of its Conſtitution and Circumſtances, muſt exiſt within limits; yet when all is done, I eſteem this ſo important a Point, that I can never be too well confirmed in the Belief of it: And ſhall therefore be glad to hear what you can ſay further to prove it.

Eub. To be liable to Alteration (and conſequently not to exiſt by way of a neceſſary Emanation from its Cauſe) is another Property inſeparable from the adequate Idea of what is Created. I ſhall illuſtrate the Truth of this Propoſition, and ſhew the connexion between it and my Inference from it. That a created Being is obnoxious to alteration, both in it ſelf, and as to its Circumſtances, is evident in Fact. We feel it in our ſelves, we ſee it in all we obſerve; we are here this Moment, and elſewhere the next; by Day we are awake, and aſleep in the Night, and that's no ſmall Alteration. We ſtep into

to the action of Life, out of a lifeleſs and actionleſs State. We grow up by degrees, and by degrees we decay. The Sentiments of Childhood are very different from thoſe of our Youth, and the raſhneſs of Youth-hood differs no leſs from the diſcretion of riper Years. How diverſified is the Bloom of Life, from the Blaſtings which appears in grey Hairs, and the Languor of old Age? Doth not a fit of Sickneſs make the ſtrong Man feeble? A Surcharge of Stout Liquor diſables him to ſtand. We come into the World we know not how, we go out of it we know not when, nor whither. All the Time of our Abode in the Body, we are expos'd to unceſſant Viciſſitudes, continually changing our State from the Cradle to the Grave: Vigorous and Weak, Hot and Cold, Gay and Grieved, Drooping and Chearful by Turns; till Death the greateſt Change we undergo on this ſide of the Day of our Reſurrection, put a period to the manifold Alterations of our Mortal State. And there is a viſible Analogy between theſe Mutations we feel in our ſelves, and what is conſpicuous in the whole compaſs of our Obſervation of other Things. Fire and Water, Earth and Air, are ſubject to violent Agitations. The Celeſtial Bodies are ever moving, probably therefore waſting; certainly ſome way changing, becauſe ſtill in Motion. Nay Time it ſelf, though ſteady like the *Punctum ſtans* of the Schools, or rather the ſtagnant Ocean of Eternity, ſeems

diverſified by Day and Night, and the ſwift Succeſſion of diſtinguiſh'd Seaſons. All but unbodied and unbounded Space, which, like him in whom we live, and move, and have our Being, is indiſcerptible, incorruptible, immoveable, is every Moment obnoxious to Mutation.

Phyg. Our own feeling is of a very narrow Compaſs, and the intire Circuit of our Obſervation, falls ſo ſhort of all that lies within the Circumference of Nature's Frame, that you'll never fetch from Conſiderations of this kind, more than a probable Proof of what you pretend to demonſtrate by indubitable Evidence; exhibit this Evidence if you can, and I'll embrace it with Pleaſure.

Eub. To leave then the Argument as it is founded upon Fact, and paſs to another taken from the nature of Things. I affirm further, that whatever is Created, muſt either be Body or Mind. If Body, it muſt conſiſt of Parts indefinitely diviſible, and conſequently no leſs variable; for an indefinite Diviſion, will make an indefinite Variety in the Caſe. Again, it muſt either be in a ſtate of Reſt or Motion. If in that of Reſt, it is capable of Motion; and if in Motion, it is capable of Reſt, and of various degrees, both of the velocity and continuance of its Motion, e'er it returns to reſt; and conſequently of much Variety in its Condition. On the other hand, if a created

ated Being is of a Spiritual Nature (for ſuch a one you muſt allow me at preſent to ſuppoſe as poſſible) it is either capable of ſubſiſting in a State of Union with, or Diſ-union from a Material Vehicle. If it ſubſiſt in the former State, it is thereby ſubject to that great variety of Sentiments to which we feel our own Minds obnoxious through the Organiſm of our Bodies: If in the latter, then it muſt either retain its old Sentiments without the help of Bodily Impreſſions, and ſo have the like mutable Feelings, as it had before in its imbodied State, or acquire a ſucceſſion of new Ones ſome other way (which muſt infer no ſmall Alteration in its State) or looſe its Sentiments intirely; and that is a formidable Change indeed, no leſs a Change than the falling out of Being, into Nothing. For ſince a Power to think is eſſential to a thinking Being, therefore to ſtrip it of that Power, is in Effect to deſtroy its Exiſtence. For to take away a Power to Think, from a Being veſted with that Power, is to make it as different from it ſelf, as a Power to Think is from an utter Incapacity of Thoughtfulneſs; and what elſe is that but to deſtroy it? Further yet, *Phygellus*, you know that a Created Being muſt owe its Exiſtence to a Creating Cauſe, and conſequently muſt depend intirely on its Creator. Now whatever depends intirely on another, exiſts, no doubt, by the Power of that other; and may therefore be reduced to Nothing, by the

Power which did produce it; and muſt ever be liable to that meaſure of Mutability which the Author of its Being thinks fit to entail upon it.

Phyg. You have more than ſufficiently evinced the Truth of this Propoſition, that to be obnoxious to Alteration, is a Property inſeparable from the Conſtitution of whatever is Created. But I ſee not after all, that therefore a Creature cannot exiſt by way of a neceſſary Emanation from its Creating Cauſe. Make out the Connexion between this Conſequence, and the alterability of Created Beings, and you'll oblige me not a little.

Eub. In doing this there is ſo little Difficulty, that the Obligation cannot be great. For whatever exiſts by way of a neceſſary Emanation from an uncreated cauſe, is neceſſarily and every where exiſtent; nay, is coeval and coeſſential with it's Cauſe, and conſequently every way the ſame with it. It is I ſay neceſſarily exiſtent, by reaſon of it's neceſſary Emanation from a neceſſary Cauſe. To think otherways of it, is to ſuppoſe it's exiſtence contingent and periſhable: that's to ſay, it is a Thing neceſſarily exiſtent, by virtue of it's neceſſary Emanation from a neceſſary Cauſe; and yet not neceſſarily exiſtent, becauſe a periſhable Being. A Contradiction no leſs palpable than this, a Thing exiſtent and not exiſtent. For a Thing

Thing may as well exiſt and not exiſt at the ſame Moment of time, as exiſt by a contingent Emanation from it's eternal and neceſſary Cauſe. But again, whatever exiſts by ſuch an Emanation, is every where exiſtent; for (as was made out at our former Interview) the Cauſe thereof being uncreated and uncircumſcrib'd, is every where exiſtent, and conſequently the effect which neceſſarily Emynates from ſuch a Cauſe muſt alſo exiſt every where. Beſides, whatever exiſts by a neceſſary Emanation from a neceſſary Cauſe, certainly exiſts neceſſarily, and whatever exiſts neceſſarily muſt exiſt every where; for if it exiſt not every where, then wherever it is, it's exiſtence is contingent. This Moment it may be here, and the next it may be hurried away a thouſand Miles hence. It may be continually changing it's ſituation, and conſequently can be no where neceſſarily exiſtent. Now, to ſay that a Thing is no where neceſſarily exiſtent, is in effect to affirm that it is not a neceſſarily exiſtent Thing. Further yet, I aſſert that whatever exiſts by a neceſſary Emanation from an uncreated, and conſequently an eternal Cauſe, muſt be coeval and coeſſential with it's Cauſe; and therefore every way the ſame, with it. That it muſt be coeval to it's Cauſe, is apparent in that it neceſſarily iſſues from it; and therefore coeſſential with it too, ſince nothing can ceceſſarily iſſue from another, but as it partakes of the natural and intrinſick Pro-

perties of that other from which it is propagated. And we may as well imagine Heat and Light, tho' neceſſary Emanations from the Sun, neither coeval with nor connatural to it, as imagine any Creature whatſoever to iſſue neceſſarily from it's uncreated Cauſe, without being both coeval and coeſſential with it's Cauſe. In ſuppoſing therefore the Complex of the Creation a neceſſary Emanation from an uncreated cauſe, you do but confound the two together. For there can be no difference between that and this, if that is neceſſarily and everywhere exiſtent as well as this, if the one is coeval and coeſſential with the other. For to exiſt always, neceſſarily, and every where, as you muſt here ſuppoſe both concerning the Cauſe and the Effect, implys ſuch an Identity of exiſtence, as deſtroys all diverſity between them; an exiſtence which can only belong to the one infinite, ſelf-exiſtent, and eternal Being. A Truth *Phygellus*, which you'll never doubt of, while you remember and reflect on the Arguments by which I proved it at our preceding Conference.

Phyg. You argue all along as if I underſtood, that a neceſſary Emanation of Creatures from their uncreated Cauſe, implies a Subſtantial efflux from that Cauſe, like that of Light from the Sun, or of a Stream of Water iſſuing from it's Fountain. Whereas I mean no more by it, but an effectual, tho'

tho' neceſſary production of Creatures by the Power of their Creator. How an act of Power can produce ſomething out of nothing, is I confeſs a riddle above the reach of my Faculties; but neither can I unravel this Myſtery, how my Mind doth produce and multiply it's own Ideas; yet ſure I am it does ſo, and does ſo too by a mental Pregnancy which I cannot explain, and in a manner neceſſary, at leaſt in many Inſtances, indeed no fewer than all the ſimple Ideas which are convey'd to my Mind through my Senſes, not only without, but even in Oppoſition to many Acts of my Will to the contrary. Now, if the finite Power of my Mind can as 'twere create (and that too whether I will or no) it's own Ideas out of Nothing, and afterwards range and connect them by the Rules of Judgment and Deliberation, why may not (by a certain ſort of Analogy) the infinite Power of the eternal Mind have thus produced the complex of the Creation out of Nothing? and thereupon have connected all it's Parts by a conſequent Act of unerring Reaſon, conſequent I ſay, according to our imperfect Apprehenſions, tho' really Simultaneous in it ſelf with the neceſſary Act of Creating Power.

Eub. Faint *Phygellus*, very faint indeed is the Shadow of the Creating Power of God in that Power you have of forming your own Ideas,

Ideas, and not ſo much as a Shadow in the main Inſtance you intend by it. For what you call a Power to produce the ſimple Ideas of Senſe, is rather a Paſſion than a Power; a Capacity to receive, but not at all to excite the Senſations ariſing from ſenſible Conveyances, without the Stroke of exterior Objects upon the Senſes. Otherwiſe you may as well ſuppoſe that the Power of creating the Idea of Colours or Sounds is in the Ear or Eye, or even in the Air which tranſmits Light and Sounds to their reſpective Senſes, as in the Mind which is the only true Recipient of theſe Senſations. For as your Mind or mine cannot have the Idea either of Sounds or Colours, but through the Ear or Eye; ſo neither doth the Ear or Eye receive Ideas of that kind (that's to ſay, enable the Mind not to create, but barely apprehend ſenſible Conveyances) otherways than through the Air, and by the Means of Light and Sonorous Objects. From all which it doth appear, that the Mind of Man is ſo far from having a Power to create it's own Ideas, that on the contrary, it has only a Capacity to entertain the Images of exterior Objects tranſmitted thro' the conveyance of Senſe, of which we can give no other Account than this, that it is the Will of God, that theſe Images ſhould be thus convey'd. As for the Power we have to rank and range our Ideas thus conveyed and exiſted in us, we know not how, to couple or disjoin them, and view them in the various Shapes of their Union

or

or Disjunction, all this falls ſo ſhort of creating Power, which implies a Power to rear ſome real Thing out of nothing (and that ſure is more than the bare Idea of ſuch a Thing) that it can never riſe above an Architectonick Power, which cannot operate without a pre-exiſtent Matter, nor riſe above the Rectification of it's Models, nay nor ever reſt ſatisfied in any of them, if for no other Reaſon, at leaſt for this, that the Architect can only alter the Figure or Colour of what is created: But cannot create the ſmalleſt Crum of Matter towards the Complexion of his Workmanſhip.

Phyg. Well, *Eubulus*, ſo far I ſubmit to your Corrections in this Caſe, but don't yet apprehend that you have proved the exiſtence of Creatures not to be the reſult of God's creating Power, as neceſſarily as my Perception of Ideas is the reſult of exterior Objects ſtriking my Senſes; or the ſeeing ſome of the References which theſe Ideas have to one another, is of the Power I have to couple and compare them in the Contemplations of my own Mind. Omitting then the Inquiry, how any Power, how great ſoever, can make that which this Moment is not, to ſtep up into exiſtence the next, (for that's an unfathomable Myſtery) pray demonſtrate to me if you can, that no Creature could exiſt from Eternity (and therefore neceſſarily) tho' not by way of a ſubſtantial

ſtantial Emanation from God himſelf, (for I ſee that Suppoſition is abſurd) ſo neither could it eternally exiſt by an effectual Operation of his reſiſtleſs Will. For if every Creature crept out of nothing into Being by an Act of his Will (which I ſuppoſe is your Opinion) and if from Eternity he could have will'd any one or all of them to have been; then from Eternity one and all of them might have been. And I may add, that if all of them were of a temporary Date, then innumerable Ages paſt e'er any of them had a Being: And if ſo, then it is not eaſy to conceive why any one of them ſhould ever have been created. For as it cannot be denied, that the eternal Mind was eternally conſcious of his own creating Power, and conſequently that the Ideas he had of all his Creatures (which ſome have ſtiled an Ideal World) was coeval with that conſciouſneſs; ſo if for number'd Ages theſe Creatures had no real Exiſtence, then for unnumber'd Ages more, and ſo onwards ſtill for more and more, they might not have exiſted; and conſequently might never have been at all. But if all the Works of God were made in Wiſdom, where was the Wiſdom of making them ſo late? Whereas they might have exiſted ſooner and ſooner, and even from Eternity, by the exertion of eternal Power. Or, Why were they made at all? If there was no need of their Exiſtence for an immenſity of Years. What ſignified that Power which

which lay ſleeping in it's Source for ſo many innumerable Ages?

Eub. Here you have heapt together various Thoughts to ſupport your tottering Structure of Infidelity: The moſt ſpecious of your Miſtakes is this, that ſince the Creature owes it's Exiſtence to the Will of the Creator (as no doubt it does) therefore it might have exiſted from Eternity, if the Creator had will'd it that way to exiſt. That thus he might have willed it to exiſt you make no queſtion, becauſe he was eternally conſcious of his Power to exert that Act of Will which might have given it exiſtence. Your Argument reduced to Form is this, the Creature owes it's Exiſtence to the Will of the Creator; therefore it might have exiſted from Eternity if the Creator had will'd it that way to exiſt. Your antecedent is abſolute (and I own it in it's abſolute Senſe) but your Inference from it is Hypothetical, and therefore falſe; becauſe it contains a Suppoſition not implied in your Antecedent, and conſequently not to be drawn from it. To ſtate then your Argument fairly, you muſt either ſtrike your Suppoſition out of your Inference, or add it to your Antecedent. Let us try it both Ways, and ſee what comes on't. Firſt, By adding it to the Antecedent, then it ſtands thus, the Creature owes its Exiſtence to the Will of the Creator, if he had willed it eternally to exiſt; there-

therefore it might have exiſted from Eternity had he willed it that way to exiſt. It's plain that the Hypotheſis thus added to the antecedent is of no ſignification at all; nor can the Antecedent, being an abſolute Truth, admit of any Suppoſition which has Senſe in it, becauſe that Suppoſition limits what is abſolute. But again, Let us cut off the Hypotheſis from the Inference, then it ſtands thus, the Creature owes it's Exiſtence to the Will of the Creator, therefore it might have exiſted from Eternity, the Conſequence here is manifeſtly falſe, becauſe it implies more than is contain'd in the Antecedent. For to have exiſted from Eternity is more than barely to exiſt by the Will of God. All you can crave by your Argument with any Colour of Reaſon amounts to this, that the Creature might have exiſted from Eternity, if the Creator had will'd it that way to exiſt. Whence I retort on the other Hand, that therefore the Creature could not exiſt from Eternity, if the Creator will'd it's Exiſtence to commence with Time. This then is the Inquiry to be made in the Caſe before us, whether or no the Act of Creation is a free or conſtrain'd Act of the Creator. If it is a free one, then certainly the exiſtence of the Creature might commence ſooner or later according to the Good Pleaſure of the Creator; if a conſtrain'd one, then that conſtraint muſt either be Natural or Adventitious to the Creator.

Creator. If natural, then he's a neceſſary Agent in all his Actions, a Creator by neceſſity of Nature; and conſequently every Creature muſt be eternal, neceſſarily exiſtent and independent, that's to ſay, not a Creature; but, how Vile ſoever, an eſſential part of, or efflux from the glorious Creator. Theſe, and the like unavoidable Conſequences of this Suppoſition, are ſo inconſiſtent with your former Conceſſions, and indeed with common Senſe, that it can be no leſs abſurd to maintain them, than a ſecond Refutation muſt be uſeleſs to you, if you can recollect the former. That no adventitious conſtraint can accrue to the Creator from any Thing exterior to him, is as evident as it is, that the Creature can lay no conſtraint upon the Creator, and all that is exterior to him being Created; therefore the ſuppoſition of any exterior conſtraint upon him, muſt be alike abſurd and impious.

Phyg. It's my Fate, I find, to have my Head fill'd with many frivolous Objections againſt Matters of the greateſt Moment. But if you can give me any further Satisfaction as to the remnant of my laſt ſuggeſted Scruples, relating to the Wiſdom of God with reſpect to the temporary exertion of his Creating Power, I beſeech you to do it as ſuccinctly as you can, for it grows late.

Eub.

Eub. Don't then interrupt me needleſsly. I proceed now as you deſire. A conſciouſneſs of a Power to act doth not imply the application of that Power in Action, otherwiſe no Agent conſcious of it's own Power to act could ever ceaſe from Action, but by a ſuſpenſion of that conſciouſneſs. If it muſt ſtill Act till that ſuſpenſion ſtop the Courſe of it's Activity, thence a Queſtion will ariſe, whether or no every, conſcious Agent muſt Act, till it's Power of acting is exhauſted. Certainly it muſt, if the Application of it's power in Action is the neceſſary Conſequence of it's conſciouſneſs of having a Power to Act. Now this Suppoſition is not only inconſiſtent with all freedom of Action, but even directly repugnant to that Degree of it which we feel in our ſelves. For we are conſcious that we can deſiſt from acting when we know we have a Power to Act; and alſo that we can forbear to Act while we know our Power of acting is ſo far from being exhauſted; that on the contrary we could Act with Vigor if we would. From all which it follows, that the Creator's conſciouſneſs of his Creating Power doth not infer the Application of that Power. For as a conſciouſneſs of having Power to act does in no Caſe imply the exerciſe of that Power, ſo leaſt of all does it imply it in the Caſe of creating Power other-

otherwiſe theſe Abſurdities would follow, 1. That becauſe the Creator was from Eternity conſcious of the whole extent of his Creating Power, therefore from Eternity he did exert it to it's utmoſt Streatch; therefore from eternity every Creature that can exiſt did exiſt; and therefore to Eternity they muſt exiſt, without Diminution, Change, or Augmentation. 2. That God is not a free, but a neceſſary Agent; becauſe upon the Hypotheſis now arraign'd, the exertion of his Creating Power is not the Prerogative of an uncompell'd Cauſe: But the irreſiſtable Reſult of a Compulſion upon his Power to Act, ariſing from his being conſcious of that Power. Unleſs then you'll eſpouſe the Defence of theſe and many other the like Abſurdities renounced by you in our preceding Reaſonings, you muſt upon no account, and leaſt of all that of the Creator's conſciouſneſs of his Creating Power, argue or imagine that this Power was exerted from eternity. You ſeem to think that a Suppoſition of the Power and Wiſdom of God undiſcloſed for innumerable Ages to his uncreated Creatures is repugnant to Reaſon; as infering, that therefore there was no need that ever either that power ſhould have been exerted, or that Wiſdom have been diſclos'd to any Creature, which had lain unexerted and undiſcloſed Ages without number. Say, *Phygellus*, Are not theſe your Sentiments?

Phyg. Yes they are, for if there was any Reaſon for the Production of Creatures, there was always a Reaſon for it, and if there was always a Reaſon for it, they ſhould always have exiſted: And

if there was ever a Time when there was no Reaſon for their exiſtence, they never ſhould have exiſted, there being no more Reaſon for their exiſting at one Time, than another.

Eub. No doubt there was always a Reaſon for their Production, otherwiſe the infinitely wiſe Creator, who never acts without a Reaſon, would never have produced them; but it doth not follow, that therefore they ſhould always have exiſted. You may have a very good Reaſon for a future Action, which would be improper for you to undertake to Day, though your Power to do it, may be the ſame now, as afterwards. Tho' then a Reaſon why a Thing ſhould exiſt, is always a Reaſon for the exiſtence of that Thing; yet it is not a Reaſon for its exiſting always: Becauſe its future exiſtence may be reaſonable, and therefore its preſent Exiſtence may be improper. For there can be no Reaſon both for its preſent Exiſtence, and a future commencement of its Being; becauſe that's a Contradiction. It is a Reaſon why it ſhould be to Day, againſt a Reaſon why it's Being ſhould begin to Morrow, which is both a Reaſon for, and againſt its Being. And is not this Reaſon againſt a Reaſon? Which in Truth is no Reaſon at all. But further yet, *Phygellus*, pray conſider that there can be no Reaſon why any Thing ſhould exiſt in a manner repugnant to the Nature of that Thing. Now, if eternal Exiſtence implies (as it hath been proved it doth) neceſſary and independent Exiſtence; and if (as hath alſo been demonſtrated) that manner of Exiſtence belongs alone to the eternal Mind, who made and governs all Things;

Things; then it neceſſarily follows, that the act of Creation muſt be of a temporary Date; and conſequently that every Creature had its Origin in Time. For it muſt either have had it in Time, or from Eternity. If in Time, that's the Point I plead for? If from Eternity, then (contrary to what we conceive of every Creature) it exiſts every where, becauſe it exiſted always, it is neceſſarily exiſtent and independent; whereas I have proved, beyond all reaſonable Contradiction, that an independent and neceſſary Exiſtence, every where, and always, are the incommunicable Properties of the one immenſe, eternal, and unoriginated Creator of the World.

Phyg. You compel me at every turn to acquieſce in your Arguments, but after all, though you have convinced me that the act of Creation muſt have been of a temporary Date, yet at the ſame time, I cannot hinder my ſelf from ſuppoſing the effects of Creating Power, of a very ancient Exiſtence; much, indeed vaſtly more ancient, than the *Moſaick* Account of them, which limits their Antiquity at this Day, to leſs than the Space of Six thouſand Years. This I can no more believe, than I can perſuade my ſelf that they have not exiſted the half, nay nor the hundredth part of that Time. For if Creating Power lay unexerted till within theſe Six thouſand Years, it might, methinks, e'en as well have lain dormant and unactive till Yeſterday, till now, and onwards for ever and ever to all Eternity.

Eub. Some of the moſt accurate Commentators on Sacred Writ have not thought the Moſaick Account of the Creation concern'd with more than the ſolar Syſtem; and the very learned and ingenious Maſter *Whiſton*, with no ſmall Shew of Philoſophy, ſuppoſeth it confined to the ſingle World in which we live; and that too in ſuch a manner, as not to reſpect the Creation of our Globe out of nothing; but only the Reduction of its Pre-exiſtent tho' ſtill created Materials from a Catholick Condition into the Conſiſtence of a regular and beautiful World. But be this as it will, the Credit of that Account depending upon an hiſtorical Tradition of Facts, can have no place in the Argument now before us, becauſe abſtracting from hiſtorical Evidence, it turns entirely upon the Point of Reaſoning from the nature of Things. Cutting off therefore your collateral Hints relating to *Moſes*'s Hiſtory, as things quite extraneous to our preſent Purpoſe; let us ſee what can be made on the other Part of your Objection which ſeems to be founded on Reaſon and the Nature of Things. Still you ſtick at the Difficulty of ſuppoſing creating Power Dormant (as you call it) for Ages without number. To remove it, I reply, 1. That there may be more ſenſe in this School Definition of Eternity, that it is, *Tota ſimul & ſemel interminabilis vitæ poſſeſſio*, than moſt Men now adays are well apprized of. The Reaſon of my Suppoſition is this, that as Eternity of Time is as immenſe as the Infinity of Place, ſo therefore it is as immovable too; for I cannot conceive any immenſe Thing moveable. If this Conception

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tion is right, then a Day, a Year, or an Age have the ſame Reference to Eternity, which a Mile, a League or a Degree have to the unbounded Expanſion of immoveable Space: And conſequently, whatever thoſe may be with reſpect to our Thoughts, which cannot comprehend many Things (far leſs all Things at once) yet in themſelves they may be no more in a Flux than theſe. And therefore may appear alike unmoved in the Eye of him who ſees the whole Extent of abſolute Space; that is, of illimited Time and Place, and one individual View; to whom therefore (ſtrictly ſpeaking) a Thouſand Years are but as Yeſterday, or as a Watch in the Night when it is paſt: And conſequently a Million of Millions more are contracted to the Compaſs of one Moment in his infinite Mind, to whom all is preſent, and who therefore ſees all at once. I am the rather inclined to this Opinion, becauſe I think it probable (if not certain) that had every Thing obſervable about us been in a perfect ſtate of Reſt, ever ſince we were born, we ſhould not have had ſuch a Notion of the Fluency of Time, as the moveableneſs of moſt Things which we behold has been the Occaſion of. *Phygellus*, If I am not miſtaken in this part of my Argument, thence it will follow, that the Exertion of creating Power ſooner or later has only a Reference to our created Conceptions; but none at all to the Wiſdom of the Creator, to whom a Million of Ages make but a Moment of Time. And there's an End of your Objection. But here I muſt own, that in what now I have ſaid, I recede ſo far from the Sentiments of the

moſt celebrated Philoſophers; that I chuſe rather to leave what I have thus deliver'd, as at beſt a diſputable Problem, than pretend that it includes an intire ſolution of the Difficulty you propoſed: And therefore I reply, 2*dly*, That the Date of the Exerſion of creating Power is of an Antiquity indefinitely Ancient. There is no aſſignable Point of Time paſt, at which it can be ſaid no Creature did exiſt; no, nor that then Millions of Worlds were not made. That none of them could have exiſted from Eternity is as certain, as it is that a Creature cannot have a neceſſary Exiſtence, independent upon, or coeval with that of its Creator. But that all of them might have exiſted for a number of Ages indefinitely great, and that more and more may ſtill be created for the like Number of Ages yet to come, and that not any one of them that either now is, or hereafter ſhall be, either could have owed, or ever can owe its Exiſtence to the Concurrence of other Cauſes co-ordinate with, or ſubordinate to the Supream Creator in the Work of Creation, are Truths which none who have juſt Notions of infinite Space, and of the incommunicable Power of the infinite Creator, can deny. This will appear plainly to you, if you'll recollect what I have diſcours'd this and the preceding Evening. I ſhall be glad to meet you here again at your leiſure Hours, that we may diſcuſs ſome Points yet untouch'd. It is now late, and I'll detain you no longer.

Phyg. Eubulus, tho' I'm apprehenſive that the frequency of my Viſits may be troubleſome, yet I have reap'd ſo much Benefit by making them; that

that I'm reſolved to be with you to morrow after Noon, at fartheſt about four of the Clock, ſo I bid you good Night.

Eub. You ſhall be heartily welcome, here, then and at all times, while you continue Inquiſitive after the beſt Things. In the mean time I wiſh you good reſt.

DIALOGUE III.

Concerning the Faculties of Human Nature.

Phygellus. I'M come again to you *Eubulus*, with a ſort of agreeable impatience, to have another conference about matters of no ſmall moment.

Eub. Let us loſe no time then, but ſtraight proceed to the examination of theſe Points which you deſire to diſcourſe of.

Phyg. Previous to this, give me leave to lay before you a few Scruples which I carried hence laſt Night, relating to ſome Particulars of our preceeding Inquiries. I cannot conceive Eternity as an immenſe Ocean of ſtagnant time, whoſe Parts are coexiſtent like thoſe of the unbounded Void, nor can I think of it otherways than as a Flux of unbegun Ages continually ſucceeding each other, and ſo ſtill to ſucceed equably for ever and ever: Nor am I ſo fully

fully convinced as I wiſh to be that no co-ordinate nor ſubordinate Power either did or could concur in the work of Creation.

Eub. That there could be no ſuch Concurrence in the Caſe, is very plain; becauſe creating Power implies the production of Something out of Nothing; and therefore appertains alone to the eternal, ſelf-exiſtent, and independent Power, in ſuch a manner that it muſt belong only to God himſelf. If it could belong to any other Being, it muſt either belong to that other eſſentially, or by way of Derivation from him who is the Fountain thereof. Eſſentially it cannot, for then all other Perfections, and conſequently that of being the ſource of all Power would likewiſe belong to it; ſince all poſſible Perfection is included in him who is the Source of Power. Now, that there ſhould be two Sources of Power is a Thing utterly impoſſible; for then there might be two Beings infinitely powerful, infinitely perfect. But two ſuch Infinites there cannot be, for if they are two, they muſt be ſome way different, for if they are no way and in nothing different, then they are every Way and in all Reſpects the ſame; and ſo not two, but one. If they are the ſame in Nature, which they muſt be, becauſe the ſame in all poſſible Perfection, they muſt be the ſame in Number too. The one every way like the other, and every where, where the other is; and therefore not two but really one. Undiverſify'd in Nature, there being nothing in the one that is not in the other, undiſtinguiſh'd in number, becauſe both of them in one and the ſame Place, and ſo not two, but only one, in the

the ſtricteſt Notion of individual Identity. Hence it follows that creating Power, which implys all poſſible perfection in him who is poſſeſt of it, cannot be derived to any Creature, for with that Power all other Perfections go along; and ſo by the former reaſoning the Creature would be numerically the ſame with the Creator. Upon the whole then, a Concreator, whether ſuppos'd coordinate or ſub-ordinate, is a downright contradiction. For creating Power is no leſs incompatible with the condition of a Creature; than the being Created is repugnant to the notion of a Creator.

Phyg. You have over-prov'd this Point, but other Scruples yet remain with me. Pray remove them too.

Eub. I ſuppoſe you mean thoſe you mention'd with reference to the equable Flux of Time.

Phyg. The very ſame, for tho' I can conceive that the eternal Being, becauſe infinite, may exiſt every where at once, ſince all the Parts of abſolute Space, as it reſpects the locality of Beings, are coexiſtent at the ſame time; yet I can no more apprehend that Yeſterday or to Morrow are now preſent to him, than I can conceive the time already paſt, or yet to come coexiſtent now at this very Moment. For the Parts of Time, like thoſe of the Water of a rapid River, follow one another in a cloſe and ſwift Succeſſion; but don't coexiſt together at once like theſe of the unbounded void.

Eub. I rather think Space, as it ſignifies abſolute Time, more coexiſtent, than as it implies abſolute Place. In the one Reſpect it's always equally and intirely coexiſtent with whatever

ever elſe exiſts; but in the other, its Parts are diſtended to the vaſteſt diſtance from ſome to others of them. And if abſolute Time is not coexiſtent with what is periſh'd, or is yet to come into Being, it does not ariſe from any defect on the ſide of Space, that way conſider'd, but only from the total defectiveneſs of the Thing that once was, or hereafter ſhall be, but is not now; for I confeſs, that Eternity it ſelf cannot coexiſt with what has no Exiſtence; and I verily helieve, that had nothing exiſted to this Day but the Eternal Being, both immenſe and immoveable, then to this Day there had been no ſuch Thing as relative Time or Place, which have a reference to finite Creatures, nothing but the infinite Mind occupying unbounded Space in all Reſpects, at once, and altogether. For properly ſpeaking, Time and Place denote only the Modes of the finite Exiſtence of finite Beings, and are not Parts addible to, or ſubſtractable from abſolute Space, as it implies Eternity, and an immenſity of immaterial Extenſion; which have a peculiar relation to the one and only eternal and every way infinite Being: And conſequently when we argue from the Conceptions we have of our own Exiſtence in Time and Place, to the manner of God's Exiſtence in Space, as it includes unbounded Place and Time, concluding thereupon, that becauſe we conceive our own Exiſtence confined to a narrow Compaſs, and ſucceſſive with what we call the run of Time; therefore God's Exiſtence muſt be analogous to ours, then perhaps we argue as much amiſs, as if we ſhould go about to reaſon from the addition of Finites to Infinites, or the ſubſtraction

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of theſe from thoſe; though they are Things of that diſparity which cannot be brought to ply to the Arithmetick of our finite Underſtanding. I ſay, perhaps then we argue thus amiſs, for it becomes me not to be peremptory concering a Point, the maintaining whereof, infers an Oppoſition to not a few Philoſophers of much deſerv'd Renown; eſpecially conſidering, that the main of the Argument I am now upon, ſtands confirmed by other Proofs antecedently explain'd. Let us therefore haſten forward to ſome freſh Inquiry.

Phyg. Good *Eubulus*, not too faſt: Here you muſt bear the being Catechized a little in your Turn. Don't you think that your Exiſtence to Day, is different from your Yeſterdays Exiſtence?

Eub. Yes, no doubt, by the ſpace of one Day, which comprehends Twenty four Hours.

Phyg. Do you think that your Exiſtence now is the ſame, with what it will be to Morrow, if you live till then?

Eub. No, for that would be to ſuppoſe this Day and the next, to be but one and the ſame Day; therefore the length of my Exiſtence to Morrow, will exceed that of this Day, by the ſpace of ſome Hours. Away with this Childiſh Stuff. What mean you by theſe ſilly Queſtions?

Phyg. Let me ask but this one more, and you'll know my Meaning. Don't you think that the Creator coexiſts with the Creature, during the time of its duration?

Eub. If by coexiſting with it, here you underſtand, that he exiſts while it exiſts, no doubt on't. But if by coexiſting, you mean that he exiſts as it exiſts, I think you are greatly miſtaken.

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For it exiſts in a particular Place; but he exiſts every where; its Exiſtence is contingent, and therefore there is no Connexion between its paſt, preſent, and future Exiſtence: But his is neceſſary; and therefore his Exiſtence to Day, implies his Exiſtence to Morrow. Not that to Day and to Morrow are different to him as they are to his Creatures, the duration of whoſe Exiſtence is meaſurable by fleeting Time; for a thouſand Ages added to, or ſubſtracted from the illimited duration of the eternal Being, neither augment nor leſſen the length of that eternal Being's duration.

Phyg. Will you then, *Eubulus*, be ſo bold as to aver, that at this Moment, God exiſts to Morrow?

Eub. Phygellus, I affirm, that this Moment, or to Morrow, are Modes only belonging to the exiſtence of temporary and finite Beings; but are not applicable to the infinite and eternal Mind, as they are to his Creatures. They who maintain, that Eternity implies an unbegun and endleſs equable flux of Moments will never rid themſelves of this Objection, that there are no more Moments of Eternity or abſolute Time yet to come, than are already paſt; and conſequently the Flux of that time being always equable, it muſt of neceſſity come to an end, one half of it being already run out. That is to ſay, Eternity muſt have a Period, and by conſequence at that Period the eternal Being muſt periſh and be no more. And therefore *Phygellus*, rather than be entangled in ſuch a maze of Monſtrous Abſurdities,

ſurdities, I will affirm it ten Thouſand times, that God's Eternity *Eſt tota ſimul & ſemel interminabilis ævi Poſſeſſio.*

Phyg. I cannot but acquieſce in what you ſay, tho' not without ſome perplexity of Thought. However, I hope by Degrees you'll quite obliterate my Libertiniſm.

Eub. In order thereto let this be our next Inquiry, whether or no the Author of our Being hath endued human Nature with Faculties which ſurmount the Strength of Mechaniſm. And ſuppoſing it thus endow'd, inſomuch that the Power of thinking is unapplicable to what is purely material and mechanical; whether or no the Subject in which that Power is ſeated, tho' immaterial and immechanical, is framed for immortality in a future State. And here I muſt lay down the Definition of a Machine, from which the general Idea of Mechaniſm may be drawn. Now a Machine is nothing elſe, but a piece of Workmanſhip compoſed of material Parts artificially put together, and acting upon one another according to the ſtated Laws of Nature viſible in the Energy of Matter and Motion. Theſe Laws how numerous ſoever with reference to the divers Structures of many different Machines; yet none of them but two needs to be conſider'd in the Caſe before us. The firſt is this, that no part of matter now at reſt can move it ſelf; and none in motion can acquire Reſt of its own Accord: And as no Body can move of it ſelf, ſo neither can it, when moved by an Impellent Cauſe, alter the Direction given

ven to it by the impulſe of that Cauſe. For cou'd any piece of Matter now at reſt move it ſelf, or any now in Motion ſtop of its own accord; or any moving (or rather moved) in a ſtreight Line bend its Courſe into an oblique one, or ſtretch its oblique Courſe into a ſtreight one; then certainly the whole courſe of Nature might either run into Confuſion, or come to a deſtructive and ſurpriſing Stand. Becauſe, If one piece of Matter now moving could of it ſelf return to reſt, or now at reſt could move it ſelf, or moved in a ſtreight Line cou'd bend it's Motion into a Curve one, or ſtretch it's Curvilinear Courſe again into a ſtreight one; then no doubt all other Pieces of Matter might do the like, there being no perceiveable Power nor Property reſpecting theſe Effects in any one of them more than in all the reſt. For it is alike obſervable of all them, that when at reſt they never move themſelves, when in Motion they never ſtop but by Reaſon of ſome exterior Obſtruction in their Way, when moved in a ſtreight Line they cannot chuſe a crooked one, or if in a crooked one, they cannot deſert their Curve but by the impreſt Force of ſome external Cauſe. Whence I infer, that tho' every part of Matter muſt either be at reſt or in Motion, and if in Motion, either moved in a ſtreight or crooked Line; yet no part of it is neceſſaily tied down to a State either of Reſt or Motion, nor it's Motion either to that of Streightneſs or Obliquity: For when at Reſt it is capable of Motion, and when in Motion of being reduced to reſt; when moved in a ſtreight Line of being compelled into a crooked one; or out of this in-

into the other again. And conſequently all matter being in it ſelf indifferent either as to Reſt or Motion, and as to this or that Degree or Modification of Motion, it is therefore a Principle purely Paſſive. It moves when moved, ſtops when ſtop'd, this or that way, with this or that Degree of Celerity; according to the Force and Direction impreſt upon it by the Cauſe of its Motion. It requires no leſs ſtrength to put it in motion, than it does to reduce it to reſt. It is therefore in it ſelf wholly inert and unactive; and by conſequence all the Changes it undergoes, either from a State of Reſt to that of Motion, or indeed any other Alteration which can befal it, are the effects of Impreſſions made upon it by ſome exterior Cauſe.

Phyg. Granting all this to be true, I don't ſee to what purpoſe it ſerves; pray therefore apply it to the Caſe in Hand, if you can.

Eub. Have but a little Patience and that ſhall be done by and by. But I muſt firſt explain to you another of the fundamental Laws of Mechaniſm, it is this; that whatever Alteration is made in the Motion of any Body, whether with reſpect to the Degree or Direction of its Motion, it muſt always be conformable to the Degree of the force and nature of the Direction of the exterior Cauſe which communicates the Motion. This is an obvious Conſequence of the former Law, by which it appear'd that no part of Matter owing either any part or direction of its Motion to it ſelf, (the whole on't being every way paſſive) but to the Cauſe that moves and directs it: Therefore it can never move otherways than that Cauſe

Cauſe imparts both the Degree and Tendency of its Motion; for not being able to move at all of it ſelf, its Motion muſt be every way owing to the Cauſe which moves it. Whence it is apparent, that a perpetual Circulation of Motion by mechanical Cauſes, is a Thing impoſſible; for that implies the Propagation of the Motion from one Part of the Machine to another, and ſo round the whole of it, with the Return of that Motion undiminiſh'd to where it began: But there can be no ſuch undiminiſh'd Propagation of Motion, unleſs the Machine were ſet a-going where it met with no manner of Obſtruction. Now it being certain, that every Machine upon Earth is ſurrounded with Air, it muſt, therefore, in the whole Courſe of its Motion, meet with ſome Reſiſtance from that Fluid, and gradually loſe its Motion, as it makes its way thro' that Reſiſtance, till it ſtop at laſt; and conſequently a Circulation of Motion ſo propagated, as to return undiminiſh'd to the Part of the Machine where it began, and whence it was propagated, is as impoſſible, as that the Motion of a Thing, tho' ſtill diminiſhing, ſhould never ſtop. And now, *Phygellus*, if you have any Objections to make againſt theſe Truths, ſpeak them out.

Phyg. Indeed I have none; but, as I ſaid before, I don't perceive to what Purpoſe they ſerve in the Enquiry we are now upon.

Eub. I proceed to ſhew it. We are enquiring, Whether or no the Author of our Being hath endow'd it with Faculties which ſurmount the Strength of Mechaniſm. That he hath thus endow'd it, appears, I think, more ways than one: *Firſt*, From the Organiſm of our Bodies. For if there is any thing to be found in it ſuperior

to the Force of meer Matter and Motion, or any how inconſiſtent with the two formention'd Laws of Mechaniſm; then it certainly follows, that there is ſomething in our organical Structure, which ſurmounts the Strength of mechanical Laws; and conſequently is the Effect of a Power in us ſuperior to the Force of meer Matter and Motion. Now that ſome ſuch ſuperior Thing is to be found in us, is undoubtedly thus demonſtrable. We are abſolutely certain, that in every Machine, ſet a-going by the fore-mention'd Laws of Nature, there is ſome one Part where that Motion begins, and from which its other Movements are derived; and we are more than morally certain, that the Circulation of the Blood iſſues from the Pulſe of the Heart, and that this Pulſe is the Reſult of that Circulation of the Blood; and conſequently, that two Things are mutual Cauſes and Effects of each other. For the Blood cannot move without the Pulſe of the Heart, nor the Heart have Motion without the Circulation of the Blood; and conſequently we are alike well aſſured, that there is ſomething in the organical Motions of an human Body (and indeed of every Animal) which tranſcends the Strength of that Mechaniſm which depends upon meer Matter and Motion; as we are, that two Things cannot at the ſame Time be mutual Cauſes of each other with the ſame ſort of Cauſality; or as we are, that the Motion of the Mill cannot be derived from that of the Wind or Water, and that of the Wind and Water from that of the Mill; and all this too with a Circulation of Motion not only undiminiſh'd, but indeed, I think, increaſing for many Years.

Phyg.

Phyg. You have made it out to me, that there is ſomething in the organical Structure of an human Body, and indeed of every other Animal, which ſurmounts the Force of mechanical Laws; and if you'll tell me what it is, you'll give me in doing it, an ineffable Delight.

Eub. I can give you no other Account of it but this, That it is a Piece of Divine Mechaniſm, ſuperior to the Force of theſe Laws of Nature, by which all other Machines, form'd by a leſs powerful Hand, and having nothing in them above the Reach of mere Matter and Motion, are made and ſet a-going: And if I could give you the Pleaſure you deſire, it would be but a Digreſſion from this Enquiry, whether or no there is ſomething in human Nature which ſurpaſſeth the mechanical Powers of Matter, however artificially put together, or moved by what Springs and Weights you can conceive.

Phyg. You have by one Inſtance convinc'd me of this Truth; and if you have any more, to make it otherways evident, I ſhall be glad to know them.

Eub. Yes, I have, and no leſs perſuaſive than the former. For *(Secondly,)* I ſay, that every Man is conſcious both of a Power to move himſelf by an Act of his own Will, and to vary or ſtop that Motion by a different or contrary Act of his Will; and conſequently carries about with him a continual Evidence, that the Author of his Being hath endow'd him with a Faculty (namely, that of moving himſelf, and of varying or ſtopping that Motion by an Act of his own Will) ſuperior to the Force of mechanical Laws. For all theſe Laws are founded on this Suppoſition, That Matter is an inert, paſſive,

and actionleſs Thing; which can neither move of it ſelf, nor ſtop of it ſelf, nor any how alter the Courſe of its Motion. Which Suppoſition is not only conformable to the uniform and everlaſting Condition of Matter conſider'd in it ſelf, but is ſuch alſo, that were it not true, there could be no ſuch thing as a regular Machine in the World; no ſuch thing as Uniformity in its Movements, had any of its Parts a Power to move, to ſtop, or alter its Motion; ſince that would ſpoil the Regularity of the other Parts of the moving Machine. And therefore, the voluntary Motions of Men, which they can begin, and vary, and break off of their own Accord, afford an unqueſtionable Proof, that the Author of their Being hath endow'd them with a Faculty ſuperior to the Force of Mechaniſm; namely, that of moving, and returning to Reſt, and changing the Courſe of their Bodily Motions, by the interior Acts of their own Will; all which Effects are both above the Reach, and repugnant to the Rules of Mechaniſm.

Phyg. Enough now of this Enquiry; you have led me thro' it by the Light of irreſiſtible Evidence: Let us proceed to the next, which is no leſs important.

Eub. Permit me firſt, to add one Argument more in Confirmation of the former; not that I think it wanted; but becauſe it will ſerve as a good Introduction to our ſubſequent Reaſoning. I aver therefore, (*Thirdly*) That the Power we have to chuſe this or that, or prefer one thing to another, either with or without Deliberation; nay, to chuſe otherways than we are directed by our deliberate Sentiments, is a manifeſt Symptom, that we are poſſeſs'd of a Faculty which tranſ-

tranſcends the Strength of mechanical Laws; for all the Effects of Mechaniſm being neceſſary, therefore no Machine can have the Capacity of chuſing one thing rather than another; and leaſt of all, a Power to do ſo upon Deliberation.

Phyg. None can deny, that a Power to act freely, ſurpaſſes that of Mechaniſm, which is the mere Effect of Force upon the Machine; but many doubt (I ſhould be glad not to be one of them) whether or no Freedom of Action is a Property appertaining to human Nature; becauſe our Thoughts ever running in a rapid Stream, and we, withal, being encompaſs'd with a Variety of Objects, and liable to numberleſs Accidents, which quicken our Paſſions, and thereby increaſe that Rapidity; ſo as to drive it out of the Reach of the Reſtraints of Deliberation; therefore conclude, that Creatures thus kept in an hurry, cannot be free: And add further, that ſuppoſing they could by Deliberation check that Rapidity of Thought at every Turn, into the Compoſure of ſtill and calm Contemplation; yet after all, they are not free, if they muſt ſtill follow Step by Step the ſubtle Influence of that Deliberation. For this (ſay they) ends in a mental Mechaniſm, and is at beſt an imperceptible Force, which determines all our Actions.

Eub. It is ſtrange, that any one ſhould doubt his having a Faculty, of which every one is conſcious to himſelf in the moſt familiar manner, that he daily exerts it. Are not you ſenſible, that by an Act of your Will, you can either ſtand or ſit, move this, or any other way; That you can anſwer theſe Queſtions, or reſtrain your Tongue from replying to them; nay, that you can do ſo, even when you have both an Inclina-

tion to make theſe Replies, and may ſee a good Reaſon for making them?

Phyg. If I anſwer, it is thro' the Impulſe of ſome Motive; if I'm ſilent, there muſt alſo be ſome Cauſe of that Silence; and therefore either way, I am determin'd by ſome Impulſe or other; tho' in the like Caſes, it is not always perceptible.

Eub. Are you not now conſcious of what induced you to anſwer?

Phyg. Yes, I am.

Eub. Could you not have withſtood the Force of that Inducement?

Phyg. I think I could have withſtood it; but then I ſuppoſe that my Silence muſt have been the Conſequence of ſome other Motive more forcible than that which moved me to ſpeak.

Eub. But what if the Motives had been on either Hand equally ſtrong, as certainly they are in every Caſe, where the Action is wholly indifferent; had you not then been at perfect Liberty either to ſpeak, or ſit ſpeechleſs at your own Pleaſure?

Phyg. Had there been nothing to determine me to the one more than the other, then I think I ſhould have remain'd as regardleſs of your Queſtion, as if it had never been propos'd to me.

Eub. After you heard my Queſtion, you could not remain perfectly *in ſtatu quo prius*, becauſe the bare hearing of it made an Impreſſion on your Mind, which you had not before; and having heard it, you might have been ſenſible, that it was in your Power either to reply, or refrain from replying to it, the Inducements to the one or the other being equally forcible; or, if you will, there being no Inducement to either.

Phyg.

Phyg. If there was no Inducement to either, as indeed I think there can be none in a Caſe of ſuch abſolute Indifference, then (as I ſaid before) I muſt have continued as regardleſs of your Queſtion, as if it had not been ask'd.

Eub. Some Regard to it, was the unavoidable Reſult of hearing it, unleſs you can quite forbear regarding what you cannot hinder your ſelf from hearing. And this looks very like hearing and not hearing at once; for the very Act of Hearing, is really an Act of Regard; and to hear a Thing neceſſarily, is really to regard it whether you will or not.

Phyg. You mean a Phyſical, and I only a moral Regard. Phyſically ſpeaking, it was not poſſible for me, after having heard your Queſtion, not to regard it; for that would have been not to have heard it, after I had heard it; but my anſwering or not anſwering, was a Matter of utter Indifference; and therefore, morally ſpeaking, I might have remain'd as regardleſs of it, as if it had not been ask'd; there being no Reaſon neither to perſuade me to Silence, nor to make a Reply.

Eub. Did you not therefore find your ſelf then at Liberty to chuſe either the one or the other? The one or the other was unavoidable; for having heard my Queſtion, you could not avoid either to anſwer, or forbear anſwering; and ſince you own there was no Reaſon for the one more than the other; then either of the two being in your Power, you was at perfect Liberty to chuſe which of them you pleas'd. Whence it appears, that you are a free Agent, at leaſt, in all thoſe Inſtances of Action within the Compaſs of your Power, which are of an indifferent Nature; and

which therefore you may either do, or not do, by the Energy of your Will, left undetermin'd by your Underſtanding in all ſuch Inſtances of Action. But further yet, *Phygellus*, I would have you to ponder with your ſelf, whether or no your Faculty of Freedom extends even to the doing of many Actions, and leaving many undone, in Defiance of the Direction of your own Reaſon. *Video meliora proboque, deteriora ſequor*, is a Truth viſibly verify'd in the Lives of Men; and but too ſad a Proof of their Freedom. Were they not free Agents, they could not act in Oppoſition to the Dictates of their Reaſon, (as daily they do.) This Abuſe of their Liberty is both an Indication of their Freedom, and of their being accountable for their Abuſe of it; becauſe the Abuſe of a Thing ſuppoſes the Exiſtence of that Thing, ſince what is not, cannot be abus'd; and a Being that acts by Neceſſity, can never be blameable for its manner of acting. There can be no moral Obliquity in its Actions, becauſe it conſtantly acts under Compulſion, and according to the Rules and Degrees of that Force which ſets it at work, and directs it thro' the whole Courſe of its Activity; or, rather, Paſſibility; for whatever acts by Compulſion, only ſeems to act, but is really acted by its compulſive Cauſe; which, when viſible, that which is acted by it loſes the Name of an Agent, and comes under that of a paſſive Machine; tho' it may carry the Name of an Agent, while the compulſive Cauſe is unknown; as Puppets do among Children, or groſsly ignorant People, who know nothing of the Springs and Wirework which ſets thoſe Puppets a-moving.

Phyg.

Phyg. I rather think, that the Power which my Paſſions have in determining my Actions, in ſpite of the Dictates of my Reaſon, is a Proof of my fatal want of Freedom; ſince the Puſh of my Paſſions, which iſſues out of my Blood, has ſuch a Force upon me, as to make me act in oppoſition to the Dictates of my Underſtanding: And conſequently, to ſay that one abuſes his Liberty in ſuch a Caſe is but an Abuſe of Language; for in this Caſe he has no Liberty, and therefore cannot abuſe it.

Eub. If in Caſes of this Kind a Man has no Liberty, then Vice and Virtue make but a Diſtinction of Sounds; and morally ſpeaking it is as good an Action to murther a Friend, a Benefactor, or even a Father, as to reſcue them out of Danger: Nay, it is a wiſe one too, if it fetch in but a ſingle Farthing into the empty Purſe of the Murderer, without expoſing him to the leaſt Hazard of being called to an Account for ſhedding of Blood, which in ſome Circumſtances he may be well aſſured of, if a Miracle don't make the Diſcovery of his Crime. And ſuppoſing it made (be how it will) yet it would be very unreaſonable to puniſh the Perſon diſcover'd, for doing an Action which was not only lawful in it ſelf, (there being no more moral Evil in it than in the contrary Action) but alſo reaſonable more or leſs, as it iſſued from a fair Proſpect of more or leſs Gain. Now, can there be either Law or Reaſon in puniſhing one for doing a lawful and rational Thing? Eſpecially, when at the ſame time it is ſuppoſed, that he had not freedom to forbear what he did.

Phyg.

Phyg. If he did it by Neceſſity, by the like Neceſſity he comes to ſuffer for it when he's found out.

Eub. But don't you think that he ought not to have done it; and that he ought to be puniſhed for doing it? If you ſay he ought not to have done it, or, that having done it, he ought to be puniſhed for it; then you affirm, that he ought not to have done what he cou'd not avoid, and ſhould be puniſh'd for doing, it tho' he cou'd not avoid it; which is at once a Contradiction to common Senſe, and the common Notions of Juſtice. If you ſay, he ought not to be puniſh'd for it, the Action being neither good nor ill in it ſelf; this declares all the Acts of Judicature to be Acts of Injuſtice, which naturally tends to an utter Abolition of Government, by deſtroying the Diſtinctions of Right and Wrong among Men, making Theſe chimerical Conceits, and That a mere oppreſſive Machine.

Phyg. I muſt confeſs, I cou'd never receive a ſatisfactory Anſwer to Objections of this Strain, among thoſe whom you call practical Atheiſts. The utmoſt they reply, amounts to no more than this, That theſe Objections are taken from moral Conſiderations, and therefore ought not to be urged in a phyſical Argument, againſt an Opponent who diſputes the Point of Morality till it is proved by Phyſical Conſiderations.

Eub. That is to ſay, till it is proved that a free Agent acts freely in indifferent Actions, which have neither Good nor Evil in them; and has a Power alſo to act after the ſame manner in other Actions which are morally Good or Evil, accordingly as that Power is apply'd to the doing a Right or Wrong, a Juſt or an Unjuſt Thing.

Thing. Now that Man is a Creature endow'd with that Freedom, I think I have made it no leſs apparent, than it is that ſome Actions are neither Good nor Evil, and others are certainly ſo; if there is any Difference between an Act that betrays, and another that preſerves the Life of a juſt and kind Benefactor; in a word, if there is any ſuch Thing as a Right and a Wrong in the Manners of Men through the World. But tell me, *Phygellus*, whether or no, tho' the Workings of your Paſſions are often very vehement, you can nevertheleſs (at leaſt in many Inſtances) delay the indulging them, how ardent ſoever they may be in their Cravings?

Phyg. I feel I can. But what infer you from that; ſince in ſome Inſtances they are ſo very preſſing that I cannot reſiſt their Importunity, nay, not for a Moment, without gratifying them, if it be poſſible.

Eub. I infer, that if in any Inſtance you can ſuſpend that Gratification of them, then in no Inſtance are you forced to comply with them; (at leaſt in none, as I ſhall prove by and by, wherein Morality is concern'd;) for were you in any Caſe compell'd to ſatisfy their Cravings, then by no Conſideration cou'd you at any time refuſe them that Satisfaction; becauſe a neceſſary Agent at all times acts by Neceſſity, and therefore can at no time ſuſpend its Operation by Choice, or defer it upon Deliberation; more than a Clock in good Order, and ſet a-going at Nine in the Morning can ſtop its Motions, and not ſtrike Ten till Noon or Night. E're I leave this Matter, *Phygellus*, I muſt ask you a Queſtion which I had well nigh forgot, and which, tho' it wou'd have been more pertinent a while ago, is of ſo much

Importance

Importance that I can't omit it; 'tis this; Don't you know that Reſpiration is a natural Function of Human Life, continued whether Men ſleep or are awake, without their Care or any act of their own Will about it?

Phyg. Yes, I do.

Eub. And don't you feel that you can ſuſpend, by an Act of your Will, that natural Function, by ſtopping your Breath for a ſhort time?

Phyg. No doubt, I do feel ſo.

Eub. Since you find you have a Power either to quicken, retard, or ſuſpend ſome of the mechanical Motions of your Nature, Is not this a Proof that ſomething muſt belong to it above the Power of Mechaniſm? For there can be no Power in a Machine thus to ſtop or alter its Movements at its own Option.

Phyg. This I take to be a Proof of a certain ſort of Phyſical Liberty appertaining to Human Nature; but ſee not how hence you can deduce a Demonſtration of our Moral Freedom.

Eub. I thought I had done that before, in obliging you to own, that we have a Power to ſuſpend the gratification of our moſt importunate Paſſions by Deliberation; till we ſee Cauſe either to comply with their Cravings, or diſmiſs them with a Denial.

Phyg. I was not quite ſatisfy'd with what you ſaid to that Purpoſe, and wiſh to hear more concerning it; for as it is the main Article of this Controverſy, ſo I think I have ſeveral weighty Objections relating to it.

Eub. Propoſe them then, and e're all is done, I deſpair not to convince you, that they are far from being ſo cogent as now you imagine them.

Phyg.

Phyg. Does not God foreknow all the circumſtantiated Actions of every one of his Creatures before they come to paſs; and your Thoughts and mine even afar off?

Eub. No doubt he does.

Phyg. Can they come to paſs otherways than he foreſees them? Or can ſo much as one of them not happen at all?

Eub. No; for in either Caſe that would fruſtrate infallible Fore-knowledge, which is a Contradiction.

Phyg. If then not one of them can fail of taking Effect, Muſt not all of them come to paſs of Neceſſity, cloath'd with every Circumſtance in which they are infallibly foreknown?

Eub. I own they muſt, otherwiſe infinite infallible Knowledge wou'd be finite and fallible.

Phyg. And can they be both Free Actions, and the Fruit of Neceſſity? I thought a Free Action had been ſuch as a free Agent might either do or leave undone, do at this or at another time, and by divers Means and Methods of acting; all which is falſe, if they muſt neceſſarily come to paſs according to the preciſe Times, Means, and Methods of an infinite and unfruſtrable Foreknowledge.

Eub. You miſtake the Notion of a free Agent, in ſuppoſing that his Freedom conſiſts in a Power to act or not to act, to act this or another Way; (which is only the exerting of his Freedom in Actions purely indifferent) whereas in reality it conſiſts in a Power of Acting without external Compulſion, by virtue of an inward Principle of Will, Wiſdom, and Choice. Thus, tho' the Eternal Being acts by the invariable Views of unerring

unerring Wiſdom, and therefore morally ſpeaking may be ſaid to act by the greateſt Neceſſity, ſince all he does is the Reſult of his Infinite Wiſdom; yet, nevertheleſs, in a Phyſical Senſe he is the only Being of abſolute Freedom, as being infinitely removed from the reach of all External Compulſion, from which none of his Creatures can be exempted, becauſe every one of them is liable to the Force of whatever external Compulſion it pleaſes him to ſubject them to, by his infinite Power in the Courſe of his Providence. Now to apply this to the Caſe in Hand; I ſay, ſuppoſing that all our Actions muſt neceſſarily come to paſs at the Times, by the Means, and in the Methods they are done, otherwiſe they cou'd not be circumſtantially foreknown of God; yet it will not therefore follow that we don't do them freely, unleſs it did appear that that Fore-knowledge compels us to do them. But 'tis plain, that the bare Fore-knowledge of an Action implies no Compulſion on the Agent, who acting by an inward Principle of Will, therefore acts freely, notwithſtanding that Fore-knowledge which makes no Impreſſion upon the inward Powers of the Agent.

Phyg. But if free Actions are thus fore-known, they muſt either be fore-known as they are in their Cauſes, or as they are in themſelves: It cannot be by the latter way, for in themſelves they are nothing till the Agent produce them, and nothing cannot be the Object of Knowledge: Nor can it be by the former, for they cannot be in their Cauſes before their Cauſes have a Being, and you ſuppoſe them fore-known from Eternity, whereas their Cauſes are all of a temporary Exiſtence, and an Infinity of them not yet exiſtent at all. *Eub.*

Eub. Tho' what is not, cannot be the Object of Knowledge; yet, becauſe what is not now may be afterwards, therefore what is not, may be the Object of Fore-knowledge, and muſt be ſo to him whoſe Knowledge is infinite; for that Knowledge extends alike to all that ever was, or is, or can be, not only to the Realities but even to all the Poſſibilities of Things. This is a ſufficient Reply to your laſt Objection; to which I might have anſwered by telling you, that in it you quite altered the State of the Queſtion. For it was my Buſineſs to make you ſenſible, that the bare Fore-knowledge of future Events doth not deſtroy the Freedom of thoſe Agents, who bring many of them about without any Compulſion upon their Active Powers. Inſtead of enervating my Proof of this Truth, you take Refuge in an Objection that overlooks it, and run to the Difficulties which occur in reconciling that Fore-knowledge with this Freedom. I therefore tell you further, that when you can ſee through many other Difficulties in Nature; for Inſtance, how the Parts of Matter hang together, how Motion is tranſmitted from your Mind to your Body, or from one Body to another, or why a Stone ſhould continue to move ſome time after you have thrown it out of your Hand, or from a Sling, ſince the Parts of Motion have no neceſſary Connexion with each other, and conſequently its moving this Inſtant does not infer its moving the next: While, I ſay, you cannot ſee through theſe or the like Riddles of Nature, and are forced to confeſs them the inexplicable Effects of Divine Power and Providence; I would fain know, why I may not with as good an Aſſurance ſolve your Objection in the ſame manner,

and ſay, I cannot explain how God foreſees the Actions of free Agents, otherways than that it is his Will they ſhould act freely, and the Property of his Nature that he ſhould foreknow their Actions.

Phyg. But are not the Images of whatever awakens our Thoughts, convey'd to our Minds through the Chanels of Senſe? And don't they repreſent exterior Objects either as lovely or loathſome, or as having nothing in them either deſirable or diſagreeable, to excite in us any manner of Paſſion about them?

Eub. Granting ſo much, What do you deduce from it?

Phyg. Thence I infer, that Man (morally ſpeaking) is a mechanical Creature, whoſe Affections are over-ruled by the unavoidable Marks, which external Objects tranſmit to his Imagination through the Conduits of Senſe; and whoſe Will is thereby determin'd, and conſequently that he is not Maſter of his Actions, ſince the whole Thread of them iſſues from Senſe, and is center'd in Memory, after it is wound up into a Clue by the ſubtle Mechaniſm of Imagination.

Eub. Now you ſtrike, (if not with all your Spite) yet I'm ſure with all your Strength at the Root of Morality; and therefore, what here you have urged deſerves a thorough Refutation. In order thereto, I own in the firſt Place, that we have reaſon to conclude, that all our ſimple Ideas conſidered ſingly, and as they enter into us aſunder one after another, are really convey'd through the Organs of Senſe to the Repoſitory of Imagination, which are inded purely paſſive Principles. I allow too in the Second Place, that our Wills and Affections are for ſome time influenced and

over-ruled by the Images of exterior Objects, accordingly as they are thus convey'd and repoſited; and continue thus influenced and over-ruled, till, by Inſtruction, Reflection, and Experience, we come gradually to underſtand, that Things are not always what they ſeem to be; not truly Good or Evil, Amiable or Deform'd in themſelves; as they often appear in the deceitful Shapes and Colours, in which Senſe and Imagination repreſents them. And therefore I add in the Third Place, that Human Liberty, as it reſpects the moral Conduct of Life, conſiſts in the Power we have to correct our Errors by the Progreſs of Knowledge and Experience; to prevent them by ſteddy Attention; and get rid of the ill Habit of falling into them, by reflecting often upon them in frequent Acts of calm and habitual Circumſpection; together with the Capacity we have of judging and acting precipitantly, without a previous pondering of the true Riſe, Tendency, and Reſult of our Deſigns and Adventures of Life.

Phyg. But as our Paſſions are excited in us by the Impulſe of ſenſible Objects, ſo don't we find at every Turn that Impulſe ſo very forcible, as to carry us headlong to the doing even of thoſe Things which our Reaſon diſapproves? Where then is our Freedom of acting upon the choice of Deliberation, when we are hurried into Action in ſpite of the Choice which Deliberation recommends?

Eub. I have ſaid enough already in anſwer to this Objection; and ſince you will have more on't, I tell you that it enervates it ſelf: For a Power in you to act otherwiſe than your Reaſon directs you, nay, contrary to its Direction, is ra-

ther a Proof of your Freedom, than an Argument againſt it: Not that I think, You, or any Man, can act (at leaſt in Matters of Moment) in oppoſition to a due Degree of Deliberation; for that would be to act both willingly and againſt your Will, becauſe the Will neceſſarily cloſes with the clear Dictates of Reaſon. But it is not every Dictate of Reaſon, nor Degree of Deliberation with which it is thus obliged to cloſe; but only ſuch, where the Dictates are ſo clear that they cannot be queſtion'd; and the Deliberation is ſo full as to exclude every Degree of Doubtfulneſs. Tho' then a Man can act and chuſe on the ſide of Paſſion in oppoſition to Reaſon and Deliberation, yet that is only done in trivial Caſes, where the Action or Choice is next to indifferent; or if in Matters of Weight, then Paſſion cloaths its Perſuaſion with ſome plauſible Colours of Reaſon; which are ſo far from implying a due Degree of Deliberation, that they don't ſo much as riſe up to any act of true and real Deliberation at all: Yet in the mean time, Paſſion does not obtain the Conſent of the Will, but as it pleads for it with ſome appearance of Reaſon, without which appearance it cou'd never obtain that Conſent in any Matter of Conſequence. In affirming then, that a Man can do that which he ſees a good Reaſon not to do, no more is to be meant, but that he can act with a doubtful Mind, that is, without due Deliberation; but he can never act againſt it, without willing to act, and not to act, at the ſame time; that's to ſay, without being both willing and unwilling to act, which is both to will and not to will one and the ſame Thing. And even when he acts with Doubtfulneſs, he is ſtill perſuaded

ſwaded (how much miſtaken ſoever he may be) that it's better for him to act than not to act; that is, he ſees, or thinks at leaſt he ſees, more reaſon for the one than the other; for if the Reaſons appear'd to him alike on both Sides, he would not act at all; and therefore whenever he acts in complyance with the Cravings of a vicious Paſſion, it is becauſe Reaſon ſeems to be upon its Side; for ſince Reaſon (in every ſuch Caſe) either true or falſe, is his only Motive to Action, it therefore follows, that he muſt always act upon that Side where he thinks there is the greater Reaſon for acting.

Phyg. If a Man muſt always act, when, and as his Reaſon (Right or Wrong) informs him, and never otherways, nor at other times, than as he's directed by that Information; Does not this cancel his Liberty, and with it the whole Morality of his Conduct, by leading him, as it were, with a String through the Thread of his Actions, from the Dawn of his Reaſon to the Day of his Death?

Eub. Tho', *Phygellus*, it is irkſome to me to inſiſt longer on a Point that I think ſo very plain, yet for your ſake I ſhall put it in a clearer Light, if I can. I affirm then, that our Freedom is nothing elſe but that Energy of our Nature, by which of our own accord we are able either to ſtir up our rational Faculties in the Exerciſe of ſuitable Contemplation, or reſtrain them from that ſort of Activity, by indulging our ſelves in ſlothful Inadvertence, and contracting by that Reſtraint the Diſeaſe of a mental Lethargy, which is the depreſſion of Reaſon under the Dominion of Bodily Paſſions, and commonly terminates in the Terrors of an evil Mind, proceeding

from an irregular and riotous Life, the natural Reſult of an habitual diſregard to the Dictates of Reaſon in a rational Creature. Nay, I ſuppoſe again, that all our Ideas enter into us ſimple and uncompounded through the Channels of Senſe, which is indeed a mechanical Conveyance; but it will not thereupon follow, that we are Beings which act by Neceſſity; becauſe we are conſcious, that after their entrance we can couple and compound them, and disjoin them again in a trice; we can conſider their References to each other, and ſo find out Truth and Maxims of Prudence; or we can forbear the doing of this, if we will; in the doing, or not doing whereof, proportionably to the Advantages which Divine Providence affords us for that End, conſiſts the Exerciſe of our Freedom, which is connected with our Obligation to Duty, and our being accordingly anſwerable for not obſerving that Obligation. Be it ſo then, that our Ideas are the Pictures of exterior Objects ſtamp'd upon the Fancy through the Mediation of Bodily Organs; Are we therefore not free Agents? Thus far indeed we are not. For we muſt of Neceſſity ſee Colours and hear Sounds, when our Eyes and Ears are open to receive the Ideas they tranſmit to us. But after all; when we have heard and ſeen them, Don't we find our ſelves at Liberty, whether or no we ſhall enter into the Speculations of Light and Harmony? I think every one is, or at leaſt by a little Reflection may be, ſenſible, that he has a Power to do this, or let it alone, according to his own Diſcretion.

Phyg. I diſpute not now the Point with reference to Philoſophical Speculations, which don't ſo heat our Paſſions as to hurry us on to Action; but

but only as it reſpects thoſe Objects which ſuddenly fire our Appetites to ſuch a Degree, that they ſeem to ſuſpend the Strength of Deliberation, till the Fewel that feeds that Fire is quite ſpent.

Eub. I ſhall put the Caſe then as you deſire, and ſuppoſe an Object as charming in the Eye of Senſe as ever you ſaw, but really no leſs noxious than it is tempting, like the forbidden Fruit of the Garden of *Eden*, thrown in your Way as a Prize within the reach of your Power; Muſt you therefore lay hold on't, and hug it in your Boſom till it ſting you to the Heart? I grant, you muſt, were you yet an Infant in Underſtanding when come to the Years of Experience; but add withal, that as Providence has provided that ſuch an Object cannot affect the Paſſions of an Infant, ſo neither is a Man of Experience, at any time, under an invincible neceſſity of being carried Captive by the Charms of any ſuch Object, how tempting ſoever; but on the contrary, he's under an Obligation to conſult his Reaſon at every new Step of his moral Conduct, becauſe he muſt be conſcious to himſelf of having made many falſe and fooliſh Steps in the former Parts of it. In ſhort then; our Ideas never neceſſarily determine the Aſſent of our Underſtanding to any Concluſion drawn from them, but upon certain Evidence; nor does any Object attract our Affections with irreſiſtible Force, but upon the like certain Aſſurance that it is morally good; yet at the ſame time we are free at every Turn, both to yield up the Aſſent of our Underſtanding, and the Conſent of our Wills; when we have neither a ſufficient Evidence of the Truths of many Propoſitions

ons which we aſſent to, nor of the real Goodneſs of many Things which we love and deſire.

Phyg. But are we not ſtill determin'd by our prevailing Ideas, inſomuch that our Minds can neither turn from one Object to another, go through with, nor break off from any Enquiry, but as they are directed by the laſt prevailing Idea. Don't therefore all our Ideas, and all our Concluſions drawn from them, go on in a Chain, tho' either in the Viciſſitudes of ſo quick a Pace, or of a Motion ſo very ſlow, that no Man by reaſon of the Hurry of his Thoughts at one time, and the languid Drowſineſs of them at another, has Attention enough to ſee the Connexion of his Thoughts, tho' linked together in a Chain.

Eub. We are indeed determined by our prevailing Ideas, but not neceſſarily by any Conception whatſoever, that does not exclude all rational Doubtfulneſs from that Determination. By whatever Links then our Conceptions hang togegether, or follow one another in a Chain, yet, while we have a Power to range our Ideas, to connect and compare them, and draw Concluſions from theſe Connexions and Compariſons, without being compell'd to yield our Aſſent to inevident Concluſions, or to act by the Force of them (which I take to be the Caſe of every rational Creature come to the Years of Diſcretion) then we have all the Freedom that's requiſite towards the rendring us accountable for our Behaviour both to God and Man. In this therefore lies our Liberty, That we can aſſent to Propoſitions as true, when we ſee not their Evidence; and can chuſe Objects as good, when we know not their Nature; or can defer this Choice and Aſſent, till we have examin'd Matters aright, and

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be thereby enabled to give a rational Aſſent to what we embrace for Truth, and make a prudent Election of what is truly deſirable. I'll ſpend no more Breath upon a Point which appears to me very plain, however abſtruſe you may think it to be. I feel a Principle of Freedom in my ſelf, and if you have no ſuch feeling in you, I believe it will be no leſs difficult to give you a diſtinct Notion of it, than it wou'd be to make a Man born Deaf and Blind underſtand the Nature of Colours and harmonious Sounds.

Phyg. I cannot deny that I have the feeling you ſpeak of, and muſt therefore own that I ſhould not have uſed ſo many Quirks in diſputing a Truth of which I am conſcious; but it being much controverted, or rather wholly abandon'd by many of my Acquaintance, I was willing to hear how you could ſolve their Objections, and am glad that you have done it to my full Satisfaction. I ſuppoſe then, that Human Nature is endued with the Faculty of Freedom, (which certainly implies thinking, and is out of the reach of Mechaniſm) but does it thence appear, that that Faculty is unapplicable to what is purely material? Or, ſuppoſing the Subject of that Faculty an immaterial Being, will it therefore follow, that that Being is form'd for Immortality in a future State of Bliſs or Miſery, according as (morally ſpeaking) we uſe our Freedom well or ill in this State? If, *Eubulus*, you can ſo anſwer theſe Queſtions as to remove the Doubts hinted at in them, you'll rid me of my Libertiniſm, and make Religion venerable in my Eyes, and the Truths of it the main Study of my Life.

Eub. I'll do my beſt both to undeceive you, and deliver you from your dangerous Doubts. To begin then: If you think that Thought is eſſential to Matter, then you muſt ſuppoſe that every Nail on your Fingers, and every Hair of your Head, nay, that every Crumb of Matter, how ſmall or putrid ſoever it be, does think as well as exiſt; unleſs you can imagine a Thing to exiſt without its eſſential Property; which is to imagine that it exiſts without its Exiſtence, ſince the Exiſtence of any Thing implies the Exiſtence of every Thing that is eſſential to it.

Phyg. I don't think that Thought is eſſential to Matter, but doubt withal, whether or no it is capable of Thought as its Modification; for as it is certainly capable either of Reſt or of Motion, according to the Impulſe or Reſiſtance it meets with from obſtructing or impellent Cauſes; ſo it may (for any thing I know to the contrary) be capable, or not capable of Thought, that is, think and not think by turns, having Thought as a contingent Modification of its Being.

Eub. To think is certainly to act, and therefore Thought is certainly the Action of that which thinks; but Matter, by all we know of it, by all we can obſerve about it, is a purely paſſive, Principle; inſomuch that if at Reſt it never moves but as it's moved; nor if in Motion, it never reſts, but as it is ſtopt by ſome impelling or reſiſting Cauſe, in the one Caſe or in the other reſpectively; it therefore follows, that it can no more think than it can move of it ſelf; or reaſon, than it can of it ſelf change the Courſe of its Motion; becauſe to think is to act, and to reaſon is to diverſify that Action by Deliberation and Choice; which are Properties quite unapplicable

cable to Matter, which is paſſive in all reſpects; and therefore incapable of Action, even of that mean one of moving it ſelf; and conſequently at leaſt as incapable of the more excellent Acts of chuſing the Courſe of its Motion, or of acting with any Degree of Deliberation.

Phyg. But ſince Motion may be communicated to Matter at Reſt, why may not Thought alſo be communicated to it.

Eub. Were Motion the Action of Matter, as Thought is the Action of the Being that thinks, there might be ſome Shew of an Argument in what here you ſuggeſt. But tho' in popular Language, Motion is mention'd, as if it imply'd Activity in the Thing moved; yet ſince in the Strictneſs of a Philoſophical Stile, it only imports the Paſſibility of that Thing, therefore your Suggeſtion falls to the Ground; for when we ſay, that this or that Piece of Matter moves, no more is truly meant but that it is moved; becauſe we are certain it cannot move it ſelf. But on the other hand, when we ſay that ſuch or ſuch a one thinks, properly ſpeaking, we underſtand that he acts; or if we ſay that his Thoughts are clogg'd, or run apace, then we underſtand, that his rational Activity is lively or languid.

Phyg. But may not Thought be the Conſequence of ſome unknown Property in Matter, or of the various and ſubtle Motions of its imperceptible Parts? Suppoſe, for inſtance, theſe of the animal Spirits moving thro' the wonderful Structure of the Brain.

Eub. Let that Property be what it will, yet ſince it implies a Power to think, it therefore implies alſo a Power to act; becauſe all Thinking is Action. And ſo your Suppoſition obliges you to

defend

defend this Paradox, That a Thing ſo purely paſſive, that by all we can conceive concerning it, is really acted on when it ſeems to act, is nevertheleſs to be look'd upon as an active Being. And is not this to ſuppoſe every thing of any thing at Pleaſure, and in ſpite of all its natural Appearances? The very ſame as if I ſhould ſay, Tho' I ſee you walk like one who has Eyes like mine, and Reaſon like one who reflects as I do; yet I am not certain, that you ſee by your Eyes, as I do by mine; nor reaſon by your Underſtanding, as I do by mine; but that all your Viſion may enter at your Ears, and all your Hearing at your Eyes, and all your Reaſoning may be nothing but the Clockwork of your Tongue. For all this indeed is every whit as conceivable, as it is, that a Principle purely paſſive, by whatever appears in it, ſhould be active; or as that there ſhould be a Connexion of Thought, which is Action, with Matter which is wholly inert, let it be moved and ſubtiliz'd what way you will. Now, if you are fallen into ſuch an Abyſs of Nonſenſe as obliges you to defend ſuch groſs Abſurdities, I muſt leave you to heſitate in the Horrors of your Scepticiſm, and henceforth can have neither Heart nor Hope in my Endeavours to deliver you out of the ſad State of your Deluſion.

Phyg. Good *Eubulus*, hitherto you have prevail'd with me in every Point we have diſputed; deſpair not therefore of perfecting the Work which you have advanc'd ſo far with no ſmall Succeſs; only I beg your Patience to hear and anſwer one Objection more, relating to what we are now upon: It's this, Cannot God, whoſe Power is infinite, ſuperadd to Matter a Property ſupereſſential to it, ſuppoſe that of Thinking?

Eub.

Eub. That is, Cannot infinite Power make that thing active, which by the Law of its Nature is inert? Cannot he make a Man who can move himſelf, of a Piece of Clay, which by its natural Conſtitution is incapable of ſelf-motion? Now to make that active, which by the Law of its Nature is unactive and inert, is in effect to make it another thing than it is. It is no other than to change its Nature, by giving it a Power to act, tho' by the Law of its Nature, it is entirely paſſive. And is not this to make it another thing? No leſs different from what it was, than was the Piece of Clay of which *Adam*'s Body was made (let the Suppoſition paſs at preſent) different, after God breathed into his Noſtrils the Breath of Life, from what it was before in its lifeleſs and unactive State.

Phyg. I deny not that Matter endow'd with Life, Activity, and Thought, differs not a little from what it was before it was thus endow'd; but don't ſee that that Difference riſes to any more than the adding to it new Modes of Being which it formerly had not. But this makes the Difference no greater than one and the ſame Man undergoes, as often as he falls into and awakens out of a profound Sleep, which may be a Difference no leſs than a thinking is from an unthinking State, ſuppoſing (what you know a Philoſopher of no ſmall Renown reckon'd no abſurd Suppoſition) that Slumber is Thought expiring, and ſound Sleep is Thought quite expir'd for a Time, till it either ſlowly revive in the Returns of Slumber, or ſuddenly ariſe in him who ſleeps, by his being ſome how or other awakened in a Trice.

Eub.

Eub. How our thinking Powers are employ'd when we are faſt aſleep, is, I confeſs, a Depth unfathomable by my Underſtanding; but at the ſame time I aver, that it is no leſs probable that theſe Powers may be active all the time of our Sleep, than it is that they ſhould at any time appertain to unactive Matter; or that ſuppoſing them to appertain to it, they ſhould be by Turns extinguiſh'd and reviv'd in the ſame Perſon, perhaps, ten times in the Space of two Days. I find, indeed, that my Thoughts are more or leſs lively, according to the different Habits of my Body; and therefore will not deny, that in the Depth of Sleep, when my animal Spirits are compos'd to Reſt, they may ſeem quite extinguiſh'd; but I ought not to infer from thence, that my thinking Powers are not then at work, tho' in a manner independent upon theſe Spirits, and about Objects much (perhaps, wholly) different from thoſe to which bodily Movements attract the Mind. If you object, Why ſhould Thoughts be ſuppos'd which are utterly forgot, and ſerve no Purpoſe at all? I reply, they may ſerve to no leſs Purpoſe than many other Thoughts do which we have quite forgotten; and I add, that as we come to remember ſome Dreams, not till ſome time after we are awaken'd from the Sleep in which we had them; ſo to anſwer the ſecret Ends of Providence, we may recover the Ideas of our deepeſt Sleep at the Day of Judgment; as no doubt we ſhall, if not the whole, yet at leaſt not a few of our forgotten Thoughts and Actions, when we come before the Tribunal of the Judge of all Men. A Sceptick may reject this Reaſoning as precarious, and chuſe rather to aſſert, that as Drowſineſs is an Introduction

duction to Slumber, and that both of them, tho' in different Degrees, imply a Decay of Thoughtfulneſs, either thro' the waſte of animal Spirits in the Brain, or ſome Cauſe or other which clogs their Motion; ſo both of them are a Tendency to Sleep, which is a thoughtleſs State; but ſuch withal, as is ſo far from ſtopping the other natural Functions of Life, that on the contrary, they are carried on with Vigour all the while, and have a due Time allow'd them to recruit the Brain with a freſh Store of Spirits; which, when done, Thought revives as it decay'd, like the expiring Light of a Lamp, by a new Supply of Oil: And the thoughtleſs Sleeper begins to think faintly at the firſt Return of Slumber, and more vigorouſly, as that breaks off in Drowſineſs, till he's thoroughly awaken'd into a thinking State, by the full Play of his animal Spirits in the Brain. *Phygellus*, Is this your Opinion of the Matter now in hand?

Phyg. It is; and ſure it ſeems more probable, than to ſuppoſe that we think when we are faſt aſleep.

Eub. It is nothing near ſo probable as you imagine; as will appear, if you conſider it impartially. For, *Firſt*, The Compariſon taken from a Lamp, is rather a Refutation, than a Proof of what is intended by it; unleſs it might be ſaid (what no Man in his right Senſes will ſay) that a new Supply of Oil, without any other Ingredient, would re-inflame not only its weak, but even quite extinguiſh'd Light. Further yet, the Train of our Thoughts, however oddly connected, or as it were jumbled together in a Dream, affords no ſmall Evidence againſt the Probability of this Suppoſition, That Drowſineſs and Slum-

Slumber (the Fore-runners, or rather the firſt Degrees of Sleep) ariſe from Cauſes which clog the Motion of the animal Spirits; and by ſo doing, make our Thoughts ſlow and languid, till they faint and die away in Sleep. For we know the Landſkip of a Dream, and the imaginary Colours in which it is ſet off, are ſo far from being languid Repreſentations, that very often they excel in Gloſs, and ſeem to glow with a double Degree of Life; then it is that our thinking Powers, how irregular ſoever employ'd, rather run too faſt, than creep along as if they were gradually clogg'd with the Weight of Slumber, Drowſineſs, and Dreams, till they be cruſh'd into a thoughtleſs State in time of Sleep. But after all, if your Theory of the animal Spirits does not ſuppoſe them to be the immediate Subject of Thought, but only Inſtruments which Nature uſes to awaken out of Sleep the thinking Being that is in us; then it's a Matter of no great Moment, whether your Theory be rejected or admitted; nor will I affirm, that uninterrupted Thinking belongs to any but to him who neither ſlumbers nor ſleeps; yet on the other hand, if thoſe animal Spirits are ſuppoſed to be the immediate Subject of our Thoughts, then I look upon the Suppoſition as both unphiloſophical and impious.

Phyg. Since we have no Idea neither of what it is that thinks in us, nor how its Thoughts are form'd; and ſince our animal Spirits bid as fair for being the Subject of our Thoughts as any thing we know beſides belonging to us, why ſhould that Suppoſition be reckon'd unphiloſophical? And further yet, ſince ſuppoſing that Suppoſition true, the Power of God can preſerve thoſe

thoſe animal Spirits from ſuch a Diſſipation as ſhall put an utter End to their Capacity of thinking, and ſo make them ſerve all the Purpoſes of his wiſe Providence in a future State, why ſhould it be accounted a prophane Hypotheſis?

Eub. It is altogether unphiloſophical, becauſe by the Principles of Philoſophy, it does appear, that Matter is a Being purely paſſive, which cannot act but as it is acted on, nor any way alter it ſelf, or its Circumſtances, by an internal Spring of Action; but whatever Variety happens to it, is the mere Effect of ſome extrinſick Force which ſtrikes it; whereas it's plain, that that which thinks is an active Being, and that the Power of Thinking is an internal Principle of Action, which can act on Matter and move it, and make it undergo many Changes; and therefore that Power cannot appertain to Matter which can neither move nor change it ſelf. You ſay, that the animal Spirits have the faireſt Claim for being the Seat of human Thought; but you aſſign no other Reaſon for ſaying ſo beſides this, That we have no Idea of that which thinks in us, nor of the manner how it forms its Thoughts. There are many Things in Nature, and not a few even in the Texture of our own Bodies, that we have no Idea of; but we muſt not therefore infer that they are not, unleſs we might pretend to have Ideas of every thing: And, perhaps, it's no bad Reaſon to conclude, that ſince the Ideas of the Mind are Repreſentations made to it of Objects different from and exterior to it ſelf; therefore it has no Idea of it ſelf; but only of its Operations relating to other things. And this Argument is no leſs probable, than it is that all our Ideas enter'd originally thro' ſome one or other of our

Senſes; and muſt appear no leſs certain to him who is perſuaded that they thus enter'd, than he is certain that the Idea of a Soul can enter thro' none of his Senſes; becauſe a Soul can neither be ſeen, nor heard, nor felt, nor taſted, nor ſmell'd to. That we have no Notion of the manner how our Ideas are form'd within us, ſignifies nothing towards the proving that the animal Spirits are the Seat or immediate Subject of our Ideas; unleſs you could let us ſee how and by what Means theſe ſubtiliz'd Particles of Blood can form Ideas in the Brain. Is it the Reſult of their Motion? And can you ſay, that hence you have a clearer Conception how they were produc'd, than another Man who tells you they were produc'd another way, even by the Energy of an incorporeal Agent, which has a Power to contemplate the Images of outward Objects, convey'd to it by the Mediation of bodily Organs? I am confident, that no Man ſees any more Connexion between Thought and the Motion of the animal Spirits in the Head, than he does between Thought and the Motion of Blood in the Heart, or even of the groſſeſt Excrements in the Guts: That to attribute the Power of Thinking to the Mechaniſm of the Brain, ſavours rank of Irreligion, is evident, if we conſider, *Firſt*, That Libertines alledge the Power of Thinking to be the Reſult of that Mechaniſm; and further yet, that they confeſs the Suppoſition of an incorporeal Subſtance in human Nature, as the Source of that Power (could it be made good) bids fairer for Man's Subſiſtence after Death, than the contrary Hypotheſis of any Syſtem of Matter, however moved or ſubtiliz'd, and preſerv'd from Diſſipation.

Phyg.

Phyg. Tho' you have well nigh diſcuſs'd this Point to a Demonſtration, yet ſince you ſaid, that there are many things in Nature, and not a few even in the Texture of our own Bodies, which we have no Idea of; thereby you ſuggeſted to me this one Objection more, *viz.* That ſince we are far from being acquainted with all the Powers and Properties of Matter; therefore, tho' from theſe we know to belong to it, we cannot infer that the Faculty of Thinking is one of its Properties; yet if we knew them all, perhaps we might perceive, that that Faculty appertains to it, and is, by the Power of God, annex'd to ſome one or other of the Properties of Matter unknown to us.

Eub. Either you ſuppoſe there may be ſome unknown Property of Matter by which it thinks, tho' nothing of Thought appears in it; and this is to ſuppoſe your Underſtanding away into a State of Scepticiſm, in ſpite of all the Appearances which ſhould preſerve you from it; much the ſame as if I ſhould ſay to you, tho' you never ſaw a Stone mount upwards of its own Accord, yet you don't know but that it may have ſome latent Wings by which it can fly: And I ſhall never think it worth my while to argue with Scepticks of this Form. Or (which you ſeem rather to inſinuate) you ſuppoſe, that the Faculty of Thinking does not belong to Matter, but as it is communicated to it by the Power of God. Whence I infer, *Firſt*, That therefore God, who imparts that to Matter which it has not in it ſelf, muſt be an immaterial Being; becauſe nothing by Nature material, can acquire Thought which belongs not to its Nature, but by the Communication of another which hath

more in it than belongs to Matter. *Secondly*, That ſince you confeſs that a Power to think cannot be lodg'd in Matter, but by virtue of a Communication of that Power from an Omnipotent and Immaterial Being; and own withal, that Matter of it ſelf is wholly thoughtleſs, unactive, and inert; thence I infer, that you ought much rather to conclude, that this Communication of Thought is made to an incorporeal, than to a corporeal Creature; becauſe, as you are certain that the Omnipotent Creator is incorporeal, ſo you are, that he hath not imparted any natural Signs of Thought or Activity to any Part of Matter; which, by the Laws of its Nature, never acts but as it is acted on; and conſequently, ſuppoſing Matter capable of a Communication of Thought, by virtue of the Impreſſions of infinite Power; yet you ought rather to believe, that that Communication is made to an immaterial Creature, by Nature active, than to a material one, which you know to be naturally unactive.

Phyg. I would certainly conclude ſo, were it not that I can form no Notion of an immaterial Subſtance.

Eub. I anſwer, *Firſt*, That neither can you conceive how a material one, which is by Nature actionleſs, ſhould come to think, which is the livelieſt Activity imaginable; and therefore your Inability to form the Idea of an incorporeal Subſtance, is no more an Argument againſt the Exiſtence of ſuch a Subſtance, than it is againſt the Poſſibility of imparting a Power to think to that which is corporeal; ſince you can no more conceive how this can be done, than you can conceive what the other is. But, *Secondly*, Suppo-

Suppoſing this poſſible to be done, you own it is only poſſible thro' the Impreſſions of infinite Power; that is to ſay, it may be done, tho' you know not how; for you have no Notion how it is done. And ſo ſay I, by a Parity of Reaſon, An immaterial, created Subſtance, may exiſt by the Power of God, whom you own to be an incorporeal Being; and whoſe Power, becauſe infinite, extends alike to the creating of incorporeal Subſtances, and ſuch as are corporeal; or, rather, (at leaſt, according to our imperfect Apprehenſions) to the creating of Thoſe than Theſe; ſince it cannot be denied, that it is ſomewhat more natural to us to imagine, that the Power of the incorporeal Creator ſhould rather be exerted in the Production of incorporeal, than of corporeal Subſtances: And there is good Reaſon to think that it was, as ſome ſay, firſt, and as others ſay, from Eternity, exerted in the Generation of the Son of God, whom the Scripture ſtiles the Image of the inviſible God, and the Firſt-born of every Creature; and conſequently incorporeal, otherwiſe he could not be the Image of the inviſible and incorporeal Creator. Him therefore, (not improbably) *Solomon* introduces ſpeaking thus in the Name of *Wiſdom*, *The Lord poſſeſſed me in the beginning of his way, before his Works of old; I was ſet up from Everlaſting, from the Beginning, or ever the Earth was.---- Before the Mountains were ſettled, before the Hills was I brought forth ----- When he prepared the Heavens, I was there; when he ſet a Compaſs upon the Face of the Depth, then I was by him, as one brought up with him, and I was daily his Delight, rejoicing always before him; rejoicing in the habitable Parts of the Earth, and my Delights were with the Sons*

of Men. I hope, *Phygellus*, you'll Pardon this one Digreſſion; for ſuch it muſt be eſteemed by you, till you are convinced of the Truth of Sacred Writ.

Phyg. Eubulus, I thank you for it, becauſe it prepares me for receiving that Conviction; I being beforehand perſuaded of the Truth of the laſt Point of our Controverſy, by your preceding Reaſons; and finding what you call a Digreſſion, ſo very agreeable to theſe Reaſons. Suppoſing, then, the Faculty of Thinking unapplicable to what is purely material, let us proceed to enquire, Whether or no the Subject of that Faculty is immortal, becauſe it is immaterial; or tho' not therefore immortal, Whether or no there is any other inconteſtible Evidence that it is framed for Immortality in a future State, and ſhall not periſh when Death thruſts it out of its Tabernacle of Clay?

Eub. After ſo tedious a Train of Arguments as we have gone thro' this Evening, it would tire us too much to enter upon a new Debate, which is of all the moſt important, and therefore deſerves our moſt vigorous Attention: It's beſt, then, to put it off till To-Morrow, when, at what time you will, you may come hither, that we may conclude our diſputatious Converſation.

Phyg. I approve of your Propoſal; for, indeed, it would not be proper now that we are weary with much arguing, to enter into a freſh Controverſy; which, of all others, calls for our moſt lively and accurate Attention. I'll be with you To-Morrow betimes; and ſo I bid you good Night.

Eub. I wiſh the like to you.

DIA-

DIALOGUE IV.

Concerning the Immortality of Human Nature in a Future State.

Phyg. EUbulus, you gave me Leave laſt Night to break in upon you at what Time I pleas'd to Day; and therefore I make no Apology for my Morning Viſit.

Eub. I expect none; you ſhall find welcome here at all Hours, while you come with an Inclination to enquire into important Truths. I know not any of greater Conſequence than the Two propoſed at our laſt Parting: (1.) Whether or no, it being granted, that from our thinking Faculty, it may be inferr'd that an immaterial Subſtance is lodg'd in our material Frame; it may thence be further inferr'd, that it is therefore immortal? And, (2.) Suppoſing its Immateriality no Demonſtration of its Immortality; Whether or no there is any other ſort of certain Evidence for a future State of Immortality awaiting Mankind in another World? In anſwer to the former, I affirm, That ſuppoſing our thinking Power lodg'd in an incorporeal Subſtance, it ſhould not afterwards be made a Queſtion, Whether or no that Subſtance is immortal. Becauſe it cannot, with any Colour of Reaſon, be

denied, that its Power to think (in which its Immorality conſiſts) ſhall never be deſtroy'd.

Phyg. Since (as it is own'd on all Hands) we can form no Notion of that Subſtance, but only of its thinking Powers; and further yet, that we are ſo far from being certain that it thinks inceſſantly, that on the contrary, there is no ſmall Reaſon to ſuſpect that its Power to think is ſuſpended in him who is faſt aſleep; I cannot therefore conclude, that its Immortality and Immateriality are interwoven with each other, unleſs I had a clearer Conception of its Subſtance than what is merely negative; which is all we have, when we ſay it's immaterial; for that amounts to more, than that it's ſomewhat not material, endow'd with a Power to think: But leaſt of all ſhould I make the foremention'd Concluſion, while there is any Cauſe to ſuſpect that theſe Powers are ſuſpended in the Time of Sleep; for if they are then ſuſpended, that immaterial thinking Thing is not only liable to Mortality, but dies more than a Thouſand times in a few Years, even as often as a Man falls into a ſound Sleep, in the Compaſs of his whole Life; in whom if Thought can ceaſe ſo often, nay, if but once, pray, Why may it not ceaſe for good and all? Becauſe if his Thinking when he is awake by Day, doth not infer that he thinks when he's faſt aſleep in the dead of Night, neither will all his Thinking in this mortal State infer that he muſt think ſo much as one Moment in another State, which may be to him no other than a ſound Sleep in the never-ending Night of Death.

Eub. You force me to a great deal of needleſs Repetition; nor is it proper now to re-urge your Ob-

Objection taken from the Condition of a ſleeping Man, after you ſeem'd ſatisfy'd with my Reply. However, ſince you may imagine it may be of more Weight in this, than in the preceding Caſe, I ſhall therefore endeavour to convince you, that it ſignifies no more in this, than it did in the former. For ſuppoſing it true, that the Power to think is quite extinguiſh'd in a ſleeping Man; and that that Power revives and dies by Turns, as often as he awakes out of Sleep and falls into it; and withal, that there is no Difference between the State of Death, and that of Sleep, with reſpect to the Power of Thinking, but this, That the one is a ſhort Sleep, which admits of the Revival of Thought; the other is ſo long a one, as never to admit of that Revival: Then I infer, that your Suppoſition (which by and by I ſhall prove to be abſurd) is utterly precarious. For ſince it manifeſtly implies, that the Power to think in Man may be a Thouſand times extinguiſh'd, and as often revived; thence it as manifeſtly follows, that as this Power is thus frequently extinguiſh'd and reviv'd in this Life, ſo after Death, and at fartheſt, at the Reſurrection of the Dead, they may be recover'd ſo as never to be loſt again in another State. If here you object, that this Power to think, thus often dying and reviving, appertains to Man in his preſent State, and you can be certain of nothing of what either belongs to him, or may befall him in another: I anſwer, *Firſt*, That ſince you are not certain of what either belongs to him, or may befall him after he is dead; therefore, you ought to be very cautious of the Conſequences of Death: But of this (perhaps) more hereafter. And, *Secondly*, That you ought not

to conclude, that a thoughtleſs State is the Conſequence of Death, ſince Death only diſſolves the Body into Corruption; and you have already been made ſenſible, that the immediate Subject of our thinking Powers is not bodily, but incorporeal. And further yet, that therefore you ſhould rather conclude, that when the Subject of theſe Powers is diſunited from its Body, it is then ſo far from being ſtripp'd of its Power to think, that on the contrary it ſleeps no more, but thinks for ever, by being diſengag'd from that bodily Burthen of its Union, to act in Conjunction with the vegetative and ſenſitive Powers of Life; which Conjunction, if it did at no Time quite ſuſpend its thoughtful Activity, yet ſo clouded its Thoughts at every Turn, (even as often as we fall aſleep) that no Creature of our Compoſition can know either where it is, or what it thinks of.

Phyg. Tho' the Repetition I put you to may be irkſome to you, yet I find it very profitable to me. Hitherto I'm ſatisfy'd with your Reply; but muſt requeſt this further Favour, of ſhewing me the Connexion between the Immortality and Immateriality of a thinking Being. For, as I ſaid before, our Notion of an immaterial Subſtance being only negative, no other indeed than this, that it is not Matter; how can we, why ſhould we, from this bare negative Conception of it, conclude that it is immortal?

Eub. Your Conceptions of theſe Things are alike poſitive, of the poſitive Properties whereof you have the like Apprehenſion; now ſince you have as poſitive a Conception of what it is to think, and doubt, to conſider, remember, and reflect, to draw Inferences and chuſe upon Deliberation, which are the Properties of a thinking Being;

Being; as you have of what it is to be divided, put in Motion, or reduced to Reſt, which are the Properties of paſſive unthinking Matter; therefore you err in ſaying, that you have but a negative Conception of the one, whereas your Conception of the other is poſitive. For ſince you know nothing of either of the two but by their Properties, and your Knowledge of the Properties of both is of ſomething poſitive; ſuch therefore muſt your Conception of them alſo be. Out of this your Error ſeems to riſe, that becauſe we denote a thinking Being by the Word immaterial, which ſignifies that it is not Matter, therefore we have only a Negative Idea of it; which is a falſe Inference; for (as has been proved) we have an Idea of its poſitive Properties. And one may as well argue, that we have only a Negative Notion of a material Being, becauſe it is thoughtleſs, unactive, and inert, that's to ſay, it can neither think nor move it ſelf. The Word Subſtance denotes either of the two, for both Mind and Matter are Subſtances, tho' of great Diſparity. Now if I ſhould reaſon thus, Mind is a Subſtance that thinks, Matter is unthoughtful, therefore my Conception of Matter is but Negative, I ſhould then reaſon as you have juſt now done; and you might thus retort the Argument as I have done; Matter is a Subſtance, which tho' it cannot think, may nevertheleſs be touched and moved, and therefore you have a poſitive Idea of it, becauſe your Idea of theſe its Properties implies ſomewhat poſitive.

Phyg. I cannot underſtand how I can have a poſitive Idea of any Subſtance that is not material; becauſe all my Ideas are conveyed by my Senſes; and my Senſes being material Conduits,

can

can only convey to me the Images of material Objects.

Eub. It's true, that no Idea of a Spiritual Subſtance can be convey'd by Senſe, becauſe no ſuch Subſtance can be either Heard, Seen, Smell'd to, Touch'd, nor Taſted; but it does not therefore follow, that by no other Means we can have the Idea of ſuch a Subſtance. For as the Idea of a Thing is nothing elſe but the Notion of its Properties, and is more or leſs adequate as theſe Properties are more or leſs notified to us in that Notion; ſo ſince we have the Idea of Thought, Will, Memory, and Reflection, which are Properties belonging to a Spiritual Subſtance, as diſtinct as we have the Idea of Mobility, Extenſion, or Diviſibility, which are the Properties of a material Subſtance; therefore I think we have the Idea of both alike; only with this Difference, that the Idea we have of the one is through the Conduit of Senſe, (as indeed all our original, ſimple, and uncompounded Ideas ſeem to come to us); whereas the Idea we have of the other, is acquired without that Conveyance, but not without collecting and conſidering what is thus convey'd; from which Collections and Conſiderations ariſe our compounded Ideas; which are ſo far from entring through our Senſes, that on the contrary they are all framed and put together by the connecting Energy of the Mind, which can compare the ſimple Ideas of Senſe, and afterwards compound or disjoyn them in the many various Views of Reaſon and Reflection. This affords as good a Proof of a Spiritual Subſtance, as any you can bring for the Exiſtence of a material one. Nay, ſo much even your own Objection doth ſuppoſe; for when you ſay that all your

your Ideas are convey'd by Senſe; Don't you at the ſame time ſuppoſe, that they are the Repreſentations of ſenſible Objects? If you ſay they are, (which of Neceſſity you muſt ſay) then I add, that the Repreſentation muſt of Neceſſity be made to ſomething different from it ſelf; for the ſame Thing can never be a Repreſentation to it ſelf, more than a Picture can be the ſame with the Perſon who beholds it. If then the Repreſentations of Senſe are made to ſomething different from themſelves, I ask, What that Thing is? To ſay it is Senſe, is no leſs abſurd, than it would be to affirm, that the Repreſentation of a diſtant Object through a Teleſcope, rather reſpects the Tube or Glaſſes of that Inſtrument, than the Eye of him who looks through it. If you ſay, the Repreſentation is carried through Senſe to the Imagination, and from thence to the Seat of Thought ſomewhere in the Brain; then you muſt ſuppoſe that Seat of Thought either a material or an immaterial Being; if material, I muſt refer you to your own Reflection on what I have already ſaid towards the Demonſtration of this Truth, That Matter cannot think. If you ſuppoſe it immaterial, then you grant the Exiſtence of a Spiritual Subſtance; of which I ſay you have as clear a Conception when you call it a thinking Active Being, as you have of Matter when you call it an extended Paſſive One.

Phyg. All my Senſes teſtify to me the Exiſtence of Matter, and therefore I cannot doubt the Truth of its Exiſtence; but after all your Arguments to prove the Exiſtence of a Spiritual Subſtance, I heſitate in yielding my Aſſent to them,

Eub.

Euh. And all your Reaſon tells you, that the Eternal Being is immaterial; that Matter cannot think, and conſequently, that the Thing in you that thinks is immaterial. To doubt of this barely, becauſe your Senſes don't notify to you the Exiſtence of an immaterial Being, is to ſet the Authority of Senſe, which is frequently fallacious, above that of ſound Reaſon, which never deceives, nor poſſibly can be deceived. And here you doubt of the Exiſtence of a Thing, both in Spite of the Dictates of Reaſon, and only becauſe the Belief of its Exiſtence is not recommended to you by the Teſtimony of Senſe; which ſignifies nothing in the Caſe before us, becauſe Senſe can only teſtify the Exiſtence of material Objects; and therefore the want of its Teſtimony, to recommend the Belief of the Exiſtence of immaterial Beings, can never be an Argument againſt that Belief; and you may as well deny the Exiſtence of immaterial Space, as of immaterial Spirits; for Reaſon recommends the Belief of Both, and neither of the Two is the Object of any of your Senſes.

Phyg. You have given me full Satisfaction as to this Point; but I don't yet ſee, that the Immateriality of a Thing infers its Immortality.

Euh. We have no other Notion of Corruption or Mortality, but what ariſes from the Diſruption, or Diſſolution of the Parts of that Being which we call Mortal or Corruptible. Hence it is we conceive every material Being to be mortal or corruptible, becauſe it is compoſed of coherent Parts, which may be disjoyn'd and ſcatter'd by the Breach of that Coheſion; and conſequently we ought to conclude, that an immaterial Being is immortal and incorruptible; ſince it

it is not made up of Parts liable to Diſſipation, in which conſiſts all the Notion we have of Corruptibility.

Phyg. Tho' I know not how to refute this Reaſoning, yet I remain rather in the Condition of a conquer'd than a perſuaded Adverſary; ſay ſomewhat further towards my Conviction, if you can.

Eub. What Motion is to Matter, the like is thinking to an immaterial Mind. For as Matter by its Motion is transferr'd from the Neighbourhood of ſome to that of other Bodies; ſo is the Mind by Thought (which is a mental Motion) carried from the Conſideration of one Object to the Conſideration of another, till through a Train of Thoughts it come to contemplate many; and is as it were (even while in the Body) tinually changing its Neighbourhood, either by going in Queſt after new Objects, or returning to the Review of old ones familiarly known. Now as it is conſonant to the Laws of Nature, that every Thing ſhould continue in the State in which it is, till it is put out of that State by ſome exterior Cauſe; inſomuch, that Matter at Reſt cannot move till it is moved; or if in Motion, either ſtop or change the Direction of its Courſe, but by virtue of ſome exterior Impulſe or Obſtruction; ſo by a Parity of Reaſon, a thinking Being, which can conſider various Objects in various Views, muſt for ever think, ſince Thought is to It what Motion is to Matter, and muſt for ever have a Power to think of various Objects; becauſe by an Act of Will it can think of one Thing after another, and of a third after both, and ſo on for ever. For this general Law of Nature, *That every Thing continues*

in its State, till ſome other Thing diſturb it out of its State, extending to every Being whatſoever; it therefore muſt needs follow, that as Matter in Motion never ſtops but by Virtue of Obſtructions in its Way; ſo a thinking Mind not being obnoxious to any Bodily Obſtruction, nor the Thought of one Mind to be obſtructed (without Miracle) by the Thoughts of another Mind, muſt therefore by virtue of that general Law of Nature think, that is, live for ever; becauſe the Life of ſuch a Being conſiſts (as I ſuppoſe you'll eaſily confeſs) in thinking.

Phyg. But cannot the Eternal Mind, who created all Things, put an end to the thinking Powers of any created Being?

Eub. This certainly cannot be done without Miracle, ſince by the eſtabliſh'd Laws of Nature it muſt always and for ever think; nay, nor by a leſs Miracle than the Annihilation of that thinking Thing; becauſe the Annihilation of Thought in that to which the Power of thinking appertains by the Laws of its Nature, is really the Annihilation of that Thing: For ſuppoſe it what you will, it is no longer that Thing than it is poſſeſs'd of what thus appertained to it; but if not abſolutely nothing, yet at leaſt ſome other Thing than it was when it was a Thinking one; and ſo either a thinking Subſtance converted into a thoughtleſs one, that is, into Matter, which is as unconceivable, as it is that that thoughtleſs one ſhould be converted into a thinking one; neither of which is poſſible, ſince Matter cannot think without being converted from a material to an immaterial Subſtance; and by conſequence a thinking Subſtance cannot be without Thought, but by being converted into

a thoughtleſs one; both of which Converſions are impoſſible, without the antecedent Annihilation of the Subſtances ſuppoſed to be thus converted, that is, in effect annihilated, and others put in their room with new Names reſpectively, by Acts of Creation, but not of Converſion, for this Word is in this Caſe utterly miſapply'd.

Phyg. And don't you think, that God can annihilate either of the two?

Eub. No doubt he can, becauſe he who has a Power to create, can by the ſame Power annihilate; ſince a Power to annihilate cannot be greater than a Power to create.

Phyg. If he can annihilate a thinking Subſtance, why ſhould we ſuppoſe that it ſhall always live and think?

Eub. By the Laws of Nature it muſt do ſo; and you don't contradict this Truth, in ſaying that by the Power of Miracle it may dye; as Creation was the greateſt Miracle that ever was, ſo Annihilation would be the next to it. But here the Queſtion is not, Whether or no God can annihilate, but whether or no we have any Reaſon to ſuppoſe that ever he will annihilate any of his Creatures.

Phyg. He has no where declared that he will not, and how then can we know whether or no he will? Eſpecially conſidering, that for innumerable Ages this World was not produced; and why then may not he as well annihilate it hereafter at what time he pleaſes, as he did defer the Production of it till within theſe Six Thouſand Years?

Eub. I anſwer, (1.) by retorting your Argument. He has no where declared that he will, and why then ſhould we ſuppoſe that he will?

For

For his not having declared he will not do it, is no better Proof on your Side, than his not having declared he will, is on mine; and thus we mutually ſuppoſe each others Suppoſition out at Doors. I add therefore, (2.) That your Suppoſition is abſurd, becauſe derogatory from the Wiſdom of him who is infinitely Wiſe, in that it implies in him a defective Foreſight, or a humourſome Way of acting; for no Workman undoes what he hath done, but either becauſe he ſees it defective, or will in an humorous Fit deſtroy it, tho' he ſees no Defect in it. It is as certain, that the Power of a Being of unerring Wiſdom is never exerted in Acts of Deſtruction, but only in thoſe of Edification, as it is, that all the Works of unerring Wiſdom are without Defects; and that no wiſe Being will rear a Fabrick in order to throw it down, nor make and unmake, only for making and unmaking ſake. I have proved before, that it is impoſſible that any Creature ſhould have exiſted from Eternity; and conſequently, the Production of the World within theſe 6000 Years was every Way as conſonant to Reaſon; as the Production of it ſo many Millions of Ages ſooner would have been; and therefore the late Date of its Production, can never be an Argument inferring that it may be annihilated. Cou'd it have been from Eternity, I own you might have had ſome Shadow of Reaſon for inferring from its late Production, at leaſt ſome Probability, of its future Annihilation; but I have proved, and you have owned, that its eternal Exiſtence was impoſſible; and therefore its late Production can be no Symptom of the approaching Period of its Being, more than any other aſſignable Date of its

its Origine, however Ancient. For 6000 Years, and ſo many Millions of Millions of Ages, have both the like proportion to Eternity; that's to ſay, none at all; more than Finite has to Infinite, or a Point of Space to the unbounded Capacity thereof.

Phyg. Was not Life the free Gift of God to Man at his Creation?

Eub. Yes, it was.

Phyg. Was not that Giſt forfeited by the Tranſgreſſion of our firſt Parents, in eating the forbidden Fruit in Paradiſe?

Eub. No doubt on't.

Phyg. Was not Death the Fruit of that Forfeiture?

Eub. I own it was.

Phyg. Whether did the threatning of Death imply a Life of everlaſting Pain, or only the utter Extinction of Life and every ſort of Feeling?

Eub. To avoid entring into the Diſpute among Divines, relating to the Conſequences of what they call Original Sin, a Thing extrinſick to our Debate; as well as for other Reaſons which I need not name; I chuſe at preſent to affirm, (but without declaring this to be my Opinion) that the Death threatned to the Eating of the forbidden Fruit imply'd only an utter Extinction of Life.

Phyg. And might not that Threatning have been juſtly executed?

Eub. No doubt it might, otherwiſe the Threatning had been unjuſt.

Phyg. Pray wherein had the Execution of it differed from Annihilation? Wou'd not the utter Extinction of the Life of Mankind, have been the utter Extinction of Human Nature which ſubſiſts by Life, and is no longer Human Nature than it lives?

Eub. I own, a Dead Man is no Man at all; for he whoſe Life is utterly extinguiſh'd falls from his very Being, which implies Life.

Phyg. Might not then Human Nature have been quite aboliſh'd out of Being; ſince if it had been thus aboliſhed, nothing had thereupon enſued but what was juſt and equitable? And why then will you affirm that it is not rational to ſuppoſe Human Nature annihilable? Since there was a Time when the actual Annihilation of it had been both juſt and reaſonable.

Eub. I never denied (metaphyſically ſpeaking) that the Power of God can at any time reduce to nothing what he hath created. For no doubt, the Power of Production implies the Power of Annihilation. Nor do I deny (morally ſpeaking) that there was a certain Juncture, when no unjuſt or unreaſonable Thing had been done, tho' Human Nature had been aboliſhed. But then I further add, that tho' both in a metaphyſical and moral Senſe this might have come to paſs, yet its not coming to paſs at that Conjuncture, is ground enough to ſuppoſe, that therefore it never ſhall come to paſs; ſince neither the poſſibility of it at all Times, nor the Juſtice of it at a certain Juncture, brought that Event about. Which Truth is not a little confirmed by this Conſideration, That when God's vindictive Juſtice called upon his reſiſtleſs Power to put a Period to Human Nature, then his Mercy with-held the Hand of his Juſtice from the Stroke, and his Wiſdom at the ſame time pointed at the Mediation of his Son, as a proper Mean both to maintain the Honour of Divine Juſtice, and preſerve Mankind from that diſmal Strokewhich otherwiſe wou'd have deſtroy'd them.

Phy-

Phygellus, You muſt not blame me for replying to you upon the Principles of reveal'd Religion, ſince from theſe Principles you borrowed your Objection. Such Enemies are ſome Men to all Religion, that rather than want Objections to ſerve their Purpoſe, by turns they'll try to wound Reveal'd Religion by Natural Religion, and Natural Religion by Revealed Religion. And therefore had I only told you, that here you argued againſt me as a Believer of Revelation; but not againſt Natural Religion, which may be true, even allowing what Libertines aſſert, that Reveal'd Religion is a Fiction; I had in ſo doing fully anſwer'd your Objection; but choſe rather to convince you, if poſſible, that the Principles of Natural and Reveal'd Religion are ſo far from claſhing, that on the contrary they agree together, even in a Caſe where you imagined them irreconcileable to each other.

Phyg. Tho' your Reproof is upon the Matter juſt, yet I hardly think it fair, thus to chide one whom you have made more than half your Convert. In hopes of being wholly of your Perſuaſion, pray permit me to proceed in my objecting Humour till it hath ſpent it ſelf, or is quite extinguiſh'd by the Strength of your Replies. Did I not perceive that every Thing that has any ſort of Life, from that of Vegetation up to that of Reaſon, is by the Laws of Nature liable to Mortality; and that Divine Providence ſeems only concern'd in the Preſervation of the Species of every living Creature, while it leaves their Individuals to dye in a continual Succeſſion one after another: And further yet, that as it fares with Plants and Animals, which gradually grow up to their Perfection, and afterward by degrees

decay, till their Decays terminate in Death; ſo it fares with Men, whom accordingly the *Pſalmiſt* compares to the Graſs or Flower of the Field, which in the Morning groweth up, e're Noon looks fair and flouriſhing, after that begins to wither, and at the Evening is cut down and dies away. Moreover, I muſt add, that we don't perceive any ſpecial Interpoſitions of Divine Providence, diſtinguiſhing the Condition of thoſe whom you call good Men from that of others whom you name bad Ones; but ſee every Thing happening alike to both, to the Wiſe Man and the Fool, *to him that ſweareth, and to him that feareth an Oath*; that is, to the cogitant and incogitant Creature, to the pious and perjured Perſon; I ſay, while I perceive all this, how can I get rid of Doubtfulneſs about a future State? Why ſhould I come under the Rigors of Religion, which abridgeth my Pleaſure in this Life, with all theſe Doubts, which render the Proſpect of another Life ſo very faint, if not improbable? Ah! *Eubulus*, *Eubulus*, remove theſe Doubts if you can; remove them, and by ſo doing you'll make me eaſy in this World, and ſave me from Miſery in another, if any ſuch there be.

Eub. Alas, *Phygellus*! Here, after all I have ſaid to ſtifle your Infidelity, you have drawn together freſh Recruits of Irreligion, tho' I think to very little Purpoſe. Becauſe by the Laws of Nature, every Thing that has any ſort of Life, from that of Reaſon down to that of Vegetation, is ſubject to Mortality; therefore you conclude, that Death puts a Period to the Life of every living Creature alike. I deny the Conſequence, becauſe it has no Connexion with the Antecedent whence it's drawn; and muſt therefore paſs for a

mere

mere Aſſertion, and no more. We ſee, ſay you, Animals and Vegetables dye daily, and Men too, to whom, together with theſe inferior Sorts of Life, that of Reaſon likewiſe doth belong; therefore ſay you, every ſort of Life is the Prey of Death alike. The Concluſion is unfair, becauſe it contains more than the Propoſition from which it is drawn. The Propoſition is this, Death preys upon every ſort of Life, by putting an End to it; therefore, ſay you, it preys alike upon the Life of every living Creature. Your Antecedent implies no more, but that it puts an end to every Sort of Life; whereas your Inference from it avers, that it preys upon them all alike. Now to prey upon three Sorts of Life does not imply ſo much as to prey upon them all alike. To make your Argument agree with the Laws of Logick, you muſt either ſtrike off theſe Words *all alike* from your Concluſion, or add them to your Antecedent, and when that is done you'll ſee it either way abſurd. Add them to your Antecedent, and your Argument is this, Death preys upon three Sorts of Life all alike; therefore it preys upon them all alike. Strike them out of your Conſequence and Antecedent too, then it amounts to this, Death puts an End to three different Sorts of Life; therefore it puts an End to three different Sorts of Life. And is not this Logick with a Witneſs? Fine Logick indeed.

Phyg. I ſee my Argument a mere Tautology; but ſince you own that Death puts an End to the Life of Three different Living Creatures, Why do you ſuppoſe that it does not put an End to them all alike.

Eub. E'en becauſe the Life of each of them is different from one another. Were there no Diverſity of Life among them; then, no doubt, they would all die alike; but then too they would not be different ſorts of living Creatures, but one and the ſame ſort; ſince it is the Diverſity of Life which makes the Diverſity of living Creatures. Suppoſe, therefore, that the Plant dies, never to ſhoot nor revive again; it is becauſe its Life of Vegetation (which conſiſts in the Circulation of its Sap) is utterly extinguiſhable by the Exhauſtion of that Sap, or the Stop of its Circulation. Suppoſe again, that the Animal alſo dies, never to recover its loſt Life; it is becauſe its ſenſitive Life, which depends upon the Circulation of its Blood, is alſo extinguiſhable by the Exhauſtion of that Blood, or the utter ceaſing of the Circulation thereof. Suppoſe yet once more, that theſe two ſorts of Life are by the like Means extinguiſh'd in Man, as they are in Beaſts and Vegetables; it will not thereupon follow, that his rational Life, which neither conſiſts in, nor depends upon the Circulation of his Blood, or any other of the Juices of his Body, but in and upon the Energy of an active, immortal, and immaterial Mind; is therefore extinguiſh'd, with the other two inferior ſorts of Life belonging to him; unleſs it could be proved that the Exerciſe of his Reaſon is the Reſult of the Motion of his Blood and Spirits, in and thro' the Mechaniſm of his Body; which is ſo far from being a ſuppoſable Caſe, that I think I have given you demonſtrative Evidence to the contrary.

Phyg. I think you have; but muſt ſay, after all your Demonſtrations of this kind, that if the

Life of Reaſon is unextinguiſhable, then ſo muſt that of Beaſts be; which are ſo far from being Machines, that they can move themſelves, and diſcover in their Conduct various Symptoms of Thought and Memory; nay, even of Fondneſs and Averſion, Gratitude and Revenge, which certainly Machines cannot do.

Eub. Yet they never ſhew the leaſt Symptom of Religion, no, not ſo much as the ſmalleſt Regard to a future State; but on the contrary, all their Actions, and all their Paſſions, begin at what is preſent, continue in that Purſuit, and terminate in the ſame; and therefore whatever Powers they are endow'd with, tho' even ſuch as ſurmount the Strength of Mechaniſm, yet we have no Cauſe to conclude that they ſhall ſubſiſt in a future State; of which, by all we can obſerve about them, they are as inſenſible as Trees, or other Creatures, which have no manner of Life in them. This *Solomon* inſinuates thus, *Who knoweth the Spirit of a Man that goeth upward, and the Spirit of a Beaſt that goeth downward to the Earth?* Pointing thereby at the Immortality of the one, and Mortality of the other; and as we cannot, ſo neither need we know more about them.

Phyg. Tho' neither from the utter Extinction of the Life of Animals or Vegetables, the like Extinction of the Life of rational Creatures can with any Colour of Reaſon be inferr'd; yet ſince it's plain that Providence ſeems only concern'd in the Preſervation of the ſeveral Species of living Creatures, while it permits their Individuals to periſh out of ſight; Why ſhould we ſuppoſe that more than the Species of Mankind is preſerv'd by Providence, ſince the Individuals of

that Species die away, as do thoſe of Plants and Animals?

Eub. If no more appear'd in the Nature of the one ſort of Individuals, than is to be ſeen in the others, I ſhould not know how to anſwer this Objection; but rather be ready to conclude, that Providence is only intereſted in the Preſervation of the Species of every kind of living Creatures, while their Individuals were left to periſh without Diſtinction; but ſince it is apparent that Plants have no Proſpect of another Life, and that mere Animals diſcover as few Symptoms of their having any ſuch Proſpect; while withal, it is no leſs evident, that Men have ſuch a Proſpect, reaſon much about it, and are not a little over-aw'd by it; therefore I conclude, that the Ends of Providence may be ſerv'd by preſerving only the Species of living Creatures, which have no Properties in them pointing towards another World; but cannot be ſo ſerv'd without preſerving the Individuals of that Species, which have Properties in them pointing to them another World; the Proſpect whereof overawes them much, and without which, Providence is ſo far from accompliſhing the Intention it points at in them, that on the contrary it thwarts it entirely; I had almoſt ſaid cruelly, in making them Creatures looking for a Future State, and leaving them to periſh in this, as if they had never ſo much as dreamed of another, nor felt any Religious Emotions riſing out of the Thoughts of it: But of this more hereafter.

Phyg. I find Conviction creeping in upon me apace. Pray proceed with your Anſwers to ſuch of my laſt Objections as you have not yet touch'd.

Eub.

Eub. Your next Objection is taken from the Parity that appears between the gradual Riſe, Growth, and Declination of the Life of Men, and that of Plants or Animals. This is but a Corollary drawn from your two former Objections: To which, therefore, I anſwer, *Firſt*, That you being now convinced that theſe Objections were groundleſs, ſo muſt this be, which is but a Conſequence drawn from them. And again, That tho' both the ſenſitive and vegetative Life of Man muſt keep Pace with the like Lives in other Vegetables and Animals; becauſe with reſpect of theſe ſorts of Life, he is every way the ſame with them; yet it does not follow, that his rational Life keeps Pace with that of Senſe and Vegetation, becauſe it proceeds from and depends upon a Principle of Life ſuperior to and quite different from that of Senſe and Vegetation. And in the *Third Place*, I affirm, That the Riſe and Declination of the rational Life of Man, ſeemingly keeping Pace with that of the Riſe and Declination of his ſenſitive and vegetative Life, is an Appearance, and no more. Were it real, then it would follow, that the Principle of his ſenſitive and vegetative Life is the very ſame with that of his rational Life, which is a Suppoſition I have refuted more ways than one. The Principle of the Life of Reaſon acting in an human Body, muſt by the Laws of Nature appear to others weak or ſtrong, accordingly as the vegetative or ſenſitive Powers of the Body in which it acts are infirm or vigorous; becauſe the rational Life of one Man cannot diſplay it ſelf to another, but by the Organs of that Body in which it acts.

Phyg. But if an old and honeſt Man tells me, that his thinking Powers decay with Age; and if you and I, who are long ago paſt the Bloom of Life,

Life, feel it is ſo; Why ſhould we conclude, both in Oppoſition to our own Sentiments, and to the Sentiments of other honeſt People, that our rational Powers don't riſe, decline, and die gradually, as do our ſenſitive Powers.

Eub. E'en becauſe, (1.) We are ſo early and ſo conſtantly inur'd in this our embodied State, to think and talk of thoſe Things which affect our Senſes, and have a Reference to our bodily Condition, that we are apt to imagine our thinking Powers decay, when only our Application to think of bodily Concerns goes off. St. *Paul*, who was much accuſtom'd to think of other things, and was certainly a ſenſible and honeſt Man, (to ſay no more of him) was of another Mind: He informs us, that tho' his outward Man periſh, yet his inward Man was renew'd Day by Day; becauſe he look'd not at the Things which are ſeen, for theſe are temporal; but the Things which are not ſeen, and are eternal. But, (2.) As the Principle of the Life of Reaſon cannot diſplay it ſelf otherwiſe in its embodied State, but as it is ſome way clogg'd and incumber'd by the Burden of the Body that belongs to it in that State; ſo neither would it be conſonant to the Deſign of Providence, that it ſhould be able to diſplay it ſelf in another manner: For if it could, this would fruſtrate the Deſign of Providence, which has put Man in a State of Probation in this World, in order to his being tried in another, according to his Deſerts. Now if it did appear that the nearer and nearer he approach'd to Death, ſo much the more his rational Life diſplay'd it ſelf to himſelf and others; or that it ſtood at a Stand in his own Eyes or theirs, when his bodily Life was daily declining; then the Ends of Providence, which put him here in a State

State of Probation, in order to his Trial hereafter, could not be ſerv'd by ſuch a Creature; becauſe in ſuch a Caſe, the Life of every Man in this World would be a Demonſtration of another World both to himſelf and others; which would not only render the Buſineſs of this State utterly inſipid, but over and above would be an invincible Enforcement of Virtue, and conſequently terminate in a double Diſappointment of the Deſigns of Providence relating to ſuch a Being as Man, both by forcing him to neglect the innocent Buſineſs of this Life, and enforcing on him the Care about another in ſo urgent a manner, as would render this State not a State of Trial, upon the Foot of the free Choice of Virtue; but a State of Neceſſity, recommending Virtue by irreſiſtible Arguments. Have you any thing to object to this Reply?

Phyg. Not a Syllable; 'tis ſatisfactory throughout, and ſuggeſts an Anſwer to my laſt Objection, taken from the appearing Inequalities of Providence, diſcernible in the promiſcuous Lots of good and bad Men in this Life. For were there a perpetual Diſtinction between Thoſe and Theſe, viſible in a meaſure of Proſperity proportion'd to the Virtue of the one ſide, and of Adverſity proportion'd to the Vices of the other; this would be ſuch a palpable Evidence of a miraculous Providence watching over and interpoſing in the behalf of virtuous People; and alſo of the like Interpoſition of the ſame Providence wounding the Vicious in their various ways of Vice, as would continually reveal the Wrath of God againſt ungodly Men; and by ſo doing, forcibly confirm Thoſe in their virtuous Behaviour, and compel Theſe to forſake Practices liable to perpetual Puniſhment, and chuſe that manner of Life

Life which brought along with it the viſible Bleſſings of Heaven: But ſuch a Compulſion had put a ſpeedy End to our probationary State, by driving all Men into virtuous Practices, without a virtuous Choice.

Eub. Over and above, it would have depriv'd us of this good Argument for a Future State; that ſince it fares no better, but rather worſe with the Virtuous than it doth with the Vicious, with reſpect to their Shares of temporal Emoluments; therefore it is but reaſonable to conclude, that a Reward is reſerv'd for the Righteous in another World, for the good Uſe they make of the few good Things they receive in this; as the Wicked are reſerv'd for the Day of Wrath in that World, for the ill Uſe they make of the many good Things they receive in this. If you have any more Objections, propoſe them.

Phyg. I acquieſce in all your Arguments, and in all your Anſwers, and have no more to add, but this Requeſt, That you'll lay before me briefly the beſt Scheme of Proofs you have for a future State, that I may be the better eſtabliſh'd in the Belief of it, and be excited by that Belief to fit and prepare my ſelf for it.

Eub. I congratulate your Conviction, and ſhall do my utmoſt to anſwer the Deſign of your Requeſt. In order thereto I muſt demonſtrate the Truth of a few Propoſitions. *Prop.* 1. *That there was a Time when there was no ſuch Creature, as a Man on the Face of the Earth.* The Moral Evidence for the Truth of this Propoſition appears, from the concurrent Teſtimonies of all Nations, eſpecially the moſt Polite, whoſe Hiſtories (how-much-ſoever they may differ about the Date of the Origination of Mankind) agree in this, That every Nation under Heaven had a temporary Origine,

gine, and conſequently owed their Exiſtence to ſome creating Cauſe. Now the Queſtion being put, Whether or no Man was created, brings on a Controverſy concerning a Matter of Fact, and that too, of ſo great Antiquity, that it cannot be determined by bare Human Teſtimony, becauſe no Man can be a Witneſs to his own Creation, for that would ſuppoſe him to have been a Witneſs to a Fact, *viz.* that of his own Creation, before he had a Being, for his Being was the Conſequence of that Fact; and this is to ſuppoſe him to have been when he was not. Hence it appears, as the Debate before us is about a Fact, ſo the Belief of it muſt iſſue from ſome other Source than that of Human Teſtimony; even that of the Creator of all Things, and have been derived downwards, either by written Chronicle, or verbal Tradition, or both Ways; otherwiſe, the Memory of Matters of Fact muſt periſh in the Streams of Time, which carry them quickly down into the Ocean of deep and dark Oblivion. But tho' the moſt obvious and eaſy Proof of any recent Fact riſes out of a recourſe to living Witneſſes; and of ancient Facts, from a recourſe to verbal Reports, or the peruſal of written Records, where they are to be had: Yet ſince Libertines, to get rid of the Authority of Revelation, reject that of Moral Evidence in the Caſe of a Religious Argument, which nevertheleſs they are forced to own in the whole Commerce of Civil Life; it may therefore be neceſſary to conſider, by what other Evidence the Truth of the Propoſition now before us may be made out. I think the Truth of it demonſtrable from theſe undeniable Axioms; That the Eternity of any Thing renders it independent upon every Thing. What owes not its Being to another can never be annihi-

annihilated; becauſe, whatever is Eternal had nothing before it to give it a Being; therefore nothing either coeval with it, or of an Exiſtence poſterior to it can take away its Being. Let then the Queſtion be put, Whether or no Human Nature exiſted from Eternity here on Earth. Now if an Infidel affirm it did, then he cannot deny that it is ſelf-exiſtent, and neceſſarily exiſtent; which Suppoſition ſhould be ſet aſide as abſurd, both becauſe it ſtrikes at the Credit of his Hiſtory and general Tradition, and alſo at the Authority of the forementioned unconteſtible Maxims. Should the Sun ſuſpend its Heat, (which we have reaſon to think diminiſh'd Day by Day;) ſhould either the Moon or It, or any of the remoter Stars (which according to the Opinion of the moſt accurate Philoſophers, revolve about their Axles and Orbits, by the direction of his Hand who made and moves them) approach much nearer us, or our Earth to them, than is now the Caſe on either Side; it's more than probable, that this World wou'd be at once ſo ſcorched with Heat, and overflow'd with Tides, as wou'd quickly put a Period to the Life of every living Creature in it, by the dreadful Devaſtations of a double Deluge of Fire and Water.

Phyg. Suppoſing all this true upon Philoſophical Principles, yet if there is no likelihood that any of the foreſaid Cauſes ſhall ever be permitted by Providence to produce that terrible Effect; then it is never like to come to paſs; and ſo the Suppoſitions are chimerical, amounting only to imaginable Cauſes of an imaginary Wreck of Worlds.

Eub. Let them be as chimerical as you pleaſe, yet while you ſuppoſe them philoſophical, you muſt own, that from the Principles of Philoſophy

phy Human Nature appears in the Complex a Dependant, and therefore in no Senſe an Eternal or neceſſarily Exiſtent Being, which is all I plead for. But further yet, *Phygellus*, here I muſt inform you, that now my Argument turns not upon what is morally impoſſible, that is, very unlike to happen: For what is thus impoſſible in a popular way of ſpeaking is ſtill phyſically poſſible, and conſiſtent with the Nature of Things, tho' it come to paſs. That ſome Hundreds of Millions of People, many Thouſands of whom dye in leſs than the Space of one Day, may periſh all together in the twinkling of an Eye, is a poſſible Chance, however improbable it may appear; and ſtill poſſible it muſt be, while the Exiſtence of none of them this Moment implies the Continuation of that Exiſtence the next Moment; which it never can imply, unleſs they were (what none of them ever can be) neceſſarily or ſelf-exiſtent Beings. Since then, various Cauſes are conceiveable, ſuch as unnatural and univerſal Wars, prodigious Plagues, Famines, and Inundations here below, or Concuſſions from circumambient Globes above, by which all Mankind may be deſtroy'd, and the whole World they live in broke to Pieces; it is therefore very abſurd to imagine, Creatures of ſo periſhable a Conſtitution, and obnoxious to ſo many deſtructive Caſualties, any other way immortal, than by the free Donation of the Author of their Life, and the continual Protection of his kind Providence. To conclude this Point, certainly that is poſſible to be done, of which we can form a diſtinct Idea how it may be done; for the conceiveableneſs of the Poſſibility of a Thing is enough to ſet aſide the bare Suppoſition of the Impoſſibility of that Thing. Yet ſuch a Suppoſition

ſition is all a Libertine has for the Support of this irrational Conceit, That by the eternal Law of Fate, the entire Courſe of Nature has ever been, and ever ſhall continue in the ſame uniform Circulation of neceſſary Cauſes and Effects. As to this other atheiſtical Hypotheſis, That the whole Fabrick of Nature was the temporary Reſult of a caſual Combination of uncreated and incogitant Atoms, which ſtray'd about in an immenſe World; till at laſt, without Concert with one another, or the Guidance of a wiſe and powerful Cauſe, they wander'd themſelves into a regular and well compacted World; it is every way ſo diſſonant to Reaſon and common Senſe, that to maintain it, ſeems to differ very little either from witleſs Banter, or bidding defiance to all the Rules of Reaſon and good Senſe. As will appear from a brief Proof of this Second Propoſition, *That as Human Nature had a Beginning*, (a Truth even ſuppoſed in that abſurd Hypotheſis) *ſo of Neceſſity the Author of its Being muſt have exerted an amazing Power, with a no leſs wonderful Wiſdom in the Production of it.* It cou'd not be the Cauſe of its own Being, for that implies that it was, and was not, at the ſame time; exiſting as a Cauſe, when it had no Exiſtence as an Effect; that is to ſay, exiſting when it did not exiſt. As therefore Man could not be the Author of his own Being, ſo neither cou'd he be the Effect of Chance; becauſe a Being (ſuch as he is) conſcious of having ſome meaſure of Knowledge, Power, Wiſdom, and Diſcretion, cou'd no more be produced by a Cauſe deſtitute of Thought and diſcerning Faculties; than Strength can proceed from Weakneſs, Knowledge from Ignorance, Wiſdom from Folly; or in one word, than ſomething can ariſe out of nothing, without any Cauſe whatſoever.

whatſoever; for it is as eaſy to conceive, that the ſame thing may both be and not be at the ſame time, or may ſpring from nothing, without an efficient Cauſe; as it is to conceive, that a thoughtleſs Thing ſhould produce a thinking one.

My *Third Propoſition* is this, *That the Author of Human Nature is the God of Mankind.* This is plain, becauſe they owe their Exiſtence to him, and depend entirely on him: For as we have no other Notion of the God of any Creature, ſo we need none elſe but this, That he is the Author of its Being, on whom it entirely does depend. Now as the God of Mankind is both wiſe and powerful, (as appears from the foregoing Propoſition) ſo we are certain that he is good and bountiful; good, in endowing us with a Variety of Powers capable of Pleaſure; bountiful, in beſtowing upon us a Variety of Objects, to gratify thoſe Powers with the good Things he gives us to enjoy. Now ſince he hath planted in us a natural Deſire of what is delightful, and afforded us Means both to purſue and obtain it; and has made Pleaſure the natural Reſult of Succeſs in ſuch Purſuits, we may therefore warrantably conclude from this Conduct of his Providence towards us, that he is a Being no leſs beneficent by Nature, than bountiful in his Diſpoſals.

Propoſition 4th, *That the Author of our Being deſign'd that we ſhould live in a friendly Fellowſhip with one another.* For notwithſtanding the Benignity of his Conduct towards us, ſuch, after all, are the Neceſſities of our Nature, and the Circumſtances of our Condition in the World, that we muſt either mutually perform many Offices of Friendſhip and Good-will, or come ſhort

of what is neceſſary towards our Subſiſtence, not to name the numerous Comforts of Life. We are Creatures ſo framed for Society, that we cannot bear the Languor of a State of abſolute Solitude; or if we could, yet certainly in that State, we cannot compaſs a competent Meaſure of the Conveniencies and Recreations we ſtand in need of, in order to keep our Faculties from falling into Stupidity, or from ſinking into Sullenneſs, and ſtagnating in that State. Let me ſuppoſe, for once, the Truth of the *Moſaick* Hiſtory; for thence it is apparent, that neither the Comforts of Innocence, nor Pleaſures of Paradiſe, were ſufficient to make the Firſt Man happy, without an Help-Meet for him, both in the reciprocal Communication of their Sentiments, and to propagate their Species, and thereby extend the Pleaſures of Society; for the Solitude of an individual Life, tho' ſpent in Paradiſe, and accompanied with Innocence, cannot quite appeaſe the Cravings of a ſociable Creature, which is by Nature prone to impart its Thoughts, and receive the like endearing Returns of familiar Converſation from others. Hence it appears, that a Propenſion to Society is the prime, nay, indeed, the indelible Inſtinct of Human Nature. *Phygellus*, Have you any thing to object againſt the Truth of theſe four Propoſitions?

Phyg. Not at all; but I am impatient to know how you'll apply them, and what you intend to infer from them.

Eub. Upon my Application of them to the Purpoſe now in hand, I hope to make you perceive, that I can fairly deduce more than a probable Proof of a Future State. For from the Firſt, it is evident, that there was a Time, when there was not

not ſo much as one Man upon the Face of the Earth. From the *Second*, That as therefore Human Nature had a Beginning, ſo of Neceſſity the Author of its Exiſtence muſt be endued with Power and Wiſdom. From the Third, That he is the God of Mankind who gave to Men their Exiſtence, an Eternal Being not only wiſe and powerful, but alſo exceeding bountiful and gracious. From the Fourth, That notwithſtanding he hath made Men of ſuch a Nature, that be their Circumſtances ever ſo agreeable in other Reſpects, yet they cannot be happy, nay, nor ſo much as eaſy in a State of utter Solitude: And therefore upon the whole it inevitably follows, that there is a World to come, in which all Men ſhall reap as they ſow in this; the Righteous a Reward ſuitable to their Social Integrity, the Unjuſt a Recompence proportion'd to their Oppreſſive, Deceitful, Ill-natured, and Unſociable Deportment. For did all Men every where, and at all times faithfully diſcharge their Social Obligations in their various Neighbourhoods, doing whatever good they ought to do to one another, and carefully avoiding all manner of Injuries; then in reaſon they cou'd crave, nor expect no more from the Bounty of the Author of their Being, but either an endleſs Continuation of thoſe Bleſſings of a juſt and kind Society, together with an Exemption from Death, and all other diſaſtrous Accidents: Or, ſuppoſing this Felicity ſhould be impaired or come to a Period, That then in ſuch a Caſe it ſhould either be ſpeedily made up to them with Intereſt, to repay their little contingent Loſſes; or another State of Happineſs no leſs deſirable ſhould ſucceed to it. And certainly, no leſs than one of theſe two is to be

looked for at the Hands of the benign Author of our Being. It is abſurd therefore to ſuppoſe, that we dye in this World without entring into another, and that we are entirely interr'd, ſo as never to get out of the dark Priſon of the Grave. Becauſe this Suppoſition implies, that the Author of our Being, whom we know to be good, from the good Things he gives us in great Abundance, is nevertheleſs void of Goodneſs, if he has deſtin'd all Men, and chiefly the moſt Virtuous, to painful Diſappointments; by giving them ſuch Faculties as induce them to believe that he approves of the Works of Righteouſneſs, and therefore will reward them; and yet not affording them any Recompence proportionable to their rational Expectations, ariſing from their dutiful Regard to the Dictates of thoſe Faculties wherewith he has endow'd them. Is not this in Effect to deny that God is good, tho' he gives us good Things without Number? Is it not an Imagination alike oppoſed to what we feel at preſent from the Appointments of Providence, and have Reaſon, by Virtue of that Perception, hereafter to expect? Can we doubt of his Beneficence by whoſe Bounty we ſubſiſt? Or diſpute a Liberality, the free Donations whereof are diffuſed throughout the World? Is there any Senſe in ſuppoſing, that the Author of our Being is not able to prevent the Abolition of it? Cannot he, in whom we live, and move, and have our Being, either preſerve us from periſhing by any Accident, or repair the Ruins of our Conſtitution, after it hath been craz'd and daſh'd aſunder by the Shocks of Sin and Death?

Phyg. Undoubtedly he can; and I confeſs you have made it more than probable that he will. If you have any thing to add further in the Confirmation of this moſt important Truth, Pray let me hear it.

Eub. Review then with me my Argument. He muſt be beneficent who beſtows upon us innumerable Benefits; but at the ſame time is not beneficent, if by the Frame of our Nature we have an unavoidable Averſion to periſh join'd to an utter Inability to preſerve our Being. Is not this to ſuppoſe him one who acts by Principles as repugnant to each other as Light is to Darkneſs, or Loving-Kindneſs to a Savage Severity? Is it not to think him not bountiful, tho' we daily feel his Bounty? Nay, Does it not amount to a downright Contradiction, in ſuppoſing him both beneficent and not beneficent?

Phyg. I acknowledge the Force of this Argument too great to be withſtood, by any Man of impartial Sentiments.

Eub. You'll feel it yet more forcible, when you reflect on this Truth already proved, *viz.* That God hath made us ſociable Creatures, and put us in Circumſtances which call upon us to contribute towards one anothers Welfare. But nevertheleſs, the generality of People, through the Promptings of their ill-govern'd and injurious Paſſions, inſtead of ſtudying to promote one another's Welfare, by the Practice of amicable Virtues, indulge themſelves either in the Arts of ſecret Fraud or open Depredation, to their mutual Damage and Diſquiet. And the worſt on't is, that even the Righteous who refrain from Guile, and habitually do as they would be done by, are often for that very Reaſon cozen'd, and other-

otherways abuſed by deceitful Sycophants and oppreſſive Plunderers. Certainly, he who made Man of a ſociable Make, muſt approve of them who perform that Part for which he created them, and endowed them with a Capacity fitted for the Friendly Communications of Fellowſhip. And if he approves their Manners, is it imaginable that he will have no regard to the Loſſes they ſuſtain, in doing that which he both approves of, and deſign'd they ſhould do, as an indiſpenſile Duty. Were he not to compenſate the Diſadvantages they undergo, in doing what by the Dictates of their Reaſon, he hath directed them to do, he would contradict himſelf, in directing all Men to aſſiſt one another for their mutual Benefit; and yet permitting thoſe who are moſt obſervant of the Laws of Juſtice and Humanity, to be upon that very ſcore Loſers in this Life, and no Gainers by it in the next. We are therefore juſt as certain, that a Recompence for living virtuouſly, (particularly in doing as we would be done by) ſince it is not received, but rather the Reverſe of it in this World, ſhall be conferr'd in another; as we are that God is good, and conſequently cannot appoint a Law to any of his Creatures, the Obſervation whereof ſhall be detrimental to them; for that in effect would be to contradict himſelf, in binding them over by the Dictates of their Reaſon, to the Obligations of a ſociable Life; and yet leaving them through the whole Courſe of his Providence, to incur a great many Hardſhips, for performing theſe Obligations in this World, without rewarding them in another. Upon the whole, then, we may infer, That it is irrational to think that Men are ſwept away by the Stroke of Death from this Stage

Stage of Life, into a State of perpetual Oblivion; for hence one of these two Absurdities must inevitably follow; either, That the Author of our Being has put the Affairs of Mankind on such a Foot, that they who do his Will with the greatest Diligence, shall reap the least Advantage from his Protection; which is a flat Contradiction to his Goodness: Or, that his Power is so limited, that he can neither reward nor punish Men according to their Works, which is no less Contradiction to the irresistible Might of his creating Energy; since he who can create, can certainly reward and punish his Creatures according to their Deserts. Thus from the Light of Reason it is evident, that there is a World to come; and if thereunto we add the Authority of Revelation, which has brought Life and Immortality to light, and ascertain'd us of a Future Judgment, we shall find it no hard Matter to yield our Assent to this Truth, *Verily there is a Reward for the Righteous, verily there is a God who judgeth upon Earth.* A Truth no less comfortable to virtuous Men, than it must needs be terrible to doubtful and dissolute Libertines. *Phygellus*, If you are convinced of it by my Arguments, good and well it is; if not, you must find somebody else to dispute you out of your Sceptical State; for I have done my best towards the effecting it.

Phyg. You have fully perswaded me into the Belief of the Principles of Natural Religion; I wish you may have the like Success with me, if ever we come to discourse of those of Reveal'd Religion. This must be deferr'd, because I am oblig'd to go to the Country for some Months. When I come back, you are like to have the

Trou-

Trouble of more Viſits from me. So wiſhing us an happy Meeting again, and many of them, I bid you heartily farewel.

Eub. I wiſh you a good Journey, and a ſafe Return to Town; and ſhall ever remain your faithful Friend, ready to do you the beſt Services I can.

F I N I S.

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